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ABSTRACT

HUMANLIFE AND THE ADVENT OF PHILOSOPHY:
A THEORY OF PHILOSOPHICAL AUTOBIOGRAPHY

By
David Frank Hoinski
December 2013

Dissertation supervised by Dr. Ronald Polansky
This dissertation presents a theory of philosophical autobiography. It includes
studies of the autobiographical writings of Plato, Augustine, Descartes, Vico, and
Nietzsche. I argue that philosophers write autobiographies in order to present and give an
account of philosophical first principles. I also argue that Plato invented philosophical
autobiography.
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Humanlife and the Advent of Philosophy:
A Theory of Philosophical Autobiography
τῶν ἀρχῶν δ’ αἳ µὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωροῦνται, αἳ δ’ αἰσθήσει, αἳ δ’ ἐθισµῷ τινί, καὶ ἄλλαι δ’
ἄλλως. µετιέναι δὲ πειρατέον ἑκάστας ᾗ πεφύκασιν, καὶ σπουδαστέον ὅπως διορισθῶσι
καλῶς· µεγάλην γὰρ ἔχουσι ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὰ ἑπόµενα. δοκεῖ γὰρ πλεῖον ἢ ἥµισυ τοῦ παντὸς
εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή, καὶ πολλὰ συµφανῆ γίνεσθαι δι’ αὐτῆς τῶν ζητουµένων.—Aristotle
Of starting points (or principles), some are grasped by induction, some by perception, some by a
sort of habituation and others in other ways: one must try to get hold of each sort in the
appropriate way, and take care that they are well marked out, since they have great importance in
relation to what comes later. For the starting point of something seems to be more than half of the
whole, and through it many of the things being looked for become evident.
In my beginning is my end.—T. S. Eliot

Chapter 1
Introduction: A Theory of Philosophical Autobiography
In this subject as in others the best method of investigation is to study things in the process of
development from the beginning (Εἰ δή τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ πράγµατα φυόµενα βλέψειεν, ὥσπερ ἐν
τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ἐν τούτοις κάλλιστ’ ἂν οὕτω θεωρήσειεν).—Aristotle, Politics, 1252a24-26.1

1. Intimacy, aversion, ambivalence.— There is a forgotten intimacy between philosophy
and autobiography. Yet today among philosophers we are witnessing a burgeoning
awareness of the importance of the relations between these two phenomena, and from this
awareness, the emergence of a new area of studies concerning the autobiographical
dimension of philosophical practice and life. What makes this development so intriguing
and exciting is that it offers us a way to think anew about philosophy itself, about what it
is, what it can do, and what it is supposed to be, especially in light of the concepts of self,
life, and writing that are central to autobiography. The present work aims to foster this
incipient philosophical awareness of the intimacy between autobiography and philosophy
by providing a theory of philosophical autobiography rooted in the study of some of the
most significant and influential philosophical autobiographies in the history of
1

Rackham translation in the Loeb Classical Library edition of Aristotle’s Politics (Harvard,
1944).

1

philosophy, including those of Augustine, Descartes, Vico, Rousseau, Mill, Nietzsche,
and (perhaps surprisingly) Plato.2 A clear and coherent theory of philosophical
autobiography that aims at a kind of comprehensiveness is greatly to be desired under
present circumstances, where an increasingly vital interest in the topic struggles to put
itself into words, seeks to give itself theoretical shape and articulation. In trying to
understand the philosophical significance of the phenomenon, a theory of philosophical
autobiography is useful because it gives us a companion to think with and against. The
theory I develop emphasizes the connection between philosophical autobiography and
philosophical principles, while it also illustrates some of the ways that philosophers have
employed autobiography in order to flesh out a conception of philosophy not as simply an
academic specialization or profession, but as a βίος or way of humanlife.3
The intimacy between philosophy and autobiography is not, however,
unproblematic. Stanley Cavell (1994, p. 3) has written of philosophy’s “ambivalence
toward the autobiographical,” and philosophy might even be seen to harbor a
longstanding and profound aversion to autobiography and its subject matter, the life of
some particular human being. This aversion is nicely illustrated by a passage from the
beginning of Porphyry’s biography of Plotinus:
Plotinus, the philosopher of our times, seemed ashamed of being
embodied. As a result of this state of mind he could never bear to talk
about his people or his parents or his native country. And he objected so
strongly to sitting for a painter or sculptor that he said to Amelius, who
was urging him to allow a portrait of himself to be made, “Why really, is it
not enough to have to carry the image in which nature has encased us,
2

In the present work I present only my studies of Plato’s autobiographical writings, Augustine’s
Confessions, Descartes Discourse, Vico’s Life, and Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo. While this
dissertation is also based on studies of Rousseau’s Confessions (and his other autobiographical
writings) and of Mill’s Autobiography, it was not possible for me to get these studies ready for
presentation at this early date.
3
On the neologism “humanlife,” please see below.
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without your requesting me to agree to leave behind me a longer-lasting
image of the image, as if it was something genuinely worth looking at?” In
view of his denial and refusal for this reason to sit, Amelius, who had a
friend, Carterius, the best painter of the time, brought him in to attend the
meetings of the school—they were open to anyone who wished to come,
and accustomed him by progressive study to derive increasingly striking
mental pictures from what he saw. Then Carterius drew a likeness of the
impression which remained in his memory. Amelius helped him to
improve his sketch to a closer resemblance, and so the talent of Carterius
gave us an excellent portrait of Plotinus without his knowledge.4
This passage might readily be taken as illustrating philosophy’s antipathy to embodiment
rather than to autobiography, yet a couple of things should be noted. First of all, although
I am not going to say a lot about embodiment in the present work, it is necessary to admit
that embodiment is one of the conditions of the possibility of both autobiography and
philosophy. Having a body may be the true cause neither of philosophy nor of
autobiography, but it is almost certainly a necessary condition of them both (unless the
gods, for example, write autobiographies and philosophize). Second, it is worth attending
to Porphyry’s characterization of Plotinus as disliking to talk about his background, “his
people or his parents or his native country.” Since the subject matter of autobiography is
life or specifically humanlife, and since humanlife is conceptually and therefore
essentially inextricable from having a background, a country, a people, parents, and so
forth, it is not such a stretch to interpret Plotinus’ intolerance for discussion of this kind
as a severe censure on autobiography. Indeed Plotinus seems to have despised the very
subject matter of autobiography, which is humanlife and, in particular, the humanlife of a
single individual such as Plotinus, “the philosopher of our times.”

4

Porphyry, On the Life of Plotinus and the Order of His Books, in the Loeb Classical Library,
Plotinus, vol. I, Porphyry on Plotinus and Ennead I, with an English translation by A. H.
Armstrong (Harvard, 1966, revised 1989), pp. 2-5.
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Here, however, it is also important to note that Porphyry and Amelius represent
the opposite pole from their master. After all, we only know of Plotinus’ disdain for his
own particularity due to the fact that Porphyry wrote his biography. Amelius, meanwhile,
went against his master’s express wishes, and with the help of the painter Carterius,
surreptitiously produced a portrait of him. Both Caterius’ portrait and Porphyry’s Life of
Plotinus (ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΠΛΩΤΙΝΟΥ ΒΙΟΥ) serve to memorialize certain aspects of
Plotinus’ particularity that will have remained long after the master himself is dead and
gone. Thus what Plotinus resisted, his pupils cultivated. Philosophy’s ambivalence to the
autobiographical is thus exemplified by this trio. Nor are Porphyry and Amelius the most
striking representatives of the autobiographical spirit in the history of philosophy.
2. A version of the aversion.— Why does philosophy have a difficult relationship with
the autobiographical, the biographical, and, in general, with particular individuals and
lives? The main problem seems to be this, that autobiography concerns the lives of
particular individuals, whereas philosophy is interested in universals, for example, in the
question “what is a human being as such?” (τί…ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, Theaetetus 174b4), and
so on. Reflecting this conception of philosophy, Georges Bataille once wrote that “there
cannot be any philosophy of the individual and the exercise of thought cannot have any
other outcome than the negation of individual perspectives.”5 One might beg to differ, but
on this version of affairs, philosophy’s conception of self-knowledge has little or nothing
to do with knowledge of oneself as a particular individual, a historically-situated being
who has a country, parents, and so forth. On the contrary, Bataille’s claim is that

5

Georges Bataille, Theory of Religion, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Zone Books, 1992), p.
13.
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philosophy and the exercise of thought tend to destroy “individual perspectives”
altogether.
The philosophical tendency to abolish individual perspectives has at times been
given more elaborate expression. Philosophy, it has been argued, does not concern itself
with the character and inclinations of particular individuals, their “peculiarities, passions,
and weaknesses,” as Hegel rather forcefully puts it in the following passage from his
(1830) Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences:
The knowledge of mind (Die Erkenntnis des Geistes) is the most concrete,
hence the highest and hardest. Know yourself (Erkenne dich selbst), this
absolute commandment (Gebot)…does not mean mere self-knowledge
(Selbsterkenntnis) about the particular capacities, character, inclinations
and weaknesses of the individual (des Individuums), but rather it means
the knowledge of the truth about a human being as such, the truth in and
for itself, or knowledge of mind (Geist) as the essence of a human being.
Just as little does the philosophy of mind have to do with what passes for
knowing about people (Menschenkenntnis), which endeavors to search out
the peculiarites, passions, and weaknesses of other people, as well as
probing the so-called intricacies of the human heart. Knowing about
people presupposes knowledge of the universal (Erkenntnis des
Allgemeinen), hence knowledge of the human being as such and hence
essentially knowledge of mind. But what’s called knowing about people
busies itself with accidental, insignificant, and untrue features (Existenzen)
of mental life, and it doesn’t press on to what is substantial, to the mind
itself.6
Hegel argues that we know ourselves when we know ourselves as mind (Geist), and also
that philosophy is entirely indifferent and even disdainful of the human desire to “know
about people” in the way Hegel describes. Indeed Hegel implies that there is something
vulgar and disreputable about this desire when viewed from a properly philosophical
standpoint. Since, moreover, self-knowledge as he conceives it is in principle open to,

6

My, rather loose, translation, but the italics belong to Hegel. See Hegel, Werke, vol. 10
(Suhrkamp, 1986), §377. Compare William Wallace’s translation of this section in Hegel’s
Philosophy of Mind (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971).
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and the same for, all human beings, it has nothing to do with the differences between
particular individuals and individual lives.
Not only is it claimed that philosophical thought has nothing to do with particular
individuals and their lives, but sometimes it is even maintained that reference to personal
experience may have a pernicious effect in philosophical contexts. “Arguments from
one’s own privileged experience,” writes Deleuze, “are bad and reactionary arguments.”7
Perhaps this was not one of Deleuze’s finer moments, but it is a telling indication of a
strain in philosophy that views the autobiographical as retrograde and inimical to
universal principles, not only in the sphere of theory but also in that of politics and ethics.
Finally, if philosophy is only about arguments and articulating the correct
position, the lives and characteristics of particular individuals might seem irrelevant to
this enterprise. As a contemporary philosopher once put it, “the philosopher’s life belongs
to a different logical category from his teachings. A thoroughly immoral man might
propound a correct moral theory, and it would be correct nonetheless.”8 Apparently one
may relish certain texts while relinquishing contact with their authors, and there is hope
that we may obtain the correct theory even from monsters.
3. Plato, Nietzsche, and philosophy’s autobiographical affinities.— Yet since the time
when Plato decided to present his philosophy in the form of written dialogues, philosophy
has also recognized that character, time, and place are among the indispensable
conditions of philosophical activity. Plato, in fact, always depicts philosophy in the
context of conversations between particular individuals, and he never assumes the
(im)posture of the treatise that affects an impossible objectivity that is really only a
7
8

Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, trans. Martin Joughin (Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 12.
Peter Caws, Science and the Theory of Value (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 5.
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pseudo-objectivity. As suggested by certain writings on philosophical autobiography, an
objective discourse, if it fails to take the subjective element into account, is not truly
objective.9 It follows that what Hegel, for example, views as a defect in Plato’s manner of
presenting philosophy is actually one of its greatest strengths, which is that it takes the
relation between philosophy and particular individuals into account.10
At the same time, Plato can appear as Janus-faced as anyone with regard to the
role of particular individuals in philosophy. For, apparently at odds with his evident
concern for particular persons, Plato at one point has Socrates characterize the
philosopher as someone who does not even know his own neighbor, and also as one who
is only interested in such questions as “what is a human being?” (τί…ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος,
Theaetetus 174b4), “what is kingship?” and so forth. Plato’s ambivalence toward the
autobiographical is nowhere more poignantly illustrated than in the Phaedo. Here, in the
same dialogue, Plato has Socrates tell an autobiographical story while yet advising his
interlocutors (and Plato’s readers) to “give little thought to Socrates and much more to
the truth” (σµικρὸν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας πολὺ µᾶλλον, 91c12).11 The proximity of aversion and affinity to the autobiographical in the Phaedo itself,
as well as in Plato’s work as a whole, suggests a certain persistent ambivalence toward
autobiography within philosophy.
It was really Nietzsche who most consistently and intelligently argued for the
affinity between philosophy and autobiography, that is, even though he believed that

9

I have in mind Davis (1999) and Yancy (2002). For full references, see note below and the
Bibliography.
10
See Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Plato and the Platonists, trans. E. S.
Haldane and Frances H. Simson (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), pp. 14-21.
11
This translation comes from Eva Brann, Peter Kalkavage, and Eric Salem (Newburyport, MA:
Focus Publishing, 1998).

7

most philosophers were unaware of the intimacy between autobiography and philosophy.
In Nietzsche’s writings we may also encounter a strong resistance to the idea of
philosophy as somehow detached from humanlife. In a discarded draft from Ecce Homo,
Nietzsche wrote, “I speak only of what I have lived through, not merely of what I have
thought through; the opposition of thinking and life is lacking in my case” (ich rede nur
von Erlebtem, nicht bloss von ‘Gedachtem’; der Gegensatz von Denken und Leben fehlt
bei mir) (EH Kaufmann trans., p. 340/KSA 14: 484-485). Already in The Birth of
Tragedy, Schopenhauer as Educator, and other early writings unpublished during his
lifetime, Nietzsche returned again and again to the idea of philosophy as something
inseparable from humanlife and also as a unique way of humanlife that needed to be
defended in a world at best ambivalent toward and at worst inimical to philosophy.
Nietzsche also held that life was the true test of a philosophy. In Schopenhauer as
Educator, for example, he contends that the most important measure of a philosophy is
“whether one can live in accordance with it” (ob man nach ihr leben könne) (1997
§8/KSA 1: 417). Nietzsche also conceives of the philosopher as being dedicated first of
all to making his life a kind of artwork, and he views the life of the philosopher as
immensely more significant than any of his particular “works,” such as writings and talks
at conferences. In a note from this period, he puts this sentiment quite nicely. “Das
Product des Philosophen,” he says, “ist sein Leben (zuerst, vor seinen Werken). Das ist
sein Kunstwerk (summer/fall 1873, KSA 7: 712).” Which I translate: “The product of the
philosopher is his life (first, before his work). That is his artwork.” For Nietzsche, the real
proof of what a philosophical teaching is worth is the humanlife of the philosopher whose
teaching it is.

8

Our discussion so far has concerned the subject matter of philosophical
autobiography, which is the humanlife of a particular individual who philosophizes. The
very fact that philosophical autobiographies exist demonstrates that at least some
philosophers have taken their own particular lives into account as part of their
philosophical activity. Having addressed the subject matter of philosophical
autobiography as well as philosophy’s ambivalence toward it, it is now time to
investigate the thing itself.
4.

Historical antecedents of the theory of philosophical autobiography.— An

autobiography is a retrospective story, or history, of a humanlife told by the person who
lived it. Throughout the history of philosophy, many philosophers have written
autobiographies, some of which are among the most widely studied and influential works
in that history. Yet the word “autobiography” is really an anachronism as applied to these
works, at least prior to the nineteenth century, when it first gained common currency in
English and then spread to other European languages.12 Sometimes a new word is

12

The Oxford English Dictionary has the word first appearing in a periodical in 1797, in William
Taylor’s review of Isaac D’Israeli’s Miscellanies. “Self-biography,” Taylor observes, seems to be
an “illegitimate” expression, because “it is not very usual in English to employ hybrid words
partly Saxon and partly Greek: yet autobiography would have seemed pedantic.” Yet Robert
Southey (1813-1843), one of the Lake Poets, used the word in 1809 with approval, and by 1828 it
had received the imprimatur of Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881), when he suggested how greatly we
would value an “Autobiography of Shakspeare (sic).” As Peter Gay notes (1995, p. 103), Carlyle
also refers in Sartor Resartus to “these Autobiographical times of ours.” Upon a recent reading of
Boswell’s Life of Johnson (1791), I had occasion to observe that the word “autobiography” was
not in common usage as recently as the late-eighteenth century. This is shown by a passage where
Boswell states that: “Had Dr. Johnson written his own life, in conformity with the opinion which
he has given, that every man’s life may be best written by himself; had he employed in the
preservation of his own history, the clearness of narration and elegance of language in which he
has embalmed so many eminent persons, the world would probably have had the most perfect
example of biography that was ever exhibited” (my emphasis). Boswell is clearly speaking of
autobiography rather than biography in our sense of these words, so it is reasonable to surmise
that the word “autobiography” was simply unavailable to him. See James Boswell, Life of
Johnson, ed. R. W. Chapman, (Oxford World’s Classics edition, 1980, 1998; first published by
Oxford University Press, 1904) p. 19. It bears saying that “biography” is a much older word than
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required in order for people to recognize the common qualities and being (οὐσία) of
diverse beings, and in this case, the new, autobiographical awareness begins to come on
the scene historically together with the word. As Georg Misch remarks in his grand study
of the history of autobiography, “this term of relatively recent formation…only raises to
the level of clear and distinct consciousness a practice that has continued through the
literature of all ages.”13 Yet if this consciousness is truly “clear and distinct,” it is
nevertheless still in its infancy.
Certainly philosophers have hitherto paid little attention to autobiography,
whether qualified as philosophical or not. Wilhelm Dilthey, Misch’s teacher and fatherin-law, is one notable exception. Dilthey accorded autobiography a prominent role in his
lifelong endeavor to give a philosophical account of the human sciences
(Geisteswissenschaften). In a passage much-quoted in the academic literature on
autobiography, he contends that “in autobiography we encounter the highest and most
instructive form of the understanding of life.”14 In an account reminiscent of Vico’s
philosophy of history, which contends that we only know what we make, Dilthey
attempts to explain why he considers autobiography to be the superlative form for the
understanding of life. This passage is worth quoting at length, especially since Dilthey’s

“autobiography.” Again according to the OED, the word goes back to Byzantine Greek around
500 CE and entered English as early as the late-seventeenth century, for example, in John
Dryden’s 1683 discussion of Plutarch.
13
Georg Misch, A History of Autobiography in Antiquity, translated by E. W. Dickes in
collaboration with the author, 2 vols. (Harvard, 1951), pp. 5-6. As Stephen Menn has noted, the
English translation represents only a part of Misch’s “mammoth Geschichte der Autobiographie,”
published 1949-1969 by G. Schulte-Bulmke, Frankfurt am Main. See Menn (2003, p. 187, note
39).
14
Wilhelm Dilthey, The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences, eds. Rudolf
A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi (Princeton, 2002), p. 221.
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work is not too widely known, and because it addresses a number of central themes
within the theoretical discourse about autobiography:
(In autobiography) a life-course stands as an external phenomenon from
which understanding seeks to discover what produced it within a particular
environment. The person who understands it is the same as the one who
created it. This results in a particular intimacy of understanding. The same
person who seeks the overall coherence of the story of his life has already
produced a life-nexus (Lebenszusammenhang) according to various
perspectives, namely, in the ways he has felt the values of his life,
actualized its purposes, worked out a life plan, either genetically when
looking back or prospectively when looking forward to a highest good.
These various ways of producing a life-nexus must now be articulated as a
life-history…The constituents of this nexus can be found in conceptions of
lived experience (Erlebnis) in which present and past events are held
together by a common meaning. Among these lived experiences, those
that have a special worth, both for themselves and for the overall lifenexus, have been preserved by memory and raised from the endless stream
of forgotten events. A coherence is formed within life itself…(and hence)
the work of historical narrative is already half done by life itself. Lived
experiences provide its constituents; from the infinite plurality of them, a
selection of what is worth narrating has been prepared. And between these
parts a connection is seen, which, to be sure, neither is, nor is intended to
be, a simple copy of the actual passage of a life of so many years, but
which, because understanding is involved, expresses what an individual
life knows about its own connectedness. Here we approach the roots of all
historical comprehension. (Dilthey 2002, pp. 221-222, my emphasis).
For Dilthey autobiography is not only the highest form with respect to the comprehension
of humanlife, it is also at the roots of historical comprehension as such. Autobiography is,
like history, retrospective, and so, as Dilthey proceeds to say, it gives a “second life to the
bloodless shadows of the past” (2002, p. 222). Autobiography is different from other
kinds of history in that the author has a special intimacy with the subject matter of the
writing, because it is her own life in the past. Memory thus plays a central role in the
autobiographical work, especially by highlighting those life-moments that the author
experienced as significant. For Dilthey, as for Augustine and others, memory is not
understood as a merely passive repository for lived experiences (Erlebnisse), but as an

11

active and selective faculty that raises certain lived experiences “from the endless stream
of forgotten events.” Dilthey also makes the perhaps obvious but certainly important
observation that autobiography is not intended to be a “simple copy” of a humanlife, a
topic to which I return below.
Duly noting the important contributions of Dilthey and Misch, Donald Phillip
Verene (1991, p. 55) nevertheless recognizes that “autobiography as a subject of literary,
historical, and philosophical investigation is a twentieth-century phenomenon.”15 This
investigation really only got under way in the latter half of the century, especially in the
1970s with the works of James Olney and Philippe Lejeune.16 In light of the relative
novelty of autobiographical studies, it is unsurprising that the question of the
philosophical significance of philosophical autobiography has barely been broached, at
least not in a sustained, focused, and systematic way.17 Indeed philosophical

15

“Apart from Dilthey’s attention to autobiography as a philosophical idea, and Misch’s attempt
to use this as a guide for a history of autobiography, little has been done to understand
autobiography in philosophical terms. Even the fairly large range of broad-based works of literary
criticism on autobiography offer little systematic thought on the nature of autobiography”
(Verene 1991, p. 73).
16
See the Bibliography for full references to Olney (1972) and Lejeune (1975). Olney, it’s worth
noting, has spoken of how his own work was inspired by Georges Gusdorf’s 1956 essay
“Conditions and Limits of Autobiography.” See Olney’s essay in Olney (1980), and his
translation of Gusdorf’s essay in the same volume.
17
J. Lenore Wright’s monograph, The Philosopher’s “I”: Autobiography and the Search for Self
(SUNY, 2006) has a claim to being one of the first sustained studies of the topic by a single
author, but Shlomit C. Schuster’s The Philosopher’s Autobiography: A Qualitative Study
(Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003) deserves mention as well. (Apparently, Schuster’s book
began as a dissertation written under the direction of Maurice Friedman, the great Martin Buber
scholar who also wrote one of the classic studies of literary modernism and existentialism, to
deny our nothingness, 1967. Friedman contributed a short Foreword to Schuster’s book.) Schuster
stresses both the novelty of her subject matter and the introductory character of her study (see, pp.
1, 16). Her book also has the merit of providing an inclusive, in my opinion too-inclusive, list of
philosophical autobiographies throughout history (pp. 7-10). As Schuster, too, notes, the term
“philosophical autobiography” seems to have been coined by William C. Spengemann in his
monograph The Forms of Autobiography: Episodes in the History of a Literary Genre (Yale,
1980), which includes studies of Augustine’s Confessions and Rousseau’s. In German, however,
the term appears earlier, perhaps originating with Karl Jaspers who titled his own autobiography
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autobiography has scarcely been recognized as a distinctive literary genre, a fact that has
inspired astonishment in at least one scholar.18
It is therefore possible and perhaps wise to draw a distinction between
philosophical autobiography, which is an old phenomenon, and the theoretical (or
philosophical) awareness of philosophical autobiography, which is something relatively
new. A certain qualification, however, is in order. In his Introduction to Poetics, Tzvetan
Todorov observes that “discourse about literature is born with literature itself.”19 The
same could be said with respect to the special case of philosophical autobiography,
because here too discourse about philosophical autobiography is to some extent born
together with the thing itself. In other words, philosophical autobiography (not the word,
Philosophische Autobiographie (published posthumously in its entirety in 1977). Michael Davis’
often brilliant but somewhat strange The Autobiography of Philosophy: Rousseau’s The Reveries
of the Solitary Walker (Rowman & Littlefied, 1999) is for many reasons harder to accept as a
systematic study of philosophical autobiography per se. Davis’ argument depends on
personifying philosophy and then viewing an array of philosophical works as autobiographies of
philosophy thus personified. In other words, Davis inclines to make all philosophy and
philosophical works autobiographies of philosophy itself, which explains his attempts to read
Heidegger’s Being and Time, Nietzsche’s Genealogy, Plato’s Lysis, and the first book of
Aristotle’s Metaphysics as autobiographies. For example, Davis writes that “in
Aristotle…philosophy seems to be autobiographical; whatever it first appears to be about, in the
end it is about itself” (p. 3). In this way, Davis’ argument tends to identify philosophy with
autobiography thus understood (as “about itself”), and a major consequence of this is that he
tends to obscure the idea of autobiography as a distinctive literary genre both within and without
philosophy. Since this footnote has become a short bibliographical essay, one should also
mention Stanley Cavell’s forays into the area of philosophical autobiography, especially in A
Pitch of Philosophy: Autobiographical Exercises (Harvard, 1994) and in his own, recently
published autobiography, Little Did I Know: Excerpts from Memory (Stanford, 2010), a poignant,
moving book. Also worthy of note is George Yancy’s thematic introduction to his edited
collection of short autobiographies by contemporary philosophers, The Philosophical I: Personal
Reflections on Life in Philosophy (Rowman & Littlefield, 2002). The collection entitled
Autobiography as Philosophy: The philosophical uses of self-presentation, edited by Thomas
Mathien and D. G. Wright (Routledge, 2006) contains both a thematic introduction to the topic
and diverse articles by a variety of scholars on the autobiographical writings of Augustine,
Abelard, Montaigne, Descartes, Vico, Hume, Rousseau, John Henry Newman, Mill, Nietzsche,
Collingwood, and Russell.
18
Schuster (2003, 12): “with so many worthy philosophical autobiographies available, one can
only marvel at the fact that very few researchers have discovered this genre so far.”
19
Tzvetan Todorov, Introduction to Poetics, trans. Richard Howard, Introduction by Peter Brooks
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), p. xxi.
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but the thing) already becomes thematic to some extent within many of the
autobiographical writings of the philosophers, especially in Rousseau, Vico, Descartes,
and Augustine. Writing autobiographies, philosophers tended—and tend—to speak
reflectively about what they were—and are—doing within the context of doing it.20
Descartes’ Discourse, for example, contains a criticism of autobiography avant la lettre,
and Augustine meditates both on how such works should be read as well as on the
cognitive conditions of the possibility for their production, especially memory as he
conceives it. Thus the thematization and even theorization of philosophical
autobiography is to some extent coeval with its production. At the same time,
philosophical autobiography is not the same thing as theory of philosophical
autobiography. An autobiography is a retrospective story, or history, of a humanlife told
by the person who lived it, and a philosophical autobiography is a story like this, but told
by a philosopher for interrelated philosophical reasons.21 Philosophers write
autobiographies for the sake of turning others toward philosophy as a way of humanlife
and in order to present, advance, and in some sense account for first (or ultimate)
philosophical principles. Their primary goal, in other words, is not to give an account of
what philosophical autobiography is.
5.

The historical emergence and contemporary efflorescence of philosophical

autobiography.— Although the word “autobiography” is relatively new, the connection
between philosophy and autobiography has a long and interesting history. This history

20

But not always. Julian Baggini (2002, pp. 295-312) registers a complaint about Quine’s
apparent failure to conduct any such reflection in his autobiography, The Time of My Life (MIT,
1985).
21
Schuster (2003, p. 5) describes philosophical autobiographies as “documents typically
providing two kinds of information: how philosophical thought processes influence the praxis of
the philosopher, and how life situations influence philosophical thought processes.”
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begins, I argue, with Plato, who established, as it were, the form of philosophical
autobiography that, knowingly or not, all subsequent philosophical autobiographies
imitate. As a model subtending so many epochal works, from Augustine’s Confessions to
Descartes’ Discourse on the Method and beyond, the Platonic paradigm of philosophical
autobiography is like a melody in jazz, upon which the generations improvise countless
variations but that remains, for all that, the same melody. The argument for Plato’s
primacy in this domain is laid out in Chapter 2 and below.
While investigation into the historical causes of autobiographical awareness
within philosophy is certainly desirable, it is not the aim of the present work, which
attempts to contribute to this awareness rather than to explain its sources.22 Insofar as it is
historical, my aim is to establish that at certain critical junctures in the history of
philosophy, philosophers have cultivated autobiography as a means of doing and
communicating philosophy. Another important historical fact I want to note provides
evidence that autobiographical awareness within philosophy is both real and becoming
increasing powerful. This is that the twentieth century witnessed an historically
22

Peter Gay provides a helpful and insightful account of the nineteenth-century preoccupation
with autobiography in The Naked Heart (1995). As he writes (p. 103): “Until the advent of
psychoanalysis in the late 1890s, autobiographies served as the deepest soundings into the inner
life the Victorians had at their disposal. The autobiography is, of course, an ancient form of selfdefinition. Any historical retrospect must go back at least to St. Augustine’s Confessions,
medieval clerics conducting devout investigations into the condition of their soul, Montaigne
probing his inner life, which never ceased to fascinate him, Descartes boldly attempting to ground
philosophy in the thinking self, scores of seventeenth-century Puritans and eighteenth-century
Pietists solemnly compiling self-questioning balance sheets. But the nineteenth century spawned
far more autobiographers, and far more readers for their work, than any of its predecessors. As
early as the 1830s, in Sartor Resartus, that sensitive barometer of cultural strains, Thomas Carlyle
had already called attention to ‘these Autobiographical times of ours.’” Jürgen Habermas’ The
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society
(MIT 1991) provides a philosophically-oriented history of the emergence of modern attitudes to
subjectivity that bears on the study of autobiography as a specifically modern phenomenon. The
aforementioned work by Misch (1951, etc.), as well as Momigliano’s important study (1993)
seem indispensible aids to the comprehension of autobiography, and specifically philosophical
autobiography, as historical phenomena.

15

unprecedented proliferation of autobiographies written by philosophers, including those
of Russell, Santayana, Collingwood, Sartre, de Beauvoir, Lyotard, Jaspers, Ayer, Sellars,
Gadamer, Hook, Derrida, Quine, and many, many others.23 This development within (the
history of) philosophy constitutes a further incentive both to the study of philosophical
autobiography and to the attempt to cultivate theoretical understanding of it.
6. The basic series of questions and the three major theses of this dissertation.— Starting
from the fact that there are a number of autobiographies written by philosophers, I ask:
why do these works exist? In other words, why have certain philosophers written
autobiographies? Is there a common reason? Or rather, is it for different reasons in each
case?
This leads me to ask: what are these works? Which means: what is their form (or
structure), and what are their principle elements? Like Aristotle, who in his Poetics
identifies the basic form and elements of tragedy, those who study philosophical
autobiography should desire to comprehend it in terms of its most important constituents.
Like Aristotle, too, one may ask about the telos or goal of philosophical
autobiography. What are such works trying to achieve? Do they tend to a common
purpose, or is it different in different cases?
23

Other twentieth-century autobiographies by notable philosophers include those of Paul
Feyerabend (1996) and Bryan Magee (1997). In the twenty-first century, Colin McGinn (2002),
Morton White (2004), and Stanley Cavell (2010) have made significant contributions to the
genre. A short, but intriguing autobiography by Hilary Putnam appears as the Introduction to his
book Jewish Philosophy as a Guide to Life (Indiana University Press, 2008). One might also
mention the collections of short autobiographical essays by contemporary philosophers in the
abovementioned text edited by Yancy (2002) and in Portraits of American Continental
Philosophers, edited with photographs by James R. Watson (Indiana University Press, 1999).
Clearly philosophical interest in autobiography transcends the (in my opinion) outmoded
Continental/Analytic divide. Finally, one might mention the autobiography of Count Hermann
Keyserling (1927), an interesting work by a neglected philosopher who had a significant
influence on twentieth-century literature. See my Bibliography for full references to the
autobiographies mentioned here and above.
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Is one in fact entitled to comprehend philosophical autobiography as a distinctive
literary genre?
Although in practice there may be many reasons why philosophers write and have
written autobiographies, the proposition of the present work is that philosophical
autobiographies share certain common features that are centrally important for
appreciating and understanding what philosophical autobiography is. What I attempt to
establish is a concept of philosophical autobiography that reflects three primary qualities
of the genre. The first two qualities have to do with its telos or purpose, while the third
relates more to its structure as a specific kind of narrative that concerns a particular
philosophical becoming. My procedure will be to articulate these three qualities in the
form of three propositions. Within the framework thus established, it will, moreover, be
possible to note a number of other, in my view, subsidiary elements that characterize
philosophical autobiography. The four studies that make up this dissertation demonstrate
the validity of the following propositions and show how they have wide application. The
studies complement the theory, and the theory complements the studies. When one has
read the whole dissertation all the way through (preferably twice), the idea of
philosophical autobiography will have become much clearer, and one will gain a
reasonably comprehensive knowledge of the form.
My first proposition states that:
Philosophers write autobiographies for the sake of presenting and giving
an account of philosophical first principles.
More elaborately, what I mean by this is that philosophical autobiographies present
readers with a special kind of argument for philosophical first principles, an argument
that accounts for such principles in terms of a life-story. If it doesn’t do any harm, one
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might call this kind of argument a life-proof, that is, even though it is only a form of
literature we are considering here and not life itself. In general terms, philosophical
autobiography constitutes a scene of instruction, to borrow a phrase from Cavell (1994, p.
14). More specifically, it is concerned with presenting and giving an account of
philosophical first principles.
It is important to note that philosophical first principles are not susceptible of
strict demonstration. Because they are first, such principles cannot follow from prior
premises. By definition, they are neither the necessary nor the probable conclusion of an
inference. Since this is the case, philosophers have reason to seek other ways of giving an
account of first principles, and the autobiographies of the philosophers constitute
themselves around this goal, attempting to show how first principles were discovered
through the course of the particular humanlife of the author. Philosophers who write
autobiographies situate their search for wisdom in the context of a narrative about their
own lives, showing how they pursued wisdom through the course of their lives, how this
search affected them, and how it determined, and was determined by, the experiences of
their lives. In Schuster’s words (2003, p. 5), philosophical autobiographies concern and
provide information about “how life situations influence philosophical thought
processes,” and my claim is that these kinds of stories pertain especially to philosophical
first principles. Thus, while J. Lenore Wright (2006, p. 3) is certainly correct, when she
observes that philosophers “incorporate philosophical concepts and language into the
recounting of the self and/or their lives,” my claim is the rather different one that
philosophers recount their lives in order to introduce philosophical concepts. In the
aforementioned study of Vico’s Life, Verene (1991, p. ix) asks, “Is the life-narrative of
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the philosopher part of his philosophy itself, a form of its verification?” With my first
proposition it can be seen that I answer this question in the affirmative.
Philosophical autobiographies are of course literary works, and literary works are
written speeches. There are, of course, many different kinds of speech. My contention is
that philosophical autobiographies present us with a type of speech directed toward the
articulation of philosophical principles, what the Greeks called οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς λόγοι,
speeches directed toward principles, as opposed to οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι, i.e.,
speeches from principles (demonstrations or deductions). The nature of principles is not
hard to understand, but there are different kinds of principles that have to be taken into
account. As opposed to secondary or derived principles, philosophical autobiography is
concerned with first, primary, or ultimate principles.24 First principles are principles that
by definition cannot be proven. Yet that first principles are in need of some kind of
account follows from the fact that philosophy is a critical discipline, which means at least
that philosophers are, and should be, fundamentally averse to making unsupported
dogmatic assertions, much less ones in which the entire philosophical life is to be rooted.
In the end, of course, it may be the case that philosophy must proceed on the basis of at
least one hypothesis or assumption; the system is perhaps always incomplete, perhaps
always rooted in hypothetical principles that are themselves the basis of everything else.
And even where ultimate principles might seem to be more solid, it is wise to examine
them critically. Plato, for example, shows again and again throughout his dialogues that
he is willing to subject even the ultimate principles of his philosophy to scrutiny, as part
24

The principle of an argument may be the conclusion of a prior one, but in that case we are
dealing with a derived principle and not an ultimate one. If I argue, for example, that senseperception gives beings like us accurate information about beings in the world, and I senseperceive that the sun moves across the sky, I can conclude that at least some being moves. I may
then take the proposition that some beings move as a premise in a further argument.
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of the philosopher’s never-ending search for an unhypothetical first principle (compare
Rep.510b-511e and 533a-539e). The theory of ideas is itself subjected to critique,
highlighting its limitations (most famously in Parmenides) and casting doubt upon its
coherence and validity. It would be unphilosophic not to examine one’s principles in this
way. “To have doubted one’s own first principles,” Justice Holmes once wrote, “is the
mark of a civilized man.”25 It is hard to go too far in praising the virtue of civility.
Philosophical autobiographies also endeavor to show that the ultimate concepts or
principles that a philosopher holds are intimately linked with a particular way of
humanlife, which leads to my next proposition:
Philosophers write autobiographies in order to provide prospective
philosophers and others with paradigms of a philosophical humanlife.
In other words, philosophical autobiographies are, and ought to be, exemplary
philosophical lives that show what a philosophical humanlife is and that such a life is
both possible and good. Philosophy as a way of humanlife is intimately related to
philosophical principles. As we have seen, this idea had special appeal for Nietzsche,
who insists that the crucial measure of a philosophy is “whether one can live in
accordance with it” (ob man nach ihr leben könne).
In recent decades, the idea of philosophy as a way of humanlife has become
increasingly current within the academy, in large part thanks to the works of Pierre Hadot
(1995 and 2002). Hadot developed this idea through his work on ancient philosophy,
including the study of Plato, Aristotle, Marcus Aurelius, Plotinus, and others. In a
wonderful text that presents twentieth-century Jewish philosophy as a guide to life,
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Quoted from Volume XII of Arnold J. Toynbee’s A Study of History (Oxford University Press,
1961), p. 1.
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Hilary Putnam (2008, p. 13) characterizes Hadot’s contribution and shows how it can be
connected with the philosophical practices of Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber,
Emmanuel Levinas, and (with some qualifications) Ludwig Wittgenstein:
Hadot does not believe that we can simply return to one or another of the
ancient philosophical schools. But he does believe that the ancient idea of
transforming one’s way of life and one’s understanding of one’s place in
the larger scheme of things and in the human community is one that we
must not lose. Philosophy certainly needs analysis of arguments and
logical techniques, but is in danger of forgetting that these were originally
in the service of this very idea…the idea of philosophy (or philosophia) as
a way of life.
Philosophical autobiography presents philosophy as a possible way of humanlife. Such
writings suggest that this way of life is possible, and it is possible because the
philosophers who narrate their life stories tell how they have lived in this way. To quote
Lewis Carroll, “if it was so, it might be.” Philosophy is distinguished by seeking
comprehensive knowledge in theoretical and practical domains with the ultimate goal of
living a good humanlife, and philosophical autobiography shows how such a search can
come to be and why it is worthwhile.
By focusing attention on their own lives, those who write philosophical
autobiographies also bring their own character into the equation. The character (ἧθος) of
the speaker is one of the three means of rhetorical proof (πίστις) Aristotle lists in his
Rhetoric (e.g., at 1356a5-15). Aristotle argues that the speech itself is decisive for
establishing the good character of the speaker in relation to the audience, and he
explicitly denies that prior knowledge of the speaker’s character on the part of the
audience is relevant. Rather, he suggests that the character of the speaker as it presents
itself in the speech may be the most persuasive proof of the speech’s value (Rhet.
1356a13). Along the same lines as Aristotle, I suggest that philosophers use
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autobiography in order to bring their whole life and character to bear on whatever they
are trying to prove. In Lionel Trilling’s words, this proof is partially based on the idea
that “(the author) is the man; he suffered; he was there.”26 The authors of philosophical
autobiographies claim to speak from experience.
Philosophical autobiography situates philosophy in the context of a life-story
about the unique humanlife of a particular philosopher. These stories, moreover, share a
common structure. They are marked out by three moments or rather periods: the period
leading up to the discovery of first principles, the moment of discovery, and the
discussion of what follows from this discovery, not only logically but also what follows
in terms of life. Hence my third proposition is that:
Philosophical autobiographies concern a particular humanlife and
narrate the philosophical becomings and conversions that mark this life.
In other words, they depict change over the time of life. An autobiography is a
retrospective story, or history, of a humanlife told by the person who lived it.
Philosophical autobiographies are stories about philosophical lives and hence about how
the author came to be the philosopher that he is. To borrow a word from the religious
context, philosophical autobiographies describe formation. This formation is also, of
course, a transformation, as Bakhtin (1981) and others have recognized. This
transformation, moreover, tends to be progressive, that is, it’s a change from worse to
better.
Philosophical autobiographies make a peculiar kind of argument, an argument
rooted in a narrative that the philosopher tells about her life. This narrative has a
distinctive form or structure: the philosopher discusses her search for truth, traces the
26

Trilling 1972, p. 24.
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course of her education, and discusses her dissatisfaction with existing modes of
knowledge. The culmination of this narrative comes when the philosopher relates her
discovery of the ultimate principle of her philosophy. This is the moment of reversal or
conversion, akin to what Aristotle calls περιπέτεια (peripeteia) in his discussion of
tragedy, except that conversion in philosophical autobiography often comes from the
inside, as the result of a judgment or decision that the philosopher makes in her own mind
and for which, she suggests, her life up to that point had been preparing her. At the
moment of reversal, there is always a decision close by, and in some cases the decision is
itself the reversal. In philosophical autobiography, the presentation of the principle
coincides more or less with the peripeteia, turning, or conversion.
For this reason, philosophical autobiography is closely connected with paradigm
shifts within philosophy, insofar as major changes in (the history of) philosophy depend
for the most part on the adoption of new philosophical principles. As Vico says, a new
science can hardly be based on old principles.27 This is not to say that autobiography is
the only way for philosophers to present new philosophical principles, but philosophical
autobiography has a special intimacy with principles. It is possible to make a good
argument that philosophy begins with an autobiography in the writings of Plato and that
modern philosophy (insofar as there is such a thing) does so as well with Descartes’
autobiographical Discourse on the Method. The autobiographies of Augustine, Vico,
Rousseau, and Nietzsche—even Mill’s Autobiography—could all be plausibly construed
as representing moments in the history of philosophy when the paradigm shifted and
something new began.
27

All references to Vico’s Life are to the translation by Max Harold Fisch and Thomas Goddard
Bergin, published as The Autobiography of Giambattista Vico (Cornell, 1944), p. 187.
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Philosophical autobiography thus charts a certain path toward philosophical
principles. Paraphrasing the structure of what philosophers relate in their autobiographies,
I put it as follows. “I will try to show you how my whole previous life led up to this
principle, the principle of my philosophy, and also, since I’ve come to it, how this
principle, has been, and will be, decisive for the remainder of my life.” The ultimate
philosophical principles that emerge in the course of a life are characterized in relation to
other principles and approaches to philosophy that the philosopher has rejected in the
course of his life and on the basis of his experiences. Thus philosophical autobiography
can be thought of as showing how one makes and comes to live a philosophy through the
course of life. According to the theory I propound, then, these three propositions express
what philosophical autobiography basically does and hence is.
7. The method of discovery employed in the present work.— How did I arrive at this
conception of philosophical autobiography? It is worth saying that I did not begin the
present study with these ideas in mind. Rather, I was initially thinking along certain lines
that are, as I have since discovered, among the predominant ones within the (relatively
scant) literature on this topic. Initially I was thinking about philosophical autobiography
as a philosophical literary genre primarily concerned with the time-honored philosophical
longing for self-knowledge, exemplified by Heraclitus’ haunting aphorism—“I sought
myself.”—and Socrates’ famous words from Plato’s Apology—“the unexamined life is
not worth living for a human being.” Hegel, in the passage quoted above, reiterates this
concern and ties it to what he calls the highest, hardest, and most concrete type of
philosophical cognition.
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Now it seems natural that the topic of philosophical autobiography is apt to
occasion reflection on the concept of self, especially insofar as this concept can be tied to
what some contemporary philosophers call narrative identity. Wright, for example, in her
study of philosophical autobiography sees the search for self as the central theme and
purpose of philosophical autobiography, and consequently she tends to view these works
as having an exploratory character, as depicting the search for self-knowledge, which in
some cases they certainly do.28 On the whole though, I now tend to read them rather as
expository than exploratory, as elaborating both a prior search and discovery, as well as
showing how this discovery has been decisive for the philosopher’s subsequent practice.
Narrative identity is tied to the humanlives of particular individuals. Loosely,
what narrative identity means is that a person is, in some important sense, nothing other
than the stories she can tell about herself. Now, while the question of the relation between
the self and humanlife is clearly an important one, I have also come to believe that
humanlife rather than self is the principal subject matter of philosophical autobiography.
Even the most self-searching autobiographers, Augustine and Rousseau, seem to be more
concerned with exploring the meaning of their lives than in searching for an answer to the
question who or what they are. Of course humanlife and self are intimately connected,
but they are also not the same thing. A self has a humanlife as well as a biological one,
which is to say that these things belong to some self. If the one that has is different from
what one has, it follows that self and life are not the same thing. Further proof of the
distinction between self and humanlife is that they have a different relation to time. From
the standpoint of the present, much of the life of the self is in the past, whereas the self
28

Compare Björn Krondorfer’s Male Confessions: Intimate Revelations and the Religious
Imagination (Stanford, 2010, p. 2), where he identifies “confessions as a mode of selfexamination.”
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itself has not fallen into the past in the same way. As long as it is, self is present, which is
not to preclude the possibility that it changes over time. On the contrary, philosophical
autobiography tends to show that the self does change as a result of what it suffers and
does and that life, especially humanlife, shapes the self.
When I began studying Socrates’ autobiography in Plato’s Phaedo. 95e7-102a1,
my thinking about philosophical autobiography started to go in a different direction away
from the concern with self-knowledge. What occasioned this study was an article by
O.S.L. Gower (2008), entitled “Why Is There an Autobiography in the Phaedo?”
Professor Polansky, the director of my dissertation, knew I was working on
autobiography in Plato and others and asked me to review Gower’s article for Ancient
Philosophy. Although I disagreed then, and still do with Gower’s interpretation of
Socrates’ autobiography and its function in the Phaedo, his article encouraged me to look
more closely at Socrates’ autobiography and to work out my own interpretation. Through
the course of this study, I realized that the main reason Socrates narrates a story about his
life is that he wants to give his interlocutors (and Plato’s readers) an account of the
ultimate principles of his philosophical activity. He wants to give them such an account,
moreover, because he wants them to accept these principles so that he can then, on their
basis, go on to a (very interesting) proof for the immortality of the soul. In his
autobiography, Socrates explains what, as a young man, he was seeking and how he
sought it. He describes his disappointments and how they changed him, and what he did
in light of his failure to find what he had been looking for. He also wants to impress his
addressees with the relation between philosophical first principles and the need for
philosophical decision or judgment.
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So one of the central propositions of my theory derives from an intellectual
perception I had while studying the Phaedo. Todorov has argued quite compellingly for
the interdependence of theory and textual exegesis (or “close reading”), which is to say,
he advocates a conception of poetics that derives its concepts from the careful study of
particular texts, rather than imposing concepts on the text, as it were, from outside.
Todorov, of course, recognizes that we cannot help coming to texts with certain
prejudices. This theme was also amply developed in the last century by Hans-Georg
Gadamer in his attempt to elaborate the principles of philosophical hermeneutics and to
put these principles into practice. A point that Gadamer reiterates throughout his work is
that the best we can do is to try to make our hermeneutical assumptions (hermeneutische
Vorgriffe) explicit.
Upon gaining this insight into the form and function of Socrates’ autobiography in
the Phaedo, my next task was to see whether or not I could discover the same form and
function in other philosophical autobiographies. What I found and believe myself to have
shown in the following chapters is that other philosophical autobiographies do share the
same basic structure, elements, and function, that is, despite their obvious myriad
differences at the level of their content.
But I want to go back even further, because in the background of my dissertation
lies a question about the relationship between philosophy and humanlife. The neologism
humanlife (which is inaudible, but one sees when reading) is justified because our word
“life” is equivocal, since it can refer either to biological life (what the Greeks called zoê),
or to a way of life that is specifically human (the Greek bios). The latter of course
presupposes the former, but it is with humanlife that I am presently concerned. Another
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way to put this would be to say that I am interested in philosophy as lived, which is to
say, as it functions in the lives of various individuals (including, naturally, my own). As it
turns out, others share this interest, and it is also becoming more prominent within
philosophy thanks to the works of Hadot, Putnam, Davis, Yancy, Cavell, and others.
There might be many reasons why philosophical autobiography is an intriguing
subject, but the initial impetus to the current work came to me from Nietzsche, from the
study of his writings in general, but also in particular from sections 5 and 6 of Beyond
Good and Evil. Probably the most famous passage comes at the beginning of section 6,
where Nietzsche writes:
Allmählich hat sich mir herausgestellt, was jede grosse Philosophie bisher
war: nämlich das Selbstbekenntnis ihres Urhebers und eine Art
ungewollter und unvermerkter mémoires; insgleichen, dass die
moralischen (oder unmoralischen) Absichten in jeder Philosophie den
eigentlichen Lebenskeim ausmachten, aus dem jedesmal die ganze Pflanze
gewachsen ist (BGE §6/KSA 5:19-20).
Which I translate:
Gradually it has become clear to me what every great philosophy so far
has been, namely, the confession of its creator, and a kind of involuntary
and unacknowledged memoirs; at the same time, that the moral (or
immoral) intentions constitute the authentic kernel of life of every
philosophy, from which the whole plant has grown.
At first, what I found striking about this passage was the idea, familiar to readers of
Nietzsche, that philosophers’ explicit views stemmed from implicit presuppositions that
were, moreover, deeply rooted in their lives, psychological constitutions, and personal
histories.29 For me, this called to mind aphorisms like “On the origin of scholars,” from
the Gay Science, where Nietzsche argues that most scholars and philosophers are much
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Although his claim that there are two basic types of philosopher appears rather too reductionist,
William James makes a similar argument in his famous Pragmatism lectures.

28

more influenced by their upbringing and background than they usually know or care to
admit (see GS §348). Thus the possibility opened up for me that the great (and not only
the great) philosophies were themselves, at least in part, a kind of confession, memoirs,
or autobiography, albeit an “involuntary and unacknowledged” one, as Nietzsche says. I
was intrigued by the idea that the overt discourse of the philosophers could be shown to
reveal the historical background and perhaps even the unconscious motivations behind a
given philosopher’s work, their secret hopes and desires and fears. The background
question is, how intimately is philosophy twined together with the particular personality
and life history of the philosopher? A question that Louis Althusser (1993, pp. 160, 169),
for example, took seriously in composing his own autobiography, as can be seen from his
repeated intention to describe “how I came to invest and inscribe my objective, public
activities with my subjective phantasies,” “to elucidate if possible the deep-seated,
personal motives, both conscious and especially unconscious, which underpinned (my)
whole undertaking beneath its outward and visible form.”
The more I thought about it, however, the more it seemed to me that the existence
of so many philosophical autobiographies, both before and after Nietzsche, cast serious
doubt upon his suggestion that philosophers had only written autobiographies
involuntarily and without acknowledging what they were doing. It now appeared to me
that, far from ignoring or suppressing the connection between their philosophies and their
lives, at least some philosophers, by writing autobiographies, had made this connection
an explicit theme of their philosophical investigations and an integral part of their
philosophical activity. Obviously this didn’t preclude even in these cases that there might
still be unconscious presuppositions, unacknowledged hopes and desires, behind what we
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encounter on the surface. What is worse, autobiography itself may be just one more
“means of self-concealment,” as Freud is reported to have said of Goethe’s
autobiography, Dichtung und Wahrheit.30 Nothing, however, precludes these possibilities,
even if one has made great progress in replacing “it” with “I,” to use the Freudian
language. Assuming one admits the reality of the unconscious (and not all philosophers
admit this), the project of making the unconscious conscious is still, by Freud’s own
admission, an “interminable” work with which no one will ever be finished. Nonetheless,
it seemed to me that many of the philosophers who had written autobiographies made
remarkable progress toward understanding how their lives informed their philosophical
beliefs and, vice versa, how their philosophical beliefs shaped their lives. To pull
Nietzsche’s beard, one might say that philosophical autobiography is the voluntary and
acknowledged attempt of philosophers to consider the connection between their
humanlives and their philosophy.
8. Philosophical autobiography and humanlife.— Philosophical autobiography makes
the connection between philosophy and humanlife explicit. The uniqueness of
philosophical autobiography is tied to the way it brings the connection between
philosophy and humanlife to the foreground. The neologism humanlife seems defensible
and even desirable given the marked equivocity of the word “life.” The subject of
autobiography, as of biography, is actually humanlife and, more specifically, the
humanlife of some particular individual. Humanlife is to be distinguished above all from
biological life. As John Dewey once wrote, “When we see a book called the Life of
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Lincoln we do not expect to find within its covers a treatise on physiology.”31 Life is
equivocal since it can mean both biological life (in our sense of “biology”), or what the
Greeks called ζωή, and also specifically humanlife, or βίος in Greek. The dialogue of the
Phaedo, for example, includes by turns consideration of both senses of life, which is
fitting because βίος, a human way of life, presupposes and indeed depends on ζωή. Yet
the central theme of the Phaedo and the Apology as well is really βίος. For although βίος
depends on ζωή, it is nevertheless not wholly subservient to it, as indeed Socrates’
predicament clearly demonstrates. For Socrates’ βίος or way of life is somehow the cause
of the impending termination of his biological life. Socrates further insists that in no case
would he change his way of life in order to preserve his biological one. The dialogue is
really about the fact that a human being has two interrelated but distinct lives, a βίος and
a ζωή, and what Socrates argues is that of the two, the βίος is by far the most important.
In The Human Condition (1958, p. 97), Hannah Arendt describes humanlife and draws a
crucial connection between it and the human capacity for biography and autobiography:
The word “life”…(can) designate the time interval between birth and
death. Limited by a beginning and an end, that is, by the two supreme
events of appearance and disappearance within the world, it follows a
strictly linear movement whose very motion nevertheless is driven by the
motor of biological life which man shares with other living things and
which forever retains the cyclical movement of nature. The chief
characteristic of this specifically human life…is that it is itself always full
of events which ultimately can be told as a story, establish a biography; it
is of this life, bios as distinguished from mere zôê, that Aristotle said that
it “somehow is a kind of praxis.” For action and speech, which…belonged
close together in the Greek understanding of politics, are indeed the two
activities whose end result will always be a story with enough coherence
to be told, no matter how accidental or haphazard the single events and
their causation may appear to be.
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Of course this does not mean that such stories are completely unproblematic, or that one
should accept them naively and uncritically. It is good to keep in mind that, as William
Gass has written, “stories break up the natural continuum of life into events,” and so they
are in some sense deceptive and certainly selective.32 It is therefore important to read
them with discretion, as Descartes suggests (see my Ch. 4).
Philosophy and life are distinguishable. For finite beings whose life is conditioned
by time, before any philosophical question emerges, there is a life. Before one becomes a
philosopher, an empiricist, a rationalist, an idealist, a materialist, a Wittgensteinian, a
Heideggarian, a Continental, or an Analytic, one is born. One is born into a life-world
and becomes self-conscious. No one is born a philosopher, and at most some (or all?) are
born with philosophical potential, in the way that people are born with athletic or artistic
potential. For the individual human being that each of us is, life comes before philosophy
in the order of time. This fact explains why philosophers going back to Plato and
Aristotle recognized the need for protreptic discourses, which are basically discourses
that aim to convert individuals to philosophy or the belief that a life devoted to
philosophical activity is best. Pace Rousseau, human beings are not by nature born what
they ought to be, and philosophical autobiography aims to foster philosophical becoming.
9. What this dissertation isn’t about.— The topic here is likely to be confused with some
others, perhaps above all with the aforementioned question about the nature of the self.
At least a few other themes are worthy of note.
The study of autobiography raises curious questions about the relations between
fact and fiction, especially germane to the philosophy of history. One cannot help but
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worry about the referent of autobiographical texts, raising the question of how truthfully
or accurately the text refers to its subject, the life of its author. One source of this
problem is that one may discover disparities between the biographies and autobiographies
of philosophers such as Augustine, Rousseau, and others. As Derrida has written,
autobiography seems to occupy an impossible zone between fiction and truth, and the
distinction between fiction and autobiography is on his account an “undecidable” one, “in
whose undecidability…it is impossible to stand.”33 In most cases, it is impossible to
verify or falsify what is presented in autobiography as the truth about a humanlife.
Rousseau (Pl. I.5) says he will present readers with “un homme dans toute la vérité de la
nature,” and the autobiographies of the philosophers are replete with promises to tell the
truth. Yet in most cases, how could we readers ever be certain of the truth of such stories?
It seems the best one can do is to strike a balance between trust and discretion.
Philosophical autobiography is, to repeat, a kind of literature, and, to paraphrase
Nietzsche, books are one thing and life is another (EH “Books”§1/KSA 6: 298).
Literature, it bears saying, is not life.34 Just as Borges’ map of the empire as big as the
empire highlights the absurdity of an exact correspondence between the thing itself and
its representation, it would be similarly absurd to think of autobiography as an exact
truthful replica of a humanlife.35 Dilthey, as we have seen, clearly recognized this truth. It
takes a narrative to tell the story of a life, and this means it takes time. To quote Boethius,
“Nothing situated in time can at one moment grasp the entire duration of its life” (2000,
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p. 110, The Consolation of Philosophy 5.6.5). Beings situated in time require a narrative,
and narrative is through time (diachronic). A life, moreover, is not repeatable. Yet
although it is not in the nature of a humanlife to be graspable in a single moment, much
less repeatable, it is clearly possible for us to give a retrospective account of our lives.
Because, after all, autobiography exists. But the question how this account could ever be
adequate to the thing itself raises so many difficulties that it is perhaps wiser to sidestep
the question altogether. On the other hand, what is known about our lives neither by us
nor by others is that which is simply unknown about them, having sunk in Dilthey’s
“endless stream of forgotten events,” where most things ultimately go.
Although one naturally thinks about memory in relation to autobiography, this
dissertation does not undertake, except incidentally, a philosophical investigation of
memory, of what it is and how it works, both in general and also with respect to the
human capacity for autobiography. Memory is clearly one condition of the possibility of
autobiography, which is something that Augustine emphasizes in his Confessions. This
dissertation concerns autobiographies as opposed to the process of composing
autobiographies, i.e., it isn’t about how autobiographies are written. Just as one may
distinguish the study of histories from historiography understood as the study of how
history is written, so the study of autobiography may be distinguished from that of how
autobiographies are composed.
This dissertation does not spell out a theory of humanlife. The broadest concept of
humanlife would have to be divided into increasingly specific types all the way down to
the humanlife of particular individuals. When a particular individual says “my life,” she
sometimes refers to her unique humanlife, and in that case the referent of the term is both
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unique and in principle unrepeatable (unless the eternal recurrence is literally true). There
is a class of countless propositions that only hold true when they are said by a particular
individual. (For example, I can say “My grandfather, Frank G. Sabo, attended my
graduation from Xavier University in 2000,” and this is true. But no one else can say it
truly.) The most general or basic concept of humanlife, meanwhile, would have to attend
to the natural stages of human life, as for example Plato and Rousseau do in Republic and
Emile, respectively. The basic concept of humanlife would also involve many of the
investigations traditionally undertaken by philosophers, for example, into human nature,
including our intellectual abilities and emotional propensities. Of course the study of the
autobiographies of the philosophers can make some contribution to this endeavor,
especially since they concern individuals. Being an individual and having a unique
humanlife determines conceptually and essentially what it means to be human.
Autobiography in general promises knowledge of the lives of particular human
beings, and when we read autobiographies, we expect to learn something about the lives
of others, though this is not all. Since autobiography is an essentially retrospective and
reflective discourse, we also expect to learn something about how others think about their
lives, how they judge what they’ve done and suffered, and how this judgment affects
their sense of what their lives have meant. Autobiographies can also, however, teach us
about human nature in general and even about ourselves, insofar as we recognize, or fail
to recognize, the actions, passions, and patterns that we find in these texts reflected in our
own lives and the lives of others we know.
10.

Reason, judgment, and the event of mind in humanlife.— Reading the

autobiographies of philosophers such as Plato, Augustine, Descartes, Vico, Rousseau,

35

Mill, Nietzsche, and others, it is possible to come to an understanding of philosophy as a
way of humanlife dedicated to the search for truth. This search is intimately related to the
goal of becoming as wise as it is possible for a human being to be. At the center of this
enterprise is reason (λόγος). Because philosophy relies on reason, it necessarily involves
principles. Principles are the starting-points for reason, and first principles are starting
points in a superlative sense. As such, first principles are not, and by definition cannot be,
the product of an inference, at least not in any straightforward way. Instead they are the
product of judgment. Judgment, or decision, follows from mind, and therefore mind
(νοῦς) and judgment are also at the center of philosophy. Judgment differs from mind,
because (in my way of framing this) judgment is an active decision to accept what mind
gives. Philosophical autobiography thus concerns the superlative event of mind and the
judgment that decides on first principles. It places this event and this decision in the
context of the humanlife of a philosopher who tells a story about his life.
In the autobiographies of the philosophers, philosophical first principles also
come forward as matters of ultimate philosophical concern and indeed, one may venture
to say, as life-giving. They appear as both the telos and the beginning of a philosophical
humanlife that has reason (λόγος) at its core. Reason itself proceeds from first principles
as does a river from its source. But unlike a river, reason can, and should, occasionally
question its source. Reason itself demands this, and there is nothing higher or better than
reason (λόγος), except perhaps for mind (νοῦς) and philosophical judgment. The life of
wisdom depends on reason, mind, and judgment.
The structure of philosophical autobiography imitates but also creates the
structure of a humanlife dedicated to philosophy. Such a humanlife, when it comes to be,
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begins by seeking its principle. In other words, it begins by seeking its beginning, not in
the sense of some historical or natural origin, but rather as a way to begin. Philosophical
autobiography then proceeds to describe the discovery of this beginning as an event of
mind and a judgment. At last, the philosophical autobiographers go on to show how this
judgment has been, and continues to be, definitive of their subsequent life and activity.
Among the many things that philosophical autobiography wants to tell us, perhaps the
most important is that a humanlife like this is possible because it has been. This, at least,
is the teaching of the philosophical autobiographies as I read them. They are works that
attempt to show how, for a particular individual, a philosophical humanlife begins.
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Chapter 2
The Platonic Paradigm of Philosophical Autobiography
The materials for a genuine biography of Plato exist in his letters and in the indirect evidence of
his dialogues.—Cornford36
ὑµεῖς µέντοι, ἂν ἐµοὶ πείθησθε, σµικρὸν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας πολὺ
µᾶλλον. (You, however, if you might be persuaded by me, will give little thought to Socrates and
rather much more to the truth. Phaedo 91b8-c2, my translation.)37

1. Plato’s invention of philosophical autobiography.— Those who track the historical
origins of philosophical concepts and methods move along a path that leads, sooner or
later, and more often than not, to Plato. It is therefore hardly surprising that in the case of
philosophical autobiography, too, one finds Plato at the origin. Plato invented
philosophical autobiography, as, arguably, he invented philosophy.38 The real surprise
here is not really that Plato invented philosophical autobiography, but rather how
thoroughly Plato already worked out the possibilities of this genre, how highly developed
this form was already to become in his hands. We should not allow the deviations and
enhancements of philosophical autobiography over millennia to blind us to the fact that
the basic elements and structure of the form are already to be found in Plato’s writings, in
the “spurious” Seventh Letter and, above all, in the dialogues. Plato devises philosophical
autobiography as a genre that emerges at certain critical junctures within his dialogic
universe, in the Apology, when Socrates is on trial for his life, and in the Phaedo (95e7-
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102a1), when he is facing imminent death. Like the Apology, the autobiographical
Seventh Letter also addresses itself to a political crisis where Plato’s own character is on
the line. Hackforth suggests that “Plato writes partly with the object of meeting charges
brought against him” by Dion’s followers, so it is possible to view this letter also as a
kind of apology.39 The birth of philosophical autobiography therefore takes place at
moments of great pitch, scenes of extremity, in which philosophical principles and
character are put to the test. Philosophical autobiography thus emerges as a response to
crisis, at moments in the dialogues and (possibly) in Plato’s life, when something of great
importance is to be decided, and judgment is required. In the Apology and the Seventh
Letter, philosophical autobiography assumes a public face, addressing itself to some
political community. In the Phaedo, by contrast, it assumes a more intimate character, as
Socrates confides a life-story to a select and sympathetic group of those already striving
to lead a philosophical life. In both cases though, the dramatic contexts suggest that Plato
sees philosophical autobiography as answering to the most demanding situations,
suggesting the possibility that in the last resort, autobiography comes first for the
philosopher.
Some scholars may find vague anticipations of philosophical autobiography even
earlier than Plato, in the writings of the so-called Presocratic philosophers. But, of those
authors whose writings have come down to us from Greek antiquity, Plato is clearly the
first to work out the form of philosophical autobiography, establishing its basic elements,
developing its function, and, in the process, demonstrating the close connection between
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autobiography and philosophy.40 Even Plato’s role in establishing this genre has scarcely
been appreciated by scholars.41 The almost universal neglect of Plato’s role here may be
partially explained in terms of the kind of historical change I indicated in the
Introduction. Human beings are for the most part only able to think in terms of the
concepts and categories that are available to mind at a given epoch in human history, and,
to repeat, theoretical awareness of autobiography is a relatively recent historical
phenomenon that simply didn’t exist prior to modern times.42 How exactly this new
consciousness arose is, as I’ve said, something of a mystery, but that it has come to be is
beyond a doubt. In light then of the insight into the relative historical novelty of
autobiographical awareness, it is understandable that Plato’s contributions to
philosophical autobiography have hardly been appreciated up till now.
Right at the outset of our discussion of Plato’s autobiographical writings,
however, we encounter a problem, and one that arises due to the fact that the
autobiographies appearing in Plato’s dialogues are written by one man, Plato, but are
about another and put in the mouth of another, Socrates. Consideration of Plato’s
autobiographical writings quickly leads to a peculiarly enigmatic encounter with the so-
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called Socratic problem. Ralph Waldo Emerson nicely symbolized the intractability of
this problem, when he wrote that, “Socrates and Plato are the double star which the most
powerful instruments will not entirely separate.”43 Christopher Rowe, a well-regarded
contemporary Plato scholar, calls this “one of the standing problems of scholarship…the
so-called ‘Socratic problem’”.44 Perhaps if we begin with a few facts we can avoid
becoming disoriented by this problem and can distinguish the double star sufficiently for
present purposes. The first thing to note is that it is, of course, the character “Socrates”
who speaks as an autobiographer in Plato’s Apology, Phaedo, and in other dialogues.
Now in these dialogues Socrates speaks his life-story and doesn’t write it, but the
distinction between speaking and writing need not trouble us here. The problems of
authorship and reference, or the attribution of certain ideas to certain individuals, might
appear comparatively more bothersome. The questions about the authorship and referent
of Plato’s Socratic autobiographies is a special instance of the more general problem of
how to understand the relationship between Plato and Socrates. There are three possible
ways of resolving this problem. Either the Platonic dialogues, and by extension some of
the Platonic autobiographical writings, are purely Plato’s invention, or they are simply
verbatim reports of actual Socratic conversations (Leo Strauss 1964, p. 55 calls this “the
most unintelligent assumption”), or they are a mixture of invention and reportage.
In his fine study of biography and autobiography in the ancient world,
Momigliano observes that the Apology and Phaedo appear to present instances of
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“biography disguised as autobiography.”45 If this is correct, then Plato would be making
the literary character Socrates articulate certain autobiographical accounts whose referent
is the life of the real, historical Socrates. In that case, Plato might still be inventing the
autobiographical gesture, that is, the historical Socrates may never have narrated a
retrospective story about his life, and Plato only makes the literary character do so. Was
Socrates, rather than Plato, the inventor of philosophical autobiography? It isn’t really
possible to answer this question definitively, but it would also be a mistake to think that
anything of philosophical importance hangs on it either way. Certainly from the point of
view of this study, which focuses on the form and function of philosophical
autobiography, even the question of the referent is not especially pressing.46 For, even if
we should think of these autobiographies as, on some level, biographies in disguise, it is
nevertheless true that within the context of the dialogues where they feature, they act like
autobiographies and perform the functions of philosophical autobiography elaborated in
the Introduction and below.
There is, however, another possible way of interpreting these autobiographical
passages, especially the one in Phaedo, namely, not as biographies of Socrates disguised
as autobiographies, but as autobiographies of Plato disguised as autobiographies of
Socrates. This was Nietzsche’s view of the autobiographical passage in the Phaedo, a
view which he expressed in his lectures on the “Preplatonic philosophers” (as Nietzsche
called them). “Socrates never came to know physics, since that which Plato narrates
concerning the studies of Anaxagoras at Phaedo and so on is certainly only Plato’s own
45
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historical development.”47 It is, then, clearly possible to maintain that Plato put his own
autobiography into Socrates’ mouth. Nietzsche’s rather bold gambit is, however, open to
serious doubts. According to Burnet, Socrates’ autobiographical account of his
enthusiasm as a young man for the study of nature “is confirmed in a striking way by our
earliest witness, Aristophanes.”48 So if Burnet is correct, and the real Socrates was for a
time deeply engaged in the study of nature, then perhaps Socrates’ autobiography in the
Phaedo is a biography disguised as an autobiography after all, as Momigliano suggests.
Certainly we do not, and shall probably never know whether and to what extent
these autobiographies are truthful biographies of Socrates or inventions of Plato, whether
referring to the real person Socrates or, perhaps in some cases, to Plato himself. These
problems are rather more historical than philosophical, however, and from the point of
view of the present investigation, we can and indeed must bracket these historical
dilemmas. The safe claim that Socrates and Plato initiate the tradition of philosophical
autobiography together provides a perfectly adequate basis on which to build. But,
keeping this cautionary word in mind, I think one is nonetheless entitled to speak of Plato
alone as the inventor of philosophical autobiography, since he alone is the writer.
Socrates himself never wrote anything, at least nothing that has come down to us (such as
the hymn to Apollo and the versification of some of Aesop’s fables discussed at Phaedo
60c-61b). We will probably never know whether the historical Socrates ever related a
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spoken life-story, though it is at least likely that the real Socrates would have given some
kind of account of his life in the context of his trial in 399 BCE.49
The autobiographies embedded in Plato’s dialogues are not, however, Plato’s only
autobiographical writings, and it would be strange not to consider the autobiographical
letters in this study, especially the Seventh Letter, which Momigliano calls “the greatest
autobiographical letter of antiquity.”50 For Plato scholars the question of the Seventh and
other letters is a complicated one, fraught with anxieties and, if I may say so, cathected
with all the energy of a neurotic symptom. As is well known, the primary question is
mainly the historical one about whether Plato himself was truly their author. Momigliano
poses the question in the following way. “The question we have to ask…is whether
Plato’s Letter 7, the greatest autobiographical letter of antiquity, is a real autobiography
or a biographical letter disguised as autobiographical. Did a pupil of Plato write Plato’s
Letter 7 just as Plato wrote Socrates’ Apology?”51 Some scholars have argued against the
Seventh Letter’s authenticity.52 The majority, including Momigliano, have argued that the
Seventh Letter was in fact written by Plato.53 In defense of this position, Momigliano
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offers a couple of arguments that are fairly persuasive. His first argument in particular
seems to me especially strong:
The first argument is that…we do not know of any autobiographical letter
comparable to Plato’s Seventh Letter before Plato. I am reluctant to admit
that forgery preceded reality in the matter of autobiographical letters. The
letter seems to me an exceptional creation by an exceptional man, namely
Plato.54
The creator of the Seventh Letter, whoever it was, was an exceptional person who
invented an altogether new genre, the epistolary philosophical autobiography. Whoever
wrote it, in other words, there can be no doubt that the Seventh Letter is a finely wrought
autobiographical work that demonstrates a high degree of philosophical sophistication.
Now from the point of view of the present study, which is philosophical, it makes
little difference whether the Seventh Letter (or any of the Platonic letters) is authentic,
and in any case, I have neither the space nor the inclination to enter into this often
tiresome and sometimes absurd debate. Unlike some, I doubt that anything of great
philosophical interest hangs on the resolution of the authenticity question, and I certainly
do not think that our (collective, scholarly) interpretation of Plato would be much better
or worse than it is had the Seventh Letter never existed. I will say, however, that I am
considerably more unpersuaded by the arguments against the Seventh Letter’s
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“only forgery, not authenticity, can be proved conclusively.” Friedländer is nevertheless
unimpressed, as I am, by the arguments against the authenticity of the Seventh Letter. With some
qualifications, Professor Polansky also takes this letter to be authentic. See also E.N. Tigerstedt,
Interpreting Plato (Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell International, 1977), especially pp. 44-50.
Aside: I actually had to cut the pages open on Gumberg Library’s copy of Tigerstedt.
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authenticity, than I am positively persuaded by the arguments for its being genuine.55 At
the same time, when scholars labor to prove that the Seventh Letter is inauthentic, I can’t
help but wonder why they are so anxious to do this. Is it because they are afraid of the
political implications that would follow if the Seventh Letter were judged authentic?
Well, no one needs the Seventh Letter to prove that Plato saw philosophy as having a
political mission connected to the reform of actually existing societies. Or is it that the
doubters are worried about the Seventh Letter’s suggestion that Plato had unwritten
doctrines? That Plato thought his writings of only secondary importance with regard to
the true goal of living philosophically? One can only smile at such naïveté. The labors of
the doubters are fairly moot, except for the fact that, if the Seventh Letter is authentic,
then we know that Plato himself really believed that his political teaching might be put
into practice in the real world. This, I think, would hardly be an insignificant revelation.
As in the case of the Socratic problem, a safe claim is sufficient for present
purposes, that either Plato or someone associated with Plato and/or Plato’s school wrote
the letter, and so in any case, one is almost certainly justified in believing that this letter
is Platonic. One is also therefore fairly certain of saying something true in saying that,
historically, philosophical autobiography emerged either with Plato’s writings or with
those of Plato and his school.56 But more on the Seventh Letter below.
2. Scholarly antecedents of the idea that Plato invented philosophical autobiography.—
The study of Plato’s autobiographical writings takes us to a place where history, literary
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theory, and philosophy intersect. As we shall see, the claim that Plato initiated the
tradition of philosophical autobiography is not wholly unprecedented, although those
who were the first to make this claim were historians and literary theorists rather than
philosophers. Georg Misch, for example, in his A History of Autobiography in Antiquity,
already indicated Plato’s contribution to the development of biography and
autobiography in fourth-century Greece:
Plato led the way…(in developing) a conception of the course of a man’s
life in which, for the first time, we find biographical material treated from
an evolutionary point of view…instead of one continuous life-story we
have a succession of quite distinct phases considered as stages in a
person’s development…(Plato) systematically surveyed the evolution of
philosophy from the Ionian beginnings down to his own time; and at one
time he gave in biographical form a description of the essential progress
made in that development. In the Phaedo he makes Socrates tell the story
of his career.57
According to Misch, Socrates’ autobiography in the Phaedo encapsulates the entire
history of philosophy up to that time. Misch further argues that Plato initiated an entirely
new way of thinking about humanlife in terms of history and personal development.
History means, above all, change, but Misch also emphasizes the role of progress in
Plato’s autobiographical writings.58 Like some others, Misch makes a case that the
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The one for whom this dissertation is written will have been haunted by Gadamer’s (1998, p.
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unforeseen is present, there is also no history to relate. Destiny also means constant
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difference that exists between the process-quality of nature and the fluctuating accidents and
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ancients prior to Plato had a much less dynamic, much more static view of humanlife
than we do.59 Plato thus innovates a way of thinking about a single humanlife as a
historical and potentially progressive process, characterized by different stages, and
furthermore as a process that has a kind of telos, end, or goal. Today people often take
this way of thinking about humanlife for granted, that is, even if the Platonic-Aristotelian
notion of telos appears somewhat foreign to our way of thinking. But even if we moderns
tend to think of the process of humanlife as endless, it is certainly common for us to think
of it in terms of concepts of progress and development. On the basis of extensive research
into the history of autobiography, Misch located Plato at the beginning of a tradition that
views humanlife historically, in terms of phases within a single humanlife, and that also
introduces the idea of progress.60 Misch also believed, as did Cornford, that for Plato a
single human life can be in some sense analogous to broader historical changes. Misch
notes, for example, that Socrates’ life-story in Phaedo mirrors the development of Greek
philosophy “from the Ionian beginnings” up to dawn of the fourth century. Cornford
believed that “it was not only the man Socrates, but philosophy itself that turned, in his

incidents of human life. What comes to expression here is a primordial opposition between nature
and spirit.”
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Franco Moretti, in The Way of the World (Verso, 1987), makes a similar case about the static
view of human character in ancient epic. Moretti plausibly argues that Achilles and even
Odysseus do not change or make progress in the course of the Iliad and Odyssey, respectively.
One might also think of Lukàcs’ theory of the novel in this context as well, since according to
him it is precisely personal change and the quest for self-knowledge that distinguishes the
(modern) novel from the (classical) epic. See also Bakhtin’s essay on the Bildungsroman (1986,
pp. 10-59).
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Plato explores the concept of humanlife as development especially in the Republic, where the
rearing and education of human beings from infancy to maturity constitutes one of the major
topics of discussion. Notably this concept figures much less prominently in the Laws, which may
add weight to Zuckert’s claim that this dialogue precedes all the others in the order of dialogic (as
opposed to compositional) time.
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person, from the outer to the inner world.”61 It is therefore possible to maintain that Plato
anticipated the Vichian, Rousseauean, and Hegelian insight into the analogy between the
history of each individual humanlife and human history as a whole.62
Misch’s A History of Autobiography in Antiquity appears, however, as more a
compendium of facts than as a philosophical history determined by an integrating
argument. Misch has nevertheless made significant contributions to our understanding of
how the ancients thought about themselves and also of how the modalities of ancient selfconsciousness changed over time.63 Misch does not, however, formulate anything like a
concept of specifically philosophical autobiography, which is the primary concern of the
present work.
Neither did Momigliano formulate a concept of philosophical autobiography,
though he has also made significant contributions to the historical understanding of the
emergence and development of biography and autobiography in ancient Greece and in the
ancient world in general. It is especially noteworthy that Momigliano recognized the
importance of the Socratics, including of course Plato, within the history of biography
and autobiography:
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Momigliano remarks on this characteristic of Misch’s History, saying it is “something of
considerable interest in so far as it clarifies what the ancients felt about themselves,” but it is also
“confusing as a history of autobiography.” Arnaldo Momigliano, The Development of Greek
Biography, Expanded Edition (Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 18. Readers interested in the
topic will nevertheless find The History of Autobiography in Antiquity a good source of
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We have denied that the origins of biography are to be exclusively
connected with Socrates and the Socratics. We have tried to show that the
most ancient evidence for Greek biographical and autobiographical work
is earlier than Socrates…But this does not mean denying the obvious –
namely that the Socratics were the leaders in biographical experiments in
the fourth century.64
The fifth-century antecedents of fourth-century experiments in autobiography and
biography need not concern us in the present context; suffice it to say that Momigliano
recognizes nothing even remotely resembling philosophical autobiography prior to the
fourth century. Noting the importance of Socratic contributions to biography and
autobiography, Momigliano also goes on to indicate their problematic character in a way
clearly applicable to Plato. “The Socratics,” Momigliano writes, “moved to that zone
between truth and fiction which is so bewildering to the professional historian,” since
their works occupy “an ambiguous position between fact and imagination.”65 It isn’t quite
clear, however, on what basis Momigliano draws the distinction between “truth and
fiction” that he apparently finds so important. If written history is distinguished from
fiction on the grounds that history has a real, as opposed to an imaginary, referent, it is
nevertheless the case that our access to this real historical referent is, as a rule,
problematic and in any case mediated by those writings that have come down to us, upon
which the vast majority of our historical knowledge depends. It’s time to admit the fact
that where history is concerned, we are for the most part dependent on the word of others.
The distinction between fact and imagination is very thin.
Of all those scholars who have considered the question of autobiography in
antiquity, the great twentieth-century literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin perhaps came
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closest to recognizing the original character of Plato’s autobiographical writings and to
forming something like a conception of philosophical autobiography. In his essay “Forms
of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel,” Bakhtin identified “two essential types of
autobiography in classical Greece,” which he calls Platonic and rhetorical
autobiography.66 According to Bakhtin, Platonic autobiography is concerned with the
metamorphosis of the seeker after truth, which is clearly a central theme of Socrates’
autobiographies in the Apology and Phaedo, as it is of philosophical autobiography in
general.67 Bakhtin observes that the Platonic type of autobiography:
…found its earliest and most precise expression in such works of Plato as
the Apology of Socrates and the Phaedo. This type, involving an
individual’s autobiographical self-consciousness, is related to the stricter
forms of metamorphosis as found in mythology. At its heart lies the
chronotope of “the life course of one seeking true knowledge.” The life of
such a seeker is broken down into precise and well-marked epochs or
steps. His course passes from self-confident ignorance, through selfcritical skepticism, to self-knowledge and ultimately to authentic knowing
(mathematics and music).68
Bakhtin’s description of what happens in the Platonic autobiographies is somewhat
idealized, first of all because the starting point in self-confident ignorance and the end in
authentic knowing are both conjectural. Except perhaps in the Parmenides, which isn’t
autobiographical, Plato never presents Socrates as self-confidently ignorant, and in
autobiographical contexts, Socrates characterizes his younger self as someone seeking
truth rather than as someone who wrongly believed that he already possessed it. The
ultimate end of philosophical autobiography in “self-knowledge” and “authentic
knowing” are also more problematic in Plato’s writings than Bakhtin’s comments might
suggest, although Plato’s Socrates knows enough to know what he doesn’t know, just as
66
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he knows enough to die well. Bakhtin’s equation of philosophy with mathematics and
music is not unproblematic either, since for Plato there is clearly a distinction between
philosophy and these other kinds of knowledge (mathematics and music seem rather
“high” propaedeutics to philosophy for Plato, as suggested by Rep. Bk. 7, 521b-541b).
Bakhtin nevertheless clearly identifies an important element of Platonic autobiography,
when he points out the role of the metamorphosis of the seeker after truth. It is precisely
this dimension, as Misch too recognized, that allowed Plato to conceive philosophy as a
kind of end that individual human beings could pursue and, to some extent at least,
achieve. Bakhtin was also the first to recognize Platonic autobiography as a genre unto
itself, and indeed he was the first to give it a name.69
One of the central characteristics of Platonic philosophical autobiography is thus
that it is dynamic, because the philosopher who narrates his life story tells how he has
undergone change through time, while also emphasizing how this change was for the
better.70 In this way Platonic philosophical autobiography in some sense anticipates all
kinds of modern literary genres, including perhaps especially the Bildungsromane, or
novels of education, exemplified by the works of Rousseau and Goethe. Where the
subjects of Plato’s autobiographical writings are concerned, perhaps the most instructive
contrast is with Homer’s protagonist Odysseus, in some sense one of the first
autobiographers in history. In the Odyssey (Books 7-12), Odysseus relates to the court of
the Phaeacians the retrospective story of his many troubles. Aside from the obvious fact
69
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that Odysseus is a fictional character, the hard core of the distinction between the epic
hero and the Platonic hero is perhaps that the epic hero does not change over time,
undergoing no personal metamorphosis. Homer of course shows us Odysseus in all kinds
of situations and adventures, but arguably Odysseus himself remains the same through it
all. Plato, by contrast, is already modern, to the extent that in his autobiographical
writings he presents human beings as changeable over time, demonstrating his concern
with the intellectual formation and, indeed, metamorphosis of the single human being
who tells his life-story. Now, the modern surely becomes more modern in the millennia
that stand between us and Plato, and their can be no question that the subject of
autobiography becomes more complicated.71 In his autobiographical writings, Plato limits
himself to describing cognitive as opposed to noncognitive developments; he concerns
himself primarily with intellectual and political, as opposed to private matters; and he
never discusses childhood in autobiographical contexts.72 All this will have to wait until
Augustine, who gives us the model of a far more comprehensive and psychologically
complex autobiographical subject. Autobiography nonetheless already appears in Plato
bearing most of its familiar characteristics, a retrospective narrative that relates some
kind of personal progress, as well as certain other key features that I elaborated in the
Introduction and further below.
Thus Misch, Momigliano, and Bakhtin already recognized the emergence of
autobiography in Plato’s writings, and Bakhtin in particular even formulated something
like a concept of philosophical autobiography. For whatever reason or reasons, however,
these theorists failed to appreciate the central function of philosophical autobiography
71
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within Plato’s work, which is to present and give some account of ultimate philosophical
principles.
3. Autobiography in Plato’s writings from the viewpoint of the whole.— Surveying
Plato’s entire body of dialogues, one will find numerous autobiographical elements but
perhaps no fully realized autobiographies outside of the Apology of Socrates, the Phaedo,
and perhaps the Symposium. My interpretation will focus on Phaedo and the Apology, but
a few comments on the Symposium are in order. In Symposium, we get both a kind of
autobiographical story told by Socrates and a kind of biography of Socrates, which Plato
puts in the mouth of the drunken and loquacious Alcibiades. Autobiography and
biography are thus juxtaposed and mutually reinforce each other, so the dialogue presents
us with a fairly full portrait of Socrates’ personal history and character. Socrates’ account
of his own education by Diotima is probably fictional, perhaps because, as Cornford
suggests, this conceit gives him a way of politely softening his criticism of Agathon’s and
the others’ inadequate conceptions of eros. By putting Diotima in the position of the
master and himself in the position of the learner, Socrates can avoid seeming
overbearing. Despite the fact that the whole story may be made up, Socrates’ speech
looks autobiographical, and within the context of the dialogue there is no sign that the
story he tells about his youthful experiences might be false. Certainly no one within the
dialogue questions the veracity of Socrates’ report. Socrates’ story here is retrospective;
he speaks about his own intellectual change and improvement; and he uses the
autobiographical conceit to present an ultimate philosophical principle, in this case,
“beauty itself (αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν), absolute, pure, unmixed, not polluted by human flesh or
colors or any other great nonsense of mortality” (211e1-3). Through the course of relating
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his conversations with Diotima, Socrates shows his own beliefs changing, for example,
when he learns that Eros is not a god but a powerful spirit (or daimonion).
Socrates talks about his background in other dialogues, for example, he refers to
his mother in the Theaetetus and claims that he inherited the art of midwifery from her,
while this passage also contains certain reflections by Socrates on his experiences
conversing with young people about ideas (149a1-151d6). It is easy to obscure, and
difficult to maintain, the distinction between any self-referential discourse whatsoever
and autobiography as a unique literary form, which is both retrospective and progressive
in the sense that the autobiographer narrates how he changed or became better over the
course of time. As Momigliano observes, “any statement about oneself…can be regarded
as autobiographical,” and in his own study, he wisely limits himself to “accounts,
however partial, of the writer’s past life,” as opposed to “expressions of his present state
of mind.”73 Perhaps even these strictures are not really sufficient, and in any case some
surprising conclusions would follow from applying Momigliano’s criterion to Plato’s
writings. The most surprising is that, on the basis of this criterion, the four dialogues
Plato has Socrates narrate in their entirety, namely, Republic, Charmides, Lysis, and
Lovers, are all autobiographies, because in these dialogues Socrates narrates a
conversation in which he participated in the past. Other dialogues, such as Euthyphro,
might also be read as autobiographical. Nor is Socrates the only character that speaks like
an autobiographer in Plato’s dialogues. One might consider the eponymous Phaedo, for
example, as an autobiographer, since he gives a retrospective narrative of a conversation
he took part in that possibly changed his life. (Even Cephalus in Plato’s Republic looks
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like an autobiographer, talking about when he was younger and describing how he has
changed as he’s gotten older.) Yet it isn’t likely that anyone would insist on the
autobiographical character of any of these works or speeches. But why not? Limiting
ourselves to those dialogues narrated by Socrates, one may say that one reason not to read
these dialogues as autobiographical is that in them Socrates neither draws attention to
himself and his life, nor does he show how his beliefs changed over time. There is no
conversion or peripeteia. Otherwise Republic, for example, shares certain characteristics
of Plato’s other autobiographical writings, especially since here, too, Socrates can be seen
to present ultimate philosophical principles. The emphasis in these dialogues, however, is
not on Socrates and his philosophical becoming, that is, even if he happened to learn
something in the course of the discussions he recounts. By contrast, in the three dialogues
mentioned, the Symposium, the Apology, and the Phaedo, Socrates focuses on himself
and his past life and provides various retrospective accounts of how he came to be what
he is. He does so, moreover, for the express purpose of presenting and giving an account
of philosophical principles.
Since philosophical autobiography first comes to light in specific contexts within
Plato’s dialogues, it will prove worthwhile to consider the nature of the relationship
between dialogue and autobiography. Perhaps we ought to recognize that the dialogic
form is especially amenable not only to the incorporation and critique of other genres, as
Nightingale suggests, but also to the invention of new genres, such as philosophical
autobiography. Nietzsche, for example, sometimes interpreted the dialogue form with an
eye to its capacity for invention. In The Birth of Tragedy, for example, he claims that
Plato gave posterity the model (Vorbild) of a new art form (einer neuen Kunstform), the
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model of the novel (das Vorbild des Roman’s).74 Nietzsche goes on to describe the novel
“as an infinitely enhanced Aesopian fable,” and perhaps philosophical autobiography is
likewise a kind of fable, similarly “enhanced.” (As I discuss in Chapter 4, Descartes will
suggest that the histoire he offers in the Discourse on Method can be taken as une fable,
si vous l’aimez mieux.) According to Nietzsche, Plato subordinates poetry to
philosophical ends, but in so doing he also creates a new literary form, namely, the novel.
In similar fashion, I claim that Plato invented philosophical autobiography for the sake of
advancing philosophy.
4. Socrates’ autobiography in the Phaedo.— Of all Plato’s dialogues, none is more
autobiographical than Phaedo. Socrates’ autobiography at 95e7-102a1—and especially
the pivotal passage at 99d4-100b9—constitutes the basic paradigm of philosophical
autobiography, its structure, basic elements, and function. This epochal autobiographical
narrative may therefore be viewed as the template that all subsequent philosophical
autobiographies follow, knowingly or not. It stands to reason that if one grasps how this
particular philosophical autobiography works, one will have understood the basics of
philosophical autobiography. Even if someone were to discover an exceptional
philosophical autobiography that deviated entirely from the pattern established in
Phaedo, this pattern would still prove extremely useful as a point of comparison and
contrast.75 This Phaedo is therefore of the utmost importance for understanding
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philosophical autobiography, of the form and function of this kind of writing.76 As Virgil
says: ab uno disce omnes, from the example of one, learn them all.
Some of the most poignant and memorable interpretations of the Phaedo have
been advanced by Nietzsche (perhaps because, as Heidegger suggests, it takes a genius to
understand one). Nietzsche focused on different aspects of the dialogue over the course of
his career, at one point arguing, as we have seen, that the autobiography at 95e7-102a1
relates nothing other than “Plato’s own historical development.” Later, in the relatively
well-known aphorism from The Gay Science (§340), Nietzsche interprets Socrates’ last
words to Crito as a condemnation of life, as saying that death is the cure for the disease of
life. Obviously this is one possible interpretation of Socrates’ offering a sacrificial rooster
to Asclepius, the god of medicine, but it is certainly not the only one. Earlier in his
career, Nietzsche himself had suggested another, and I believe better interpretation,
which deserves to be more widely known. In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche writes:
Socrates appears to us as the first who could not only live, guided by the
instinct of science, but also—and this is far more—die that way. Hence the
image of the dying Socrates (das Bild des sterbenden Sokrates), as the
human being whom knowledge and reasons have liberated from the fear of
death, is the emblem that, above the entrance gate of science, reminds all
of its mission—namely, to make existence appear comprehensible and
thus justified; and if reasons do not suffice, myth has to come to their aid
in the end—myth which I have just called the necessary consequence,
indeed the purpose, of science (BT §15/KSA 1: 99).
As we saw in the Introduction, Nietzsche was to maintain the belief throughout his career
that the ultimate test of a philosophical teaching is, as he put it in Schopenhauer as
about himself than to its difficult style. See especially pp. 38, 56. We simply have a hard time
talking about certain things, but philosophers must sometimes overcome shame for the sake of the
good.
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It would be strange to claim that all subsequent philosophical autobiographies consciously base
themselves on this model, though it must be said that in many cases, if not all, the possibility of
conscious imitation cannot be ruled out altogether. Autobiography, even if it is a historical
phenomenon, possesses a logic inherent to itself.
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Educator, “whether one can live in accordance with it (ob man nach ihr leben könne)”
(§8/KSA 1: 417). For the young Nietzsche, Plato’s Socrates proved not only that he could
live on the basis of his philosophy but also that he could die fearlessly because of it. The
other reading of Socrates’ words last words is, therefore, that Socrates owes a sacrifice to
the god of medicine because he has been cured of the fear of death. Of course, Socrates’
character and philosophical principles have something to do with this as well.
In Socrates’ autobiography, we witness the coming-into-being of a new kind of
philosophy and perhaps, if Nightingale and others are right, of philosophy itself.
Socrates’ autobiography foregrounds the human, historical origin of philosophy.
Nietzsche was not alone in noticing that the Phaedo gives us valuable insight into the
nature and development of philosophy as Plato understood it. Referring to Socrates’
autobiography, Cornford writes that “Plato has made Socrates himself describe the
revolution of thought he effected—how he turned philosophy from the study of external
Nature to the study of man and of the purposes of human action in society.”77 Now even
if we admit, as I think with some qualifications we must, that the western philosophical
tradition antedates both Socrates and Plato, it is nevertheless true, as Nietzsche
recognized, that this tradition takes a great turn with them (see, for example, The Birth of
Tragedy, sections 13-15). Plato and Socrates together inaugurate a new philosophical
tradition, and philosophical autobiography plays a significant role within this foundation.
In a striking historical analogy, Descartes’ Discourse on the Method, a text that is often
taken to mark the beginning of specifically modern philosophy, is also autobiographical.
So there is an affinity between philosophical autobiography and beginnings, which
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coincides nicely with my claim that the primary function of philosophical autobiography
is to present and account for first or ultimate philosophical principles.
Socrates’ autobiography concerns his own conversion (περιπέτεια) from being an
enthusiast of “that wisdom they call inquiry into nature” to being a philosopher of
speeches (λόγοι) and, as it turns out, of “forms” (see especially 99d4-100b9). Socrates
decides to give an autobiographical narrative in response to Cebes’ argument that admits
the existence of the soul before birth but calls into question its continued existence after
death. The preeminent topic of discussion in the Phaedo is of course whether or not the
soul is immortal, and prior to giving his autobiography, Socrates and the others advance a
number of arguments that attempt to prove that the soul is truly deathless. They consider
how opposites come from opposites, such as waking from sleeping, and suggest that the
relationship between death and life is analogous (70c-72e). They adduce the idea of
learning as recollection, which they all seem to accept and which further suggests the
soul’s immortality (72e-77a). In yet another argument, Socrates shows that the soul
resembles the immortal forms by being simple and invisible, as opposed to bodies that
are complex and visible (78b-84c). Simmias and Cebes remain skeptical, however, and
encouraged by Socrates, they take turns voicing arguments that cast serious doubts about
the soul’s immortality (84c-88b). Phaedo, who narrates the dialogue, tells Echecrates how
Simmias’ and Cebes’ arguments threw everyone present into sadness, confusion, and
doubt about the arguments for the soul’s immortality, and Echecrates even interrupts
Phaedo’s narrative to say that he feels “real sympathy” with the sorry state they were in at
that point in the discussion. Yet Phaedo proceeds to say that he never admired Socrates
more than for how he responded to these arguments:
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That he had a reply was perhaps not strange (οὐδὲν ἄτοπον). What I
wondered at most (ἔγωγε µάλιστα ἐθαύµασα) in him was the pleasant,
kind, and admiring way he received the young men’s argument, and how
sharply he was aware of the effect the discussion had on us, and then how
well he healed our distress and, as it were, recalled us from our flight and
defeat and turned us around (προύτρεψεν) to join him in the examination
of their argument (89a1-8).
In what follows, Socrates easily shows that Simmias’ argument that the soul is produced
by the body as a melody is produced by a lyre cannot withstand scrutiny from Simmias’
own point of view. Socrates admits, however, that Cebes’ argument poses far greater
difficulties.
Cebes contends that it is possible that the soul is not immortal but rather very
durable; it might go through many cycles of birth, death, and rebirth, before finally
wearing out. Like the tailor who makes and wears out many coats over the course of his
lifetime, the soul might finally die, never to be reborn, leaving behind nothing behind but
the last body it inhabited, as the tailor leaves his last coat. After recounting Cebes’
argument, Phaedo tells us that “Socrates paused for a long time and within himself
considered something” (Ὁ οὖν Σωκράτης συχνὸν χρόνον ἐπισχὼν καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτόν τι
σκεψάµενος) (95e8-9). This is the essence of a dramatic pause, and given its proper
weight, Socrates’ pausing or holding up (ἐπισχών) builds suspense and alerts us to the
possibility that something important is about to happen. As at other key junctures within
Plato’s dialogues (for example, at Symposium 174d-e and in the Phaedo itself at 84b),
Socrates pauses to think, and as ever, we readers can never know what exactly Socrates
has thought, since it is the nature of thought as silent internal dialogue not to reveal itself
to others. All we know is the speech act, or acts, that emerge from this silent pondering
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(what Wilfrid Sellars calls “language entry transitions”), and in this particular case
Socrates’ speech act will be his autobiography.
Why is autobiography an appropriate literary form (or way of speaking) in this
context? As I argued in my Ancient Philosophy article (Fall 2008, pp. 347-355), Socrates’
autobiography aims to impress Cebes and others with the necessity of decision or
judgment where philosophical first principles are concerned. It isn’t, however, simply this
need that Socrates wants to emphasize. Rather, Socrates’ autobiography also works to
present and advance a specific philosophical principle, as well as a kind of practice, or
activity, based on it. The life-story he tells is his way of persuading his interlocutors (and
Plato’s readers) to accept this particular principle that depends on Socrates’ judgment.
Now, since first principles are by definition indemonstrable, philosophers such as
Socrates need a way to account for first principles other than as following necessarily
from prior premises.78
Socrates says that Cebes argument asks him to examine closely the cause of
coming-to-be and passing away in general (ὅλως γὰρ δεῖ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν
αἰτίαν διαπραγµατεύσασθαι, 95e10-96a1). This is no small matter, as Socrates says. In
order to address it, Socrates offers to narrate his own experiences with respect to these
things. The word that apparently everyone translates as “experiences” is τὰ πάθη (ta
pathê), and it is important to note that the word “experiences” doesn’t quite convey all
the connotations of the Greek word. The singular τὸ πάθος (to pathos) has a range of
meanings, but foremost among them is surely suffering coupled with a sense of passivity.
78

One hardly needs to cite Aristotle in support of the claim that first principles are
indemonstrable. This is basically an analytic statement inasmuch as the predicate is implicitly
contained in the subject, i.e., it is like the statement that all bachelors are unmarried men. But,
anyway, for Aristotle’s explanation of first principles see Post. An. ii 19 esp. 100b10-11.
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(One might compare Homer’s use of the term at Odys. 1.4.) When Socrates says he will
tell the story of his sufferings, he means it quite literally, and his autobiography is
nothing if it is not also a tale of the agony involved in the odyssey of the search for truth.
Socrates’ autobiography is also a startling and memorable testament to the courage and
endurance required to persevere in such a quest.
What might seem strange, however, is that Socrates responds to what looks like
an impersonal problem by giving a personal narrative. The related problems of comingto-be, passing-away, and being certainly admit of non-autobiographical treatment, as is
amply demonstrated by multiple texts throughout the history of so-called “Western”
philosophy. In the context of Phaedo itself, Socrates might have presented the theory of
ideas more straightforwardly, by means of a myth, through Socratic conversation
(elenchus), or by means of another sort of speech. Yet autobiography can be seen to have
a special appeal within the context of what Socrates is trying to do. Socrates wants to
impress Cebes and the others with what it means to decide on first principles and why, in
his own case at least, he found it necessary to make such a decision.
Socrates begins his autobiography by emphasizing the kind of knowledge that he
sought as a young man. I quote Plato’s Greek then provide my own translation:
ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, νέος ὢν θαυµαστῶς ὡς ἐπεθύµησα ταύτης τῆς
σοφίας ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν· ὑπερήφανος γάρ µοι
ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἑκάστου, διὰ τί γίγνεται ἕκαστον καὶ
διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τί ἔστι (96a5-9).
Which I translate:
(Socrates) said, “I, Kebes, being young was wonderfully enamored of this
wisdom, which they call the study of nature. For it seemed to me to be
sublime, to know the causes of each thing, why each thing comes to be,
and why it disintegrates, and why it is.
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Wanting to know the causes (τὰς αἰτίας) of all the particular things, Socrates states that
he believed the study of nature was the most promising route to such knowledge. It is
interesting to note that this passage shows how there are certain limits to what Socrates’
autobiography attempts to explain, because Socrates never tells us why he wanted to
know the causes in the first place; he only tells us that he wanted to know them. The
origin of his desire to know the causes, therefore, remains shrouded in mystery. (In the
Apology, by contrast, Socrates does give some answer to the question why he began his
life of philosophical activity, namely, in order to understand the enigmatic utterance of
the god that said Socrates was the wisest human. Of course this particular story is
problematic, but see below about this.)
In searching for the causes, Socrates explains that he wanted to know three things:
on account of what (διὰ τί) things come to be, on account of what (διὰ τί) they are
destroyed, and, finally, on account of what (διᾶ τι) they are at all. Especially with respect
to the third question, why things are at all, one can see how Plato already implies the
philosophical question formulated and reformulated throughout the history of philosophy,
for example, by Leibniz and Wittgenstein, namely, why are there beings at all instead of
nothing? Natural science cannot answer this question: it is therefore a question that marks
the limit of what we are naturally able to know. Thus in the first few lines of Socrates’
autobiography the seeds of his subsequent disillusionment with natural studies are
already present. He was looking in the wrong place for an answer to his question about
the causes.
Socrates proceeds to describe how he went about studying nature, and his account
of his natural studies is far more sophisticated than some scholars believe, perhaps
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because they are somewhat too much taken in by Socrates’ protestations of ineptitude and
ignorance (for example, at 96b). Socrates’ protests are undoubtedly ironical. As
Kierkegaard, for example, noted, it is a great mistake to think that Socratic ignorance
means that Socrates was wholly ignorant of empirical matters, such as those the natural
sciences address.79 Socratic ignorance is about the source of beings, and so it is perhaps
unsurprising that it should have a theological dimension, insofar as Socrates, in other
contexts, regularly maintains that he has no knowledge of the character of god or the
gods. His ignorance is not principally about empirical or even mathematical things, it is
rather about the source of beings, why they come to be, why they perish, and why they
are at all. Again, as Kierkegaard (1989, p. 169) says, “(Socrates) was ignorant of the
ground of all being, the eternal, the divine—that is, he knew that it was, but he did not
know what it was.”
In his autobiography, Socrates describes the character of his investigations into
nature. He claims he thought often about heat, cold, and their mixture as it pertains to the
composition of animal organisms; he considered whether the source of our ability to
think came from blood or air or fire or the brain (ὁ ἐγκέφαλος); and he considered the
“affections (πάθη)” of the heavens and the earth. In his account of these studies, he
succinctly summarizes an entire theory of what we call cognitive psychology:
Is the blood that by which we’re thoughtful? Or is it air or fire? Or is it
none of these, and is it the brain (ὁ ἐγκέφαλος) that produces the senses of
hearing and seeing and smelling; and would memory and opinion (µνήµη
καί δόχα) arise out of these, and in this way out of memory and opinion
brought to a state of rest arises knowledge (ἐπιστήµην)? (96b3-9)
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Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, trans. Hong and Hong (Princeton, 1989), especially
p. 169.
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Socrates presents this theory in the form of questions, thus escaping the strictures of what
Aristotle would later call apophantic discourse (i.e., discourse that makes assertions that
can be true or false). Questions are neither true nor false, but one can nevertheless state a
theory by means of questions. Probably this particular series of questions indicates in
outline Socrates’, or rather Plato’s, theory about how cognition works, but in the present
context there is no need to go beyond the indication of this possibility.
At this point, Socrates introduces the first reversal in his life story. Having
devoted substantial effort to the study of nature, he says that he finally came to believe
that he was without natural talent (ἀφυής) for the kind of investigation (τὴν σκέψιν) he
was attempting to conduct (96c1-3). He further promises to give Cebes a sure and
sufficient proof (τεκµήριον) of his ineptitude, which leads into a rather strange passage in
which Socrates talks about all the things he used to believe he knew, for example, that a
human being grows by eating and drinking and that ten is more than eight because two
has been added to the latter. This is strange because one might naturally think that human
beings do in fact grow by eating and drinking and that ten is more than eight because two
has been added. Cebes interrupts to ask how these things seem to Socrates now, which
prompts the latter to swear by god that he is “far from thinking that (he knows) the cause
(τὴν αἰτίαν) concerning any of these things” (96e6-7). Again, contrary to what some
scholars seem to suppose, Socrates’ subsequent meditations on mathematics are hardly
unsophisticated or without interest. Quite the opposite is true. Socrates offers a profound
meditation on the nature of number itself in light of reflection on the basic operations of
addition and division. That the one is in the two and the two is in the one is both
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philosophically interesting and pertinent to the question of the relation between soul and
body around which much of the dialogue revolves.80
Here, however, a second reversal occurs, when, Socrates says, he chanced upon
someone reading from a book by Anaxagoras (on the wide availability of Anaxagoras’
writings in Athens compare Apology 26d-e). Socrates submits that when he heard
Anaxagoras’ claim that “mind is that which both orders and causes all things” (νοῦς
ἐστιν ὁ διακοσµῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος, 97c1-2, my translation), he became once more
full of hope. It is well-known that these hopes too were to be disappointed, but it is rather
what Socrates says he hoped to find in Anaxagoras’ writings that provides real insight
into Socrates’ own beliefs about both mind and cause. With respect to the idea that mind
(νοῦς) is the cause of beings, he says:
ταύτῃ δὴ τῇ αἰτίᾳ ἥσθην τε καὶ ἔδοξέ µοι τρόπον τινὰ εὖ ἔχειν τὸ τὸν
νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον, καὶ ἡγησάµην, εἰ τοῦθ’ οὕτως ἔχει, τόν γε
νοῦν κοσµοῦντα πάντα κοσµεῖν καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέναι ταύτῃ ὅπῃ ἂν
βέλτιστα ἔχῃ· εἰ οὖν τις βούλοιτο τὴν αἰτίαν εὑρεῖν περὶ ἑκάστου ὅπῃ
γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, τοῦτο δεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ εὑρεῖν, ὅπῃ
βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἐστιν ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν· ἐκ δὲ δὴ
τοῦ λόγου τούτου οὐδεν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ περὶ
αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀλλ’ ἢ τό ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον
(97c2-d4).
I was pleased by this cause and it also seemed to me that it was in some
way good that mind be the cause of all things, and I believed, if this is how
it is, ordering mind orders each and every thing in what way it would be
best; and so if someone wished to discover the cause concerning each
thing, how it comes to be or is destroyed or is, it is necessary to discover
about this in what way it is best for it to be, or to suffer, or to do; and then
from this what is proper for a human being with respect to this itself and
all the other things is to investigate nothing other than what is noblest and
best.
80

When you add one soul to one body, you get a two, namely, a soul-body composite that is also,
however, a one, i.e., one composite; then again, when you divide the one composite, you get two
halves, a soul and body, each of which is also one. Addition and division, therefore, both result in
a kind of two. Yet the two of division seems to differ from that of addition in that, subsequent to
division, each of the two halves goes its separate way.
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Socrates admits that he thinks of mind (νοῦς) as that which orders things for the best
(βέλτιστον). His hope was that Anaxagoras’ writings would show him how this was so,
how exactly it is that mind orders beings in the best way. Socrates’ account thus clearly
indicates the kind of cause he was seeking, which would seem to be a kind of divine,
intelligent cause that orders everything in the best possible way. In a subsequent passage,
he says that he never supposed that Anaxagoras, while advancing mind as the cause of
beings, would explain beings in terms of any other cause than mind that looks to the best.
Socrates seems to have believed that if mind were the cause of beings, then beings would
be in the best condition it was possible for them to be in; if they came-to-be, or ceasedto-be, or were at all, then it would be because that was what was best for them. He says,
“thus, once (Anaxagoras) had given the cause for each one and for all of them in
common, I thought he’d go on to take me through the best for each and the common good
to all” (ἑκάστῳ οὖν αὐτῶν ἀποδιδόντα τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι τὸ ἑκάστῳ
βέλτιστον ᾤµην καὶ τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσιν ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι ἀγαθόν) (98a9-b3, Brann,
Kalkavage, Salem trans.). Socrates search, then, was a search for the good and for an
understanding of how the good makes and governs the all.
It is only in the context of expressing his disappointment with Anaxagoras’
teachings that Socrates gives the real reasons that he became disillusioned with the entire
approach taken by “natural studies” with respect to the question of the cause. This
disillusionment has nothing to do with Socrates’ supposed ineptitude; rather, it stems
from the fact that natural studies cannot even really explain natural beings, much less
account for why human beings act as they do. The problem with Anaxagoras is that,
although he recognized mind as a cause, he made no use of it when it actually came to
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explaining beings. Instead, as Socrates laments, he spoke like those others who pursued
the study of nature, referring to air, ether, water, and so on in his attempts to explain
beings. Since today the ancient hope of providing a comprehensive naturalistic
explanation of the cosmos is alive and well, Socrates’ critique of natural studies may
prove quite relevant to a critique of the spirit of our own times. Socrates describes his
dissatisfaction with naturalistic explanations in terms of an analogy. Those who explain
things in terms of their material properties, like Anaxagoras and the other “students of
nature,” are like people who would explain why Socrates is sitting in jail by referring to
facts such as that he has a body, bones, and sinews. In opposition to such people and their
ideas, Socrates maintains that “to call such things causes is exceedingly absurd” (λίαν
ἄτοπον) (99a4-5). He explains this absurdity in terms of the nature lovers’ failure to
distinguish between true causes (τὰς ὡς ἀληθῶς αἰτίας, 98e1) and what we might call
secondary, or enabling, causes. Those who practice “natural studies” would explain
Socrates’ sitting in prison in terms of enabling causes, such as that he has a body
composed of bones, sinews, and so forth. Socrates, however, swears “by the Dog” and
jokes that his bones and sinews would probably have emigrated from Athens, avoiding
death, if it were up to them. Socrates himself is something different than these things, and
in fact he regards these bones and sinews with something like the disdain expressed by
Turenne: “Carcasse, tu trembles? Tu tremblerais bien davantage, si tu savais, où je te
mène.”81 (Carcass, you tremble? You would tremble much more if you knew where I am
taking you.)

81

Quoted by Nietzsche as the epigraph to Wir Furchtlosen (the title of Book 5 of Die fröhliche
Wissenschaft).
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Socrates recognizes that he could not be sitting in prison without bones and
sinews; hence he realizes that they are enabling causes of his being there. He submits,
however, that the true causes (τὰς ὡς ἀληθῶς αἰτίας) of his being there are that the
Athenians believed it was better (βέλτιον) to condemn him to death, while he, for his
part, has decided it better (βέλτιον) to accept the Athenians’ decision and to stay in
prison awaiting death (98c2-99b2, especially 98e1-5). The implication of Socrates’
analogy is that material causes cannot explain actions within the human realm of political
life, where decisions are made with respect to the good (n.b., good, better, best are the
three modalities of a single idea). How much stranger would it be, then, to explain the
entire cosmos, universe, or whatever one wants to call it, in terms of such secondary,
enabling causes? That there could be no cosmos without air, ether, water, and so forth;
that, in modern parlance, our world wouldn’t be at all without, for example, the chemical
elements, tells us nothing about the true cause (or causes) of the world. For, to cite a
familiar story, even if the cosmos is turtles all the way down, this in no way explains why
there are turtles in the first place.
Having thoroughly explained his acquired belief about the inadequacy of natural
studies to discover, much less teach, the true cause, Socrates is now ready to present the
decisive reversal (περιπέτεια) in his autobiography, which is the moment when he
became a philosopher of speeches and forms. As he says, he was never able to find a
teacher of the kind of cause he was looking for, which he calls “the truly good and that
which ought to bind and hold-together” (ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον συνδεῖν καὶ
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συνέχειν, 99c5-6, my translation), nor was he able to discover this cause for himself.82 In
the key passage of Socrates’ autobiography, he describes his “second sailing” in the
following way:
ἔδοξε τοίνυν µοι, ἦ δ’ ὅς, µετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπειρήκη τὰ ὄντα
σκοπῶν, δεῖν εὐλαβηθῆναι µὴ πάθοιµι ὅπερ οἱ τὸν ἥλιον ἐκλείποντα
θεωροῦντες καὶ σκοπούµενοι πάσχουσιν· διαφθείρονται γάρ που ἔνιοι
τὰ ὄµµατα, ἐὰν µὴἐν ὕδατι ἤ τινι τοιούτῳ σκοπῶνται τὴν εἰκόνα
αὐτοῦ. τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐγὼ διενοήθην, καὶ ἔδεισα µὴ παντάπασι τὴν
ψυχὴν τυφλωθείην βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγµατα τοῖς ὄµµασι καὶ ἑκάστῃ
τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἅπτεσθαι αὐτῶν. ἔδοξε δή µοι χρῆναι εἰς
τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν
ἀλήθειαν. ἴσως µὲν οὖν ᾧ εἰκάζω τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν· οὐ γὰρ πάνυ
συγχωρῶ τὸν ἐν λόγοις σκοπούµενον τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκόσι µᾶλλον σκοπεῖν
ἢ τὸν ἐν ἔργοις. ἀλλ’ οὖν δὴ ταύτῃ γε ὥρµησα, καὶ ὑποθέµενος
ἑκάστοτε λόγον ὃν ἂν κρίνω ἐρρωµενέστατον εἶωαι, ἃ µὲν ἄν µοι δοκῇ
τούτῳ συµφωνεῖν τίθηµι ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα, καὶ περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν
ἄλλων ἁπάντων, ἃ δ’ ἂν µή, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ. βούλοµαι δέ σοι
σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν ἃ λέγω· οἶµαι γάρ σε νῦν οὐ µανθάνειν (99d4100a8).
After I had renounced these things, he said, it now (τοίνυν) seemed to me
that investigating beings, it was necessary to beware that I might not suffer
(πάθοιµι) in the way those suffer (πάσχουσιν) who contemplate and
investigate eclipses of the sun; for their eyes are sometimes destroyed, if
they don’t investigate the image of the sun in water or some other such
stuff. I thought about something like this, and I feared that if I didn’t look
at things (τὰ πράγµατα) in stuff like water, my soul might be blinded,
since I was attempting to grasp them by each of the senses (τῶν
αἰσθήσεων). It seemed necessary to me then to take refuge in (or to flee
into) speeches and in them to investigate the truth of beings. And yet
perhaps I am making a likeness that is somehow not a (proper) likeness.
For I do not at all concede that the one investigating beings in speeches
investigates likenesses more than the one who investigates them in
actions. Now, however, I began (ὥρµησα) this (investigation) in earnest,
and hypothesizing in each case the speech that I judge (κρίνω) to be the
strongest, whatever beings seem to me to harmonize with this speech I set
down as true, both with respect to causes and to everything else, and
whatever doesn’t harmonize with it, I set down as false. I wish, however,
to tell you more clearly what I mean; because I think now you don’t
understand.83
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For the idea that there are only two ways of learning anything, learning from another or
discovering for yourself, see Alcibiades I 106d.
83
My translation.
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There are a number of things to note about this passage. First of all, it epitomizes the
confidential character of autobiography, since Socrates confides (or at least purports to
confide) the fundamental presuppositions of his entire philosophical practice. He tells
Cebes and the others his belief that speeches (λόγοι) are no less true beings than are
works, deeds, or actions (ἔργα). λόγοι, he believes, have just as much reality as ἔργα, and
in both cases one investigates the truth of beings as one contemplates the image of the
sun in reflective stuff like water. Human access to the truth of beings is through speeches
and deeds, and although speeches and deeds may equally provide access to the truth of
beings, Socrates prefers to investigate this truth through speeches. (In Apology, Socrates
suggests that, in contrast to his own practice, the demos honors actions more highly than
speeches and words, 32a4-5.) Speeches themselves, however, are also deeds, and it is
therefore the case that, by investigating speeches, Socrates investigates deeds at well.
Even more important is Socrates’ revelation that his philosophical activity rests
on judgment about the strongest hypothesis in any given instance. Socrates says “I
decide” or “I judge,” κρίνω (krinô) and this is the only appearance of this verb in the
Phaedo, which opens the possibility that it has been specially reserved for this moment,
i.e., by Plato. It follows that the ultimate principle of Socrates’ philosophical practice
rests on judgment or decision. More precisely, Socrates confides that his philosophical
activity rests on a first, foundational choice and on the judgment about the strongest
speech to hypothesize in each and every case. His first and fundamental decision is to
turn to the investigation of speeches and then to hypothesize the strongest speech he can
find in any given case. Socrates seems interested in exploring speeches in order to learn
what they disclose. As the autobiography shows, this foundational decision is not ex
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nihilo; rather, it is based on the experiences of his life and the things he suffered in his
search for the cause. His decision to pursue investigation of the truth of beings in a new
way rests on his realization that his desire allows him no alternatives. The predecessors
who study nature cannot answer his question about cause, and he says he was never able
to discover the kind of cause he was looking for on his own. In a sense, Socrates turns to
the λόγοι because he is unable to find any worthwhile alternative. If in each particular
case the best he can do is to hypothesize the strongest speech, in the case of his attempt to
prove the immortality of the soul, the strongest hypothesis he can muster is the theory of
ideas.
Indeed, Socrates ultimately replies to Cebe’s argument with a certain version of
the hypothesis of ideas: a thing according to itself can neither change nor admit its
opposite (102d5-103a2). This enables Socrates to argue that since soul “always comes on
the scene bringing life to bear on whatever she herself occupies,” it is impossible that
soul should ever admit death, which is the contrary of life. Consequently soul is deathless
or immortal (105c8-107a1, BKS). Socrates’ argument depends upon a specific
formulation of the theory of ideas, and so he must get Cebes to accept this theory in order
to prove the soul’s immortality. His autobiography is his means of persuading Cebes to
accept his starting point.
Since my argument contends for its paradigmatic status, it is important to note
that Socrates’ autobiography contains all the primary elements of a philosophical
autobiography, while it also exemplifies the basic function of autobiography within a
philosophical context. Three points in particular are especially worthy of note. Socrates’
autobiography presents, first of all, a conversion, and it has a conversion structure.
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Socrates relates at least three reversals: his initial disappointment with the study of
nature; his turn to Anaxagoras; and his turn to speeches and the theory of forms. Second,
the autobiography is protreptic because it aims to turn hearers to philosophy as the best
way of humanlife. Socrates’ adduces both his life and himself as proof of the worth of the
principles he wants to present and advance, while he also shows that it is possible to live
in accordance with these principles. To quote Lewis Carroll again, “if it was so, it might
be.” Socrates’ autobiography thus attempts to meet Nietzsche’s demand that the true test
of a philosophy is to see “whether one can live in accordance with it,” and this goes for
philosophical principles too. Socrates wants to highlight that he has been able to live by
the principle he presents, and this goes to show that the truths he expresses in his
autobiography are not merely abstract arguments but have an integral connection to his
own life and becoming. Here, as elsewhere, ultimate philosophical principles inform
subsequent philosophical activity. Third and finally, Socrates’ autobiography shows how
philosophical autobiography is essentially a means of presenting and giving an account of
philosophical principles. In the Phaedo, Socrates uses his life story for the sake of
presenting his own philosophical principles, which are arguably the ultimate principles of
his philosophy. In the Apology, he presents these same principles in another way and
pitched in a more popular idiom, but there too autobiography serves as the primary means
of the presentation. These autobiographical accounts establish that Socrates is committed
to the philosophical life, why he is committed to it, and how this commitment expresses
itself in his activity and particular humanlife.
Although it is not the only reason or even the most profound one, Socrates
indicates that his interest in political philosophy and the question of the best life for
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human beings contributed significantly to his ultimate turn. This is consistent with the
usual interpretation of Socrates that goes back to Aristotle, namely, the one that views
Socrates as turning philosophy away from concern with the natural things and toward
concern with the human ones. If Western philosophy as such is determined by the
Socratic turn away from the predominantly naturalistic Presocratic philosophers and
toward concern with the things of the polis, it is clear that, as Misch and Cornford
suggest, Plato presents something like the autobiography of philosophy itself in this
passage of the Phaedo. It seems clear, however, that Socrates’ conversion was motivated
even more by the inability of natural studies to give an account of the true cause of
beings. The Platonic-Socratic turn is, therefore, not only a turn toward the human things
but to the divine ones, that is, insofar as we can know them through speeches and deeds.
The deepest sense of the conversion philosophy undergoes in the persons of Socrates and
Plato is away from natural studies and toward (what we call) metaphysics.
5. Socrates’ autobiography in the context of the Phaedo as a whole.— Having focused
on Socrates’ autobiography at 95e7-102a1, it will now be worthwhile to zoom out and
consider its place within the Phaedo as a whole. Significantly Socrates’ imminent death
or, to be more precise, the anticipation of his death shared by Socrates and his
interlocutors, elicits a conversation in which one of the central themes is life, both
biological life and humanlife, as well as their interconnection. Although Socrates’ speech
at 95e7-102a1 is clearly the central autobiographical narrative in the dialogue, the
Phaedo is autobiographical in a broader sense as well. The dialogue raises the question of
self from its first word, αὐτός, when Echecrates asks Phaedo whether he himself was
present on the day of Socrates’ death or whether he instead heard about it from others. As
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suggested above, this question encourages Phaedo himself to become something of an
autobiographer, because he relates a story about his past life, while also suggesting how
this experience changed him. Although the discussion of the immortality of the soul is the
most salient feature of the dialogue, the Phaedo as a whole is also very much concerned
with the question of how one is to live one’s humanlife.
The eponymous Phaedo relates his story to Echecrates and perhaps to some other
unnamed hearers.84 Plato has Phaedo tell the interlocutors that he (Plato) was ill on the
day of Socrates’ death (59b10), one of three times Plato mentions himself in his own
dialogues (the others are Apology, 34a2 and 38b7). The self-reference is undoubtedly
noteworthy, but since consideration of this would throw us right back into the historical
dilemmas I want to bracket, I will not attempt to make much of this reference here.85
The dialogue puts the question of humanlife (βίος) into play almost from the
onset, by raising a question about how Socrates in particular has spent his life. Early in
the dialogue Cebes asks Socrates why the latter has been composing poems while in
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Burnet, in his notes on the text, observes that the presence of other hearers in addition to
Echecrates is implied at 58d7 and 102a8. See John Burnet, Plato’s Phaedo, edited with an
Introduction and Notes (Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1911), Notes, p. 1.
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See Burnet, ibid., p. xxix-xxx. Does Plato’s being ill necessarily mean that he was absent? That
is how the statement is usually interpreted, but in that case he must have been very sick indeed, to
have missed the last opportunity to talk with his friend in person. Is it possible that Plato was sick
but nevertheless present? If, however, we content ourselves with the standard reading, Plato
opens various interpretive possibilities respecting the dialogue and Socrates’ autobiography in
particular. If Plato really was absent on that day, it is unthinkable that he would not have heard
subsequently some report or reports of what transpired then. Despite Plato’s self-professed
absence, therefore, it is certainly within the realm of possibility that the Phaedo has some basis in
historical fact. It is also possible, however, and perhaps more likely, that by mentioning his
illness, and thus suggesting his absence, Plato signals that the Phaedo is, at least in part, his own
creative reconstruction of that day’s events. In that case, he signals that the dialogue should not be
taken to present what the historical Socrates actually said and did on the day of his death, but
rather what Plato believes he should have said and done. Whatever the extent of Plato’s creative
contribution, it would undoubtedly have been informed by his superlative respect for the actual
man Socrates, as well as his desire to make the literary character Socrates an exemplary figure of
the philosopher.
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prison, and Socrates answers by referring to a recurrent dream he had previously in life
(ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ, 60e4-6). Again and again, the dream had told him to make music
and work at it, and Socrates says that he had always thought this dream message was
encouraging him to do what he was already doing, namely, philosophizing. The
assumption he had made was that philosophy itself is the greatest music. But now, he
says, he has begun to harbor doubts about whether his assumption was correct, and
consequently he has begun to make music in the more conventional sense. Perhaps this is
one of the most humanly moving developments in the whole dialogue, since we see
Socrates actually seeming to entertain doubts about how he has spent his life.
As I explained in the Introduction, life is equivocal, since it can mean both
biological life (in our sense of “biology”) or ζωή (zôê), on the one hand, and specifically
humanlife, or βίος (bios), on the other. The discussion of the Phaedo includes by turns
consideration of both senses of life, which is fitting because βίος or humanlife,
presupposes and indeed depends on ζωή as an enabling cause. Yet the central significant
theme of the Phaedo is really βίος. For although βίος depends on ζωή, it is nevertheless
not wholly subservient to it, as indeed Socrates’ current predicament clearly
demonstrates. For, as I previously noted, Socrates’ βίος (or way of life) is somehow the
cause of the impending termination of his biological life, and he insists that in no case
would he change his way of life in order to preserve his biological one (compare Apol.
28a3-30c). To say it again, the Phaedo is about the fact that a human being has two
interrelated but distinct lives, a βίος and a ζωή, and what Socrates argues is that of the
two, the βίος is by far the most important and valuable.
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There is, however, an even deeper sense in which Socrates opposes βίος and ζωή
in the Phaedo, and this opposition applies in both his own case and in the case of all
those philosophize “in the proper manner” (ὀρθῶς). He insists that the philosophical way
of life aims to transcend the limitations inherent in mere animal or biological life. “The
one aim of those who practice philosophy in the proper manner is to practice for dying
and death ” (64a). In response to this surprising claim, Cebes and Simmias both voice
their doubts, because to them death quite naturally seems to be something bad.86 Socrates
explicitly frames his rejoinder to their concerns in terms of a legal trial; at the beginning
of a longish argument (63b-69e), he refers to the need for him to make an apology as if
he were in court, and he says that he will speak to Simmias, Cebes, and the others as
though to judges. Socrates then intends this fairly lengthy apology to complement the
apology he made for himself at his trial before the Athenians, and at the end of his
apology in the Phaedo he expresses his hope that by this defense (τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ) he has
convinced his present interlocutors more than his previous defense had convinced the
Athenian jury (69e). In the Phaedo, Socrates’ explicit goal is to defend the belief that
those who spend their lives philosophizing have good reason to face death cheerfully:
ὑµῖν δὴ τοῖς δικασταῖς βούλοµαι ἤδη τὸν λόγον ἀποδοῦναι, ὥς µοι
φαίνεται εἰκότως ἀνὴρ τῷ ὄντι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίψας τὸν βίον
θαρρεῖν µέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι καὶ εὔελπις εἶναι ἐκεῖ µέγιστα
οἴσεσθαι ἀγαθὰ ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ (63e8-64a2).
I want to make my argument before you, my judges, as to why I think that
a man who has truly spent his life in philosophy is probably right to be of
good cheer in the face of death and to be very hopeful that after death he
will attain the greatest blessings yonder.

86

Rousseau (1979, p. 193): “the aversion to dying is the strongest of all those aversions nature
gives us.”
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It is necessary to emphasize that Socrates’ ἀπολογία in the Phaedo has an
autobiographical character without being a proper philosophical autobiography. What
Socrates does here is to outline the way of life he considers proper to those who
philosophize, and then at the conclusion of the argument he says that “in life” (ἐν τῷ βίῳ)
he has “left nothing undone” to participate as far as possible in the philosophical life thus
described (69d3-4). In other words, in his ἀπολογία he attempts to give a definition,
however partial, of the philosophical life in general, and then he refers this definition to
himself. Insofar as he is a philosopher, he has much hope that something good awaits him
after death. Yet although Socrates describes here a way of life that he says has been his,
he neither discusses specific events in his life, nor does he say anything about his own
intellectual or ethical development. There is no life-story here, no narrative; and even
with respect to the philosophical life as such, Socrates describes what it is rather than
how it comes to be, which is the proper subject of philosophical autobiography. This
other apology does, however, present certain principles, especially if the proper aim of
philosophy is to prepare for dying and death.
6. Socrates’ popular autobiography in the Apology of Socrates.— Whereas he narrates
his life-story in Phaedo to sympathetic and philosophically-minded friends, in the
Apology Socrates addresses certain autobiographical stories to a mixed and partially
hostile public. It is therefore unsurprising that the autobiographical stories of the two
dialogues should differ so much in content and character, though in the Apology too,
Socrates employs autobiography to give an account of the principles of his philosophical
activity.
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The Apology might claim to be a legitimate report of what Socrates actually said
at his trial, especially since Plato himself tells us that he was present on this occasion
(34a2, 38b7).87 But, as many scholars have noted, Plato’s account of Socrates’ speech
differs from that of Xenophon, while there appear to have been multiple other versions of
the same (historical) speech that have not come down to us. In addition, there is the
rumor, noted by R. E. Allen, that the real Socrates said nothing in his own defense. As
Allen notes, however, this rumor only originated rather late, in the Hellenistic period, and
as Allen and Polansky both contend, the source of this story is probably Callicles’ claim
in Gorgias that, if called to trial, Socrates would have nothing to say in his own defense.
As before, it is both necessary and desirable to bracket these historical dilemmas for
purposes of the present study. Our primary interest here will be how the Socrates of
Plato’s dialogue uses autobiography within the context of the Apology. This consideration
will provide a first test of the idea that Socrates’ philosophical autobiography in the
Phaedo constitutes the basic paradigm of the genre, containing all its key elements, and
so forth. The autobiographical passages of the Apology can be seen to confirm that
philosophical autobiography, even garbed for public consumption, presents philosophical
principles, gives a life-proof, describes some sort of conversion, and advances the claim
that philosophy is the best way of life for human beings.
In considering the Apology, it is important to keep the juridical context in mind.
As the autobiographical writings of Rousseau show very clearly (especially Rousseau,
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C.J. Rowe, in his Plato, points to the possibly exceptional character of the Apology among
Plato’s dialogues: “Plato is not there just to record the thoughts and actions of Socrates. Nearly all
the works are fictional, to the extent that the conversations they purport to record never in fact
took place; possibly the only exception is the Apology…whose relative authenticity (Plato) may
well intend to mark through the explicit mention of his presence at the event” (1). (Bristol
Classical Press, 2nd edition, 2003). Cornford (1966, p. 35) believes the Apology is “no doubt
faithful in spirit and substance to the speech actually made by Socrates in his own defence.”
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Judge of Jean-Jacques: Dialogues), accusation, real or imaginary, may invite
autobiography. Defending oneself, in fact, necessarily involves giving an account of
one’s words, deeds, or both, and the natural context of such accounts is a life-story.
Trials, both in specifically juridical settings as well as in the realm of public opinion, call
character into question, and autobiography can adduce a presentation of character in
opposition to the vague and perhaps false notions of the philosopher and his activity
prevailing within the community. Both Socrates’ autobiographical defense speech and
Plato’s autobiographical letter aim to account for philosophical activity, as a way of life
and discourse, by showing how this activity developed from lived experiences.
Autobiography appeals to a basic structure of human understanding that grasps events in
terms of cause and effect, and activities that may have appeared strange and questionable
might find explanations in the autobiographical revelation of causes.
Such accounts we find in the Apology and Seventh Letter, where philosophy in the
persons of Socrates and Plato, respectively, stands accused by the public. These texts
offer autobiographies attempting to explain philosophical activity to the political
community. If philosophy were irresponsible or indifferent to the political community, it
might not attempt to justify itself, but philosophy is responsible. Yet philosophy also
seems strange and perhaps questionable to the average member of the polis or political
community, who takes his or her bearings from within the cultural mainstream, the
traditional beliefs and wonted ways of some community. Today, as in Socrates’ time,
philosophy appears to swim against this current, because it calls the usual beliefs and
ways of living into question. As one of Socrates’ most infamous interlocutors, Callicles,
observes, philosophy appears to turn humanlife (ὁ βίος…τῶν ἀνθρώπων) upside down
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(Gorgias, 481c). At the same time the philosopher comes to be within the political
community, and there is really no such thing as philosophy outside some socio-political
community, some polis. In Apology, and in the Seventh Letter discussed below,
philosophical autobiography arises as a consequence of the tension and interrelation
between philosophy and polis.
Autobiography creates a confidential mood by promising to reveal some private
truth of the particular author. Autobiographers solicit a special trust from their hearers,
even in juridical settings where judges are on guard to detect falsehoods. Although I am
doubtful about certain aspects of his theory of autobiography, Philippe Lejeune’s le pacte
autobiographique suggests something essential about the genre. The autobiographer
makes, or attempts to make, a certain agreement with her addressees, since she promises
to tell some truth about herself. In the Apology, Socrates repeatedly vouches for the truth
of what he says and will say, from the outset telling the members of the jury that, “from
me you will hear the whole truth (πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν)” (17b8).88
If we hold to the concept of autobiography as a retrospective life-story, the
Apology is not autobiographical in its entirety. Socrates manages for long stretches of the
dialogue to turn his defense into a Socratic conversation, just as in Symposium, he
manages to avoid giving a speech by making an autobiographical Socratic dialogue with
himself. Socratic conversations may be autobiographical, as the example of Symposium
suggests, but the principal subjects of the elenchus of Meletus in the Apology are the
education of the young and the question whether Socrates is truly an atheist. Since
autobiography is distinct, and distinguishable, from other literary genres, it is different
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See also 20d5-6, 22a2, 24a4.
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from Socratic conversations that do not touch upon Socrates’ life history.89 If one makes
everything autobiography, or if one simply identifies the subjective with the
autobiographical, then one disfigures the concept of autobiography and risks destroying it
altogether. As I argued in the Introduction, one should resist the temptation to make the
one too quickly and hold fast to the distinction of autobiography from other modes of
discourse or literary forms.
Let’s consider how the Apology as a whole can be broken up: Socrates’ opening
speech (17a1-18a6); his distinction between old and new accusers; account of the old
accusation and Socrates’ initial response to this accusation (18a7-20c3); Socrates’
prologue and autobiography (20c4-24b2); Socrates’ defense against the new accusers
through the elenchus of Meletus (24b3-28a2); Socrates’ comparison of himself with
Achilles and the argument that doing what one knows to be wrong is worse than death,
since we do not know whether death is good or bad (28b3-30c2); the defense of
philosophical activity and the philosophic life, which bleeds into Socrates’ second,
specifically political autobiography (30c3-34b5); Socrates’ refusal to appeal to pity and
his argument explaining this refusal (34b6-35d9); Socrates’ response to the guilty verdict,
his claim that what he deserves is free meals in the Prytaneum, and the argument that the
unexamined life is not worth living for a human being (35e1-38b10); and his speeches to
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Although in the present work I do not go much into the question of literary genre, I maintain
that philosophical autobiography constitutes a distinctive genre alongside others, such as the
novel, epic, tragedy and so on. Aristotle, e.g., recognizes several literary genera in the Poetics. If
one accepts Wellek and Warren’s determination of literature as fictional, autobiography would
fall outside of “literature” properly speaking, at least if we assume that autobiography is
nonfictional. Cf. Wellek and Warren, Theory of Literature, Third Edition, (Harcourt Brace &
Company, 1970; First Edition, 1946) p. 26. I at least am reluctant to limit the concept of literature
in this way.
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those who voted to condemn him to death (38c1-39d10) and to those who voted with him
(39e1-42a5).90
On this division of the dialogue Socrates offers two distinct but complementary
autobiographical narratives in his defense. The first (at 20c4-24b2) aims to refute the
charges of the old accusers by explaining the true reasons why Socrates believes he has
been brought to trial. The second autobiographical narrative is broader in scope and
speaks to Socrates’ relation to the Athenian political community as a whole. In this
second autobiographical passage Socrates contends that he will focus on his past deeds,
and not only on such things as he said in the past. The theme of words and deeds, the
difference between the two, and their interrelation is also prominent in Plato’s Seventh
Letter. The first autobiographical narrative (at 20c4-24b2) more clearly fits the paradigm
of philosophical autobiography, because it describes a sort of conversion and presents
principles upon which subsequent philosophical activity is based. The second
autobiographical narrative is more static. Socrates presents himself as the god’s gift to the
city and compares himself to a gadfly. He says he neglects his own affairs, has no money,
and that he avoids political life because there is no place in politics for a person who
90

As a basis for comparison, C. D. C. Reeve, in Socrates in the Apology: An Essay on Plato’s
Apology of Socrates (Hackett, 1989, p. 3), suggests the following division of the work: “the
opening address (17a1-18a6), in which Socrates distinguishes the kind of speech he plans to
make from the one made by the prosecution; the prothesis (18a7-19a7), in which he outlines the
plan of the defense; the defense proper, which consists of the defense against the popular
caricature (19a8-24b2) and the defense against the formal charges brought by Meletus (24b328a1); the digression (28a2-34b5), in which Socrates describes his divinely enjoined,
philosophical mission to Athens; the epilogue (34b6-35d8), in which he returns to the rhetorical
themes of the opening address; the counterpenalty (35e1-38b9), in which he proposes an
alternative to the death penalty demanded by the prosecution; and, finally, the death penalty
having been chosen by the jury, a closing address (38c1-42a5).” Reeve goes on to suggest that
the dialogue also has a “broader tripartite structure,” but I do not find his arguments for this
tripartition convincing. In Socrates and Legal Obligation (University of Minnesota Press, 1980,
pp. 5-6), R. E. Allen notes how the parts of Socrates’ defense speech in Plato correspond to the
parts of a traditional rhetorical speech, with an exordium, prothesis, refutation, digression, and
peroration.
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fights for the right. He adduces the controversy over the ten generals and the Leon of
Salamis incident.
Socrates distinguishes between old and new accusers, and he claims that the old
accusers are by far the more dangerous ones because many of the judges have listened to
these accusers from childhood (ἐκ παίδων). The old accusers charge Socrates with being
a wise man (σοφὸς ἀνήρ), who investigates the natural things and who makes the weaker
argument the stronger, and Socrates adds that men like that tend to be generally regarded
as not believing in the gods. These are the charges leveled against Socrates famously by
Aristophanes in his play, The Clouds, in which Aristophanes’ has Socrates denying the
existence of Zeus and in which Socrates’ pupil Pheidippides is shown to beat his father
Strepsiades.91 In his defense, Socrates alludes to Aristophanes once and then mentions
him explicitly as representative of the old accusers (18d, 19c).
Socrates’ autobiography addresses itself to the charges of impiety and corrupting
the young leveled against him by Aristophanes and the many, though nameless old
accusers. Socrates’ presents his philosophical activity as consistent with, and actually
stemming from, his reverence for the gods, since he presents this activity as according
with a divine mission in the service of Apollo. Socrates introduces his autobiography by
saying that some may think he is only joking but that all he will say will be the truth. The
word “I” (ἐγώ) opens the autobiography:
For I, men of Athens, have gained the name of wisdom through nothing
but this. What kind of wisdom? Human wisdom (ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία),
perhaps. It may be that I really possess this, while those whom I
mentioned just now (Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias, perhaps Evenus) are wise
with a wisdom more than human; else I cannot explain it, for I certainly do
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The symbolism of children beating their parents signifies a lack of respect for tradition and
ancestors upon which the city is founded. Strauss makes this argument in Natural Right and
History, but the key reference is to his curious book Socrates and Aristophanes (1966).
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not possess it, and whoever says I do is lying and speaks to slander me. Do
not create a disturbance, gentlemen, even if you think I am boasting, for
the story I shall tell does not originate with me, but I will refer you to a
trustworthy source. I shall call upon the god at Delphi as witness to the
existence and nature of my wisdom, if it be such. You know Chaerephon.
He was my friend from youth, and the friend of most of you, as he shared
your exile and your return. You surely know the kind of man he was, how
impulsive in any course of action. He went to Delphi at one time and
ventured to ask the oracle—as I say, gentlemen, do not create a
disturbance—he asked if any man was wiser than I, and the Pythian
replied that no one was wiser (σοφώτερον). Chaerephon is dead, but his
brother will testify to you about this (20d6-21a9).92
Socrates’ autobiography works to undermine the charge of impiety, though it does not do
so in an unambiguous way. Recounting how he was puzzled upon hearing the Pythian’s
words, since he did not consider himself even a little bit wise, Socrates presents his
philosophical activity as flowing from Chaerephon’s question to the Delphic oracle and
her surprising answer. Socrates asserts that it would have been impossible for the god of
Delphi, Apollo, to lie, so that the oracle’s statement that no one is wiser than Socrates
must be true, and yet he claims not to understand it. Many scholars have recognized that
Chaerephon’s question to the Pythian must have been prompted by Socrates’ previous
demonstration of wisdom, and Socrates’ story surely suggests that he was already
practicing a kind of wisdom prior to Chaerephon’s question.93 The character of the earlier
activity that must have prompted this question remains, however, obscure, since Socrates
only attends to the nature of his activity subsequent to the Pythian’s pronouncement.
Socrates thus explains the activity that has brought him such unpopularity in
terms of a beginning and a principle that he derives from the oracle. His goal, as he
characterizes it, is to understand what the Pythian means. He explains his activity in light
92

Grube translation in Cooper, except for the first sentence which is my translation.
See, for example, the (not altogether satisfactory) discussion in C. D. C. Reeve (1989, pp. 2837) and Waterfield (2009, pp. 10-11). Others might check this, but Reeve’s references to Burnet’s
discussion appear to be faulty. The correct reference is: Burnet, 1924, pp. 170-171.
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of this goal. He maintains that his entire life has been devoted to questioning himself and
others, but he adds that he has also done this out of a concern for human excellence and
from a desire that both he and his fellows should become as excellent as human beings
can be.
7. The Seventh Letter of Plato.— Plato’s Seventh Letter resembles the Apology in being
an autobiographical defense of philosophy in a political context, in this case, relative to
Plato’s involvement in the political life of Sicily, at that time a part of Greater Greece.
Similar to Socrates’ presentation of his character to the Athenians by recounting deeds
(ἔργα) and not only speeches (λόγοι), Plato insists on the importance of works or deeds
in the Seventh Letter, which may be one reason why some professional scholars fear
recognizing this letter as authentic (328c3-d2). Plato says he feared acquiring the
reputation of someone who is all talk (λόγος µόνον, 328c6) and no action. Like the
Socrates of the Apology, too, Plato stresses philosophy as a way of life, referring to “the
account and the life (λόγον καὶ βίον)” he “always (ἀεί)” teaches (328a4-5) and
throughout the letter repeatedly returning to the theme of how one should live. The
Seventh Letter also bears comparison with Phaedo, since, in response to the travesty of
philosophy enacted by Dionysius II, Plato endeavors to say what philosophy truly is.
In contrast to Socrates’ autobiography in the Apology, however, Plato gives an
autobiographical account of the origin and evolution of his specifically political
philosophy. Further, whereas Socrates portrays himself as qualifiedly apolitical in the
Apology, Plato frankly admits his belief that philosophy might bring about the best, most
just political regime (a regime governed by laws is second-best in relation to a regime
ruled by a true philosopher or philosophers, 337d-e). Rowe (p. 28) captures something of
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this difference between Socrates and Plato when he writes that “Socrates addressed
people as individuals, talking to anybody who cared to listen. Plato’s ambitions are
larger: not the piecemeal reform of individuals, but the reform of society as a whole.”
Whereas the Socrates of the Apology appears to have held philosophy and politics apart,
Plato presents himself as trying to marry the two. His and his friend Dion’s shared hope
(ἐλπίς, 328a6) guided their attempt to blend politics and philosophy in the person of the
tyrant Dionysius the Younger, and it also explains Plato’s two subsequent voyages to
Sicily and indeed his whole Sicilian adventure.
The Seventh Letter is addressed to multiple recipients, the friends of Dion, and in
this sense it is an open letter. One may wonder whether Plato in writing the Seventh had
an even broader audience in mind.94 When early on he praises Dion’s beliefs about
government, he sounds like an author addressing a wide audience, holding Dion up as a
paradigm worthy of imitation. He says the account of how Dion’s beliefs came to be is
worth hearing for young and old (324b5-6). The fact that the letter has come down to us,
moreover, suggests that it may have been often reproduced, widely circulated, and highly
valued within the ancient world. The Seventh Letter is autobiographical in its entirety, yet
it may nevertheless be divided into parts for purposes of better comprehension: Plato’s
opening address to the friends of Dion (323d/e-324b7); his story about his early political
experiences and how they disillusioned him about politics (324b8-326b4); his account of
his first trip to Sicily and the beginning of his friendship with Dion (326b5-327b6); his
account of Dionysius II’s ascendency to the throne following his father’s death and
Dion’s appeal to Plato to help him bring justice to the Syracusans by turning Dionysius to
94

The first known reference to the Seventh Letter in antiquity is found in Cicero’s Tusculan
Disputations, Bk. 5. This has led some commentators, such as Edelstein, to doubt its authenticity,
on the argument that this reference is so late (Cicero 106-43 B.C.).
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philosophy (327b6-328b1); Plato’s account of how he considered Dion’s proposal and his
decision to go to Sicily a second time ; the account of Plato’s first visit to the court of
Dionysius (329b7-330c3); Plato’s advice to the friends of Dion (330c3-337e); Plato’s
account of his third trip to Sicily and second visit to the court of Dionysius II (337e-); the
famous philosophical excursus (342a); Plato’s account of Dionysius’ conduct during his
second visit (345a-350b); Plato’s return to the Greek mainland and his account of the
aftermath of his “Sicilian wandering” (350b-352a).95
The autobiographical Seventh Letter presents an account of philosophical
principles. More broadly, the Platonic autobiography explains the principles of Platonic
discourse, Plato’s works and way of life, marking the parallel and converging
developments of Plato’s philosophical and political ideas in terms of a life-story
presented by himself.96
The Platonic autobiography proceeds by stages, starting from Plato’s recollections
of his early political experiences. As Friedländer notes, Plato begins his autobiography by
using some of the same words he ascribes to Socrates in Phaedo, writing “I being young
(νέος ἐγώ…ὤν, compare Phaedo 96a5-7).” Plato begins his autobiography by describing
his youthful wish to enter into politics and then proceeds to discuss how this wish was
frustrated, as a consequence of his observations of the corruption of Athenian political
life. Plato describes how his negative political experiences led him to the philosophical
contemplation of politics in general and to the realization that “evils for humankind will
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For a similar outline and division of the Seventh Letter into parts, see Post (1925, pp. 56-57).
As mentioned in the Introduction, Pierre Hadot has done much to reintroduce the idea of
philosophy as a way of life into contemporary philosophical discourse. With respect to the
ancient philosophers, he notes how they conceived philosophy “as a specific discourse linked to a
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trans. Michael Chase (Harvard, 2002; originally published Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1995), p.
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not cease until philosophers rule in the polis or those who rule become genuine
philosophers” (κακῶν οὖν οὐ λήξειν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα γένη, πρὶν ἂν ἢ τὸ τῶν
φιλοσοφούντων ὀρθῶς γε καὶ ἀληθῶς γένος εἰς ἀρχὰς ἔλθῃ τὰς πολιτικὰς ἢ τό τῶν
δυναστευόντων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἔκ τινος µοίρας θείας ὄντως φιλοσοφήσῃ, 326a7b4).97 Plato presents his subsequent political activity as an effort to bring about the
coincidence of philosophy and political rule.
As a young man, Plato’s political disillusionment precipitated his full
commitment to a philosophical way of life, though it would be hazardous to postulate a
one-to-one correlation between Plato’s political disenchantment and the beginnings of
philosophy. Contrary to what one might think, in the Seventh Letter Plato does not
explain his turn to philosophy as a consequence of his disenchantment with politics. The
beginning of Plato’s interest in philosophy lies elsewhere, beyond the scope of this
particular autobiographical letter. At the same time, Plato clearly sees philosophy as the
best hope for a just political order. Plato tells that he was already friends with Socrates at
the time of the Thirty Tyrants’ ascendency (324d8-e1), so he had clearly been exposed to
philosophy prior to his political disillusionment.98 Yet there can be no doubt that Plato’s
disillusionment with political life intensified his commitment to philosophy. He says that
the things he witnessed, first under the oligarchic government of the Thirty (or FiftyOne), and then under the restored democracy, considerably diminished the ardor of his
desire to participate in political life, at least under actually existing conditions. His
observation of the badness of successive political regimes in Athens brought about the
frustration of this hope. This experience and the ambivalence toward politics it
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engendered in Plato contributed, on his account, to the development of his political
teaching. Philosophy and the polis are intimately related for Plato because philosophy is
for him the highest development of human powers and the only human pursuit consistent
with the human good. By insisting on the importance of politics for Plato, one need not
then go on to argue that Plato is primarily a political philosopher. Plato is certainly also a
political philosopher, however. Even if it is true that “Plato’s initial intentions were
political,” it is also true that philosophy and politics are not the same thing, even if
philosophy involves politics and in some sense depends on it.99 Of course Plato also
thinks that in the best case philosophy may shape politics as well, for the good of the
community as a whole and not just for the benefit of a single class.
In the Seventh Letter Plato describes the development of his political philosophy,
and he explains how he understood the interworking of philosophy and politics in
general. Plato presents his political disillusionment as being closely tied to the political
fortunes of his older friend Socrates, so that Socrates functions as the standard by which
Plato evaluated the Athenian political regimes of his youth. In a passage reminiscent of
the closing words of the Phaedo (118a15-17), Plato tells his correspondents that he is not
ashamed to call Socrates the “most just” (δικαιότατον) man then living (324e2). The
revolution (µεταβολή) that brought the Thirty Tyrants to power took place in 404 BCE,
when Plato was in his early twenties. As is well known, Plato had relatives and
acquaintances among the Thirty who were also sometime companions of Socrates,
namely, Charmides and Critias, and he tells us that he hoped the new regime would lead
the polis “from an unjust to a just way of life” (ἔκ τινος ἀδίκου βίου ἐπὶ δίκαιον
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τρόπον) (324d4-5). Things rapidly went bad under the tyranny of the Thirty, however,
and Plato cites the new rulers’ poor treatment of Socrates as the main reason for his own
change of opinion about what kind of men they were. As Socrates says in the Apology
(323c3-e1), the Thirty attempted to implicate him in their crimes by ordering him to go
with some others to arrest a man (Leon of Salamis) who had done nothing wrong, but
whose wealth the new government wished to steal. After the fall of the Thirty and the
restoration of democracy, Plato claims that his political hopes were reawakened. These
hopes were again frustrated when the democracy put Socrates to death. On Plato’s
account, a more synoptic consideration of political regimes convinced him of the truth of
the position elaborated at Republic 473c11-e5 and thereafter, which he rehearses in the
Seventh Letter (326a-b). Plato’s involvement in Syracusan politics shows that the
arguments and ideas of the Republic guided Plato in his life as well.
In the philosophical excursus of the Seventh Letter (342a1-344d2) Plato explains
his conception of philosophy, describing the way to the apprehension of truth, while also
indicating the limitations that attach to our ability to know what actually is. Consideration
of Dionysius’ character directly precipitates the excursus, since Plato’s second visit to the
his court (his third visit overall) had been motivated by reports of Dionysius’ burgeoning
interest in philosophy. Although the philosophical position outlined here appears in an
autobiographical context, Plato does not relate how he arrived at his understanding of
human knowledge in terms of his life story. Plato describes how he attempted to convert
a political ruler to philosophy. Plato recounts how upon his arrival in Sicily he put
Dionysius to the test to see whether this interest was genuine or merely the superficial
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product of the tyrant’s vanity. Plato tells his correspondents that there is “a way…to test”
(τις τρόπος…πεῖραν) the authenticity of a young person’s passion for philosophy:
To such persons one must point out what the subject is as a whole, and
what its character, and how many preliminary subjects it entails and how
much labor. For on hearing this, if the pupil be truly philosophic, in
sympathy with the subject and worthy of it, because divinely gifted, he
believes that he has been shown a marvelous pathway and that he must
brace himself at once to follow it, and that life will not be worth living if
he does otherwise. (340b-c).100
Dionysius quickly proved his ineptitude for philosophy by his neglect of Plato’s company
and by his suspicious, unreliable, and harmful conduct. Yet as Plato notes, Dionysius
claimed to have understood Plato’s teaching and was even reputed to have written a book
on it. This prompts Plato to engage in one of the most fascinating and important passages
of the entire letter, the famous “digression,” in which he describes what the philosophical
search for truth is really like and why it cannot be adequately captured by written texts.
Here we see that, for Plato as for Nietzsche and others, philosophy is essentially a way of
life as opposed to something that can be captured and pinned down in writings, however
eloquent and consistent with the truth such works may be. Instead one must engage in a
lifelong practice of dialogue with like-minded individuals and then, only gradually, may
one come to see the truth in a sudden moment of intellectual perception.
8.

The philosophical significance of Plato’s autobiographical writings.— Plato’s

autobiographical writings present us with an intensely personal expression of certain
ideas about what the philosophical life is supposed to be, as well as how it came to be for
both Plato and Socrates. By presenting philosophy autobiographically, Plato
communicates the importance of philosophy for humanlife, showing how philosophy is a

100

Compare Statesman 286a on the topic of how much labor the philosophic life requires.

93

discourse and way of life (λόγος καί βίος) that arises out of life itself. Plato’s
autobiographical writings present an array of life-stories that attempt to account for
ultimate philosophical principles by telling how Socrates and Plato came to hold certain
principles as a result of their search for truth and the things they suffered and experienced
along the way. They are narratives about how a certain kind of philosopher comes to be
what he is. Although these philosophical autobiographies are complicated stories, and
despite the fact that there are limits to what they explain, they nonetheless present us with
memorable accounts of philosophical lives. They also succeed in giving an intelligible
account of the source of ultimate philosophical principles, and Plato and Socrates go on
to show how their subsequent philosophical activity was rooted in these same principles.
Showing how they have lived the philosophical life and how it was best for them, they
suggest that this course of humanlife may be best for others, too. Narrating how in their
own lives they were able to discover philosophical principles and to live according to
them, they show that it is possible for others to make such discoveries and to live
accordingly. Plato’s autobiographical writings suggest that if it was, it might be yet again
in the future.
The philosopher on Plato’s account immerses himself or herself in the
contemplation of things, attempting to understand the things that are as they are. Such
understanding requires, however, apprehension of the relations among all things, and the
limitations imposed on human beings by time and space make truly comprehensive
knowledge perhaps only a goal to be approximated but never fully attained.
It is unnecessary to appeal to the Seventh Letter in order to establish that Plato
was interested in political life and that he conceived a political role for philosophy,
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focusing on the reform of education as a prerequisite for political reform. Plato’s
autobiographical writings have a political function. Working to turn prospective readers
to philosophy, they aim to develop the kind of human beings that Plato sees as
humanity’s best chance for a just political order. At the same time, Plato is hardly
optimistic in the sense of thinking things will inevitably work out for the best, and the
specific situations that determine the autobiographies of the Apology and the Phaedo, not
to mention the Seventh Letter, underscore the great difficulties the philosopher faces in
bringing about political reform. Socrates’ own eventual disappointment with the study of
nature (or physics) arises in part because of the inability of the students of nature to
address the concerns of the polis. Physics as pursued by the predecessors cannot give an
adequate account of human actions, because the physicists’ reliance on material causes
cannot explain Socrates’ decision to stay in prison instead of escaping (Phaedo 98d-99a).
The autobiography of the Phaedo describes how this and other deficiencies in natural
studies led Socrates (and Plato) to formulate the theory of ideas. This theory suits better
the character of human nature and the human community that is based in speech and
reason (λόγος), since ideas are presupposed in any speech as those things to which
speech refers.
The Platonic autobiography, however, suggests that “speech alone” (λόγος µόνον)
is insufficient for a philosophical way of life (Seventh 328c6). Works or deeds (ἔργα) are
equally necessary. Speeches and deeds, moreover, must flow from, and in truth consist in,
some at first mysterious third, signified in Plato by the good or the natural good.
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Comprehension of the source of properly philosophic speech and action is approximated
in Plato through dialectic and “much labor.”101
Plato’s autobiography offers an account of the origin and development of Platonic
dialectic in its intimate relation to ideas. The Symposium’s autobiographical account of
the theory of ideas complements the autobiographical narrative of the Phaedo, while it
also enhances comprehension of the origin and development of Platonic dialectic that
begins and ends with ideas. In the autobiographical dialogue of the Symposium, Plato
explains how philosophy comes dialectically to grasp enriched ideas of the divine and
human things, and elaborates upon how this dialectic tends to the discovery of the ideas
themselves. Diotima demonstrates how eros of the beautiful explains the entire
continuum of animal life in terms of the longing for both beauty and immortality.
Immortality is a major theme of the Symposium, as well as of the Apology and Phaedo,
and this topic appears intimately related to philosophical discussions of self.102 Self is
equivocal, however, though many commentators fail to recognize this truth, focusing
instead on the question whether some ultimate, unequivocal self exists, for example, the
body. Unequivocally self is just self itself, i.e., it refers to nothing but itself. Yet self itself
is discovered to be equivocal through dialectical investigation, inasmuch as self must be
defined or determined in its relation to everything else. In the Phaedrus, Plato has
Socrates ask: “Do you think that it is possible to reach a serious understanding of the
nature of the soul without understanding the nature of the whole?” (Phaedrus 270c) The
consideration of everything reveals that self consists in its being many things, so that the
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signifier self signifies equivocally. Self can be what one is intensively as well as
expansively.103 Although discussion of self or soul, whether it is mortal or immortal,
might appear irrelevant to Plato’s concerns in the Seventh Letter, this letter shares with
the dialogues mentioned above profound concern with immortality properly conceived.
Like self, immortality is equivocal. For, inasmuch as self or soul gains a share in
immortality through sexual reproduction, fame, and most of all through the virtuous
concern to foster excellence in the younger generation, Plato’s autobiographical writings
prove that immortality is a primary philosophical concern. For in telling how he risked
life and limb on the thin hope of bringing the tyrant Dionysius to philosophy, Plato shows
how he, like the Socrates of the Apology, fears doing what is certainly evil (conniving
with tyranny) more than his own death.104 He also demonstrates how the primary
motivation of philosophy is not the negative one of avoiding evil but rather the positive
one of bringing about specific good by turning others, as much as possible, toward
philosophy.
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Chapter 3
Augustine’s Confessions
Isn’t human life on earth a trial without a break?
(numquid non temptatio est vita humana super terram sine ullo interstitio?)
—Augustine, Conf. 10.28.39105

1. “The first great autobiography”— If the form of philosophical autobiography already
becomes evident in Plato, Augustine’s Confessions nevertheless extends and enhances
this form in so many ways that the work almost seems to constitute an entirely new
genre. For whereas Plato’s autobiographical writings remain within a primarily
intellectual and also political framework, in the Confessions Augustine reaches out to
encompass the story of his whole life, intellectual and emotional, public and private, good
and bad; further, whereas Plato’s autobiographical writings emphasize intellectual
conversion and the cognitive becoming of his auto-protagonists, Augustine, though also
concerned with intellectual transformation, introduces a notion of ethical conversion in
his autobiography, a conversion that he presents in terms of both the cognitive and the
emotional side of his being; whereas, finally, Plato’s autobiographical writings limit
themselves to relatively discrete chronological periods in his own and Socrates’ lives,
Augustine attempts to account for his philosophy in terms of his entire life, from his birth
105

All references to Augustine’s Confessions are by book, chapter, and section number, hence
10.28.39 refers to book 10, chapter 28, section 39. For the Latin text, I have used the James
O’Donnell’s wonderful edition of the Confessions in three volumes (vol. I: Introduction and Text;
vols. II and III: Commentary). This text was published by the Clarendon Press at Oxford, 1992,
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up to his conversion and beyond. One might multiply points of contrast with Plato’s
autobiographical writings. For example, Augustine draws in the Confessions a more
explicit connection between philosophical reflection and mundane but often traumatic
human events, such as the death of a loved one (see especially Conf. 4.4-12 and below)
than we find anywhere in Plato’s autobiographical writings. Augustine’s autobiography
thus fosters a sense of how philosophical thinking can arise in response to such events as
normally mark the course of human lives, and how, looking back through memory on our
lives, and the events of our lives, we can find ample occasions for philosophizing and
raising our minds to truth.
For all these reasons, and also due to the fact that Plato’s autobiographies are
problematic, embedded in dialogues, and so forth, it is hardly surprising that Augustine’s
Confessions is generally considered to be “the first great autobiography,” the “first great
example of autobiography in the West.”106
Yet although Augustine was certainly an innovator in this domain, it would be a
mistake to exaggerate the differences between Plato’s autobiographical writings and
Augustine’s famous text. For, despite the pronounced differences noted above, these
works share the same basic form and function. In both cases we find a life-narrative with
a conversion structure, and Plato and Augustine both use autobiography protreptically, in
order to turn readers toward philosophy as the best kind of humanlife. (Augustine, of
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course, considers Christianity to be the true philosophy.) Furthermore, just as Plato’s and
Socrates’ self-narratives are exemplary, so “(Augustine’s) narrative of himself is
archetypal for humankind,” as James O’Donnell has written in his fine biography of
Augustine.107 Finally, for both Plato and Augustine philosophical autobiography is
essentially a means of presenting and giving an account of philosophical principles, and
just as Plato and Socrates use autobiography to present principles, Augustine writes the
Confessions to show how he arrived at the starting point of his philosophy, which for him
is his belief in the truth of the Christian religion. For Augustine, Christianity is the proper
starting point for philosophy, though of course he himself only arrived at this starting
point after a long and tortuous search for wisdom and truth. Christianity as the principle,
as the result of the search for truth that he presents in the Confessions, constitutes the
basis for all Augustine’s subsequent philosophical activity. As with Plato and Socrates, so
in Augustine, too, the preeminent philosophical principle is presented not only as the
product of a life, but also as a turning point or reversal in this same life, and thus as the
beginning of a new way of life consistent with the principle.
To be clear, I am not claiming that Augustine merely took over this literary form
from Plato; as a matter of historical fact, it is unlikely that Augustine ever read any of
Plato’s autobiographical writings.108 It is rather much more likely that if Augustine had
models in mind when composing his autobiography they would have been oral
conversion stories within the Christian community, such as those described in Book 8 of
the Confessions (see Conf. 8.2.3-5 and 8.6.14-15) and writings on the lives of the saints,
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such as Athanasius’ Life of St. Anthony, which Augustine also mentions (Conf. 8.6.15).109
Undoubtedly the story of St. Paul’s sudden conversion on the road to Damascus (as
related in the Acts of the Apostles 9) would have figured as the preeminent example of
conversion for a Christian writing in the late fourth century, and there can be no doubt
about Paul’s importance for Augustine’s thought. Both the metamorphosis of the convert,
and the process leading up to that metamorphosis, were of great interest within the
Christian community of Augustine’s time. Indeed the idea of conversion was at the
foreground of the collective consciousness in Augustine’s time, and the practice of
writing life-stories was already highly developed, although probably somewhat more so
in the Greek-speaking culture. The Christian Gospels themselves are in some sense
nothing other than biographies of Jesus. None of this is to suggest, however, that the
Confessions is not a strikingly original work and a significant enhancement of the
autobiographical form as a means of doing philosophy.110
The similarity between Plato’s autobiographical writings and Augustine’s
Confessions appears not to be the result of one author influencing another (although one
cannot discount the possibility of influence altogether, however mediate and perhaps
unconscious). Instead these works are similar because they reflect similar processes and
similar humanlives. There is a similarity between great minds and philosophical lives. As
a product of a certain kind of humanlife dedicated to the search for truth or wisdom,
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philosophical autobiography is an understandable phenomenon and, as it turns out, a
durable historical form. Since no one is simply born what they are and become, a
humanlife can always be related as a story of development, and there is a becoming
peculiar to philosophers whose lives are dedicated to the search for truth. If we accept the
well-attested opinion (discussed in the previous chapter) that both autobiography and
biography only developed rather late in human history, first flowering with the Socratics,
we cannot assert that this literary form and the way of thinking about life that it presents
are simply natural. Based on the best evidence we have, biography, autobiography, and
specifically philosophical autobiography emerged historically against the background of,
and in contrast to, a worldview that regarded individuals as essentially static. The
emergence of biography and autobiography as dynamic, developmental narrative genres,
involving metamorphosis, and so on, is a more or less datable historical fact. Plato
created specifically philosophical autobiography, and this means that if Plato invented
philosophy, philosophical autobiography is coeval and co-existent with the start of
philosophy. Philosophers like Plato and Augustine are interested in fostering in others the
desire to search for truth and to pursue a good life, and philosophical autobiography is a
good form for this purpose, especially in the case of resonant and forceful
autobiographies like those of Plato and Augustine.
But to return to the Confessions itself, it is important to note, as O’Donnell
observes, that calling the Confessions “the first great autobiography” is a very modern
and far from unproblematic way of speaking. O’Donnell, who in 1992 published a new
critical edition of the Confessions, with an introduction and extensive commentary, has
argued in a more recent book that, “Augustine’s readers…have made the Confessions
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into the first modern autobiography, and it is a classic of modern literature…as
Augustine’s doctrinal eminence has faded with passing years, his prestige as self-narrator
has grown stronger.”111 By comparison, “Augustine’s early medieval audience seems to
have paid this book relatively little attention, preferring his more prosaic biblical
commentaries and theological treatises. The book began to come into its own in the
twelfth century and after, but it’s equally possible to argue that moderns have made far
more of it than any earlier age.”112 These observations support the claim that the idea and
theory of autobiography (as opposed to the thing itself) is a modern invention. Although
premodern thinkers sometimes wrote autobiographies, there was little or no theoretical
awareness of autobiography prior to modern times (recall that the very word
“autobiography” is a late-eighteenth or early-nineteenth century coinage). The
Confessions has thus been recognized as a great autobiography in our own era, in the
bourgeois-capitalist era, and it is only in this era that we have become conscious of the
theory of autobiography, a development that coincides with the rise of writing and
reading autobiographies since the nineteenth century.113
By juxtaposing modern and pre-modern ways of thinking about autobiography,
and by thus bringing the status of the Confessions as an autobiography into question,
O’Donnell is driving at an even more significant point, which is that there are reasons we
might doubt whether Augustine’s Confessions are an autobiography at all. This chapter
is, as the reader will discover, haunted by these doubts. Since Augustine for the most part
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addresses his Confessions to god114, the work might appear to be more of a prayer than an
autobiography, and insofar as the book is an account of how Augustine sees god working
and having worked through his (Augustine’s) life, god and not Augustine is, in some
sense, the chief protagonist of the book. Nor does Augustine allow that he himself, that
the man Augustine should serve as an exemplar for other human beings, since he believes
humanity’s true goal is to model itself after god, to become as much like god as possible,
in accordance with the word of sacred scripture that has god make human beings in god’s
own image and likeness (Conf. 13.22.32).115 It is therefore in some sense true to say, as
O’Donnell does, that, “The Confessions aren’t about Augustine, they’re about his god.”116
(Of course one might argue that for Plato, too, god, or the gods, are more appropriate
models for human beings than is a philosopher even of Socrates’ stature.) At the same
time, would anyone deny that Augustine himself, his authorial presence, is everywhere
apparent in the Confessions? That even in the last three books of the Confessions that do
not directly concern his life, Augustine himself is very much in the foreground? The story
of his life, past and (in Book 10) present, is clearly central to what Augustine is trying to
do in his unusual book.117
Yet Garry Wills contends that Augustine’s Confessions “is often treated as if it
were an autobiography, but it is not.”118 In addition to the Confessions being addressed to
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god, about god, and aiming at god, the book has a peculiar structure that makes it look
very different from what we might take autobiography to be. Only the first nine books
contain a retrospective narrative, and Augustine continually interrupts this narrative to
pray, to praise god or to ask god for help, to meditate on particular philosophical
questions, and to detail philosophical arguments that arise in the course of his reflections
on his life. Book 10 concerns Augustine’s present life and memory, while on the surface
Books 11-13 have little to do with Augustine’s life, since they consist primarily of a
speculative, metaphysically-oriented reading of the first chapter of Genesis. So both the
role of god in the Confessions and the peculiar character of the last four books might
make Augustine’s book seem an unlikely autobiography.
It turns out then that one can adduce many reasons why the Confessions are at
best a problematic autobiography. These reasons, however, admit of another
interpretation that takes them as consistent with understanding the Confessions as not
only an autobiography but as an exemplary philosophical autobiography. It is difficult not
to agree with James Olney, when he says that, “it is not possible to think about
autobiography or life-writing as we have come to know it without thinking also—and
first of all—about the Confessions.”119 The interpretation I offer will sustain the
conventional wisdom that the Confessions are an autobiography, but it will also go
beyond the common view to show how Augustine’s book is an exemplary philosophical
autobiography. In order to do this, I will address the question of how the role of god in
the Confessions is consonant with viewing the work as an autobiography, as well as how
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the last four books, far from taking anything away, actually enhance the Confessions’
claim to be a philosophical autobiography.
Arguably the greatest appeal of Augustine’s Confessions has been, and is, its
central story of conversion. As I pointed out in the Introduction, narratives with a
conversion structure are attractive due to a fundamental characteristic of human nature,
which is that human beings are not by nature what they ought to be.120 Conversion
resembles peripeteia in the Aristotelian sense, and humans take pleasure in contemplating
reversals. Indeed, as Jean Starobinski has observed, autobiography itself depends on
conversion, because “one would hardly have sufficient motive to write an autobiography
had not some radical change occurred in one’s life—conversion, entry into a new life, the
operation of Grace.”121 Conversion is in some sense the sine qua non of autobiography.
Again according to Starobinski, “it is the internal transformation of the individual—and
the exemplary character of this transformation—that furnishes a subject for a narrative
discourse in which ‘I’ is both subject and object.”122 Augustine presents himself as
seeking truth and a way of living, and he also describes how he actually found (what he
takes to be) the truth that he was seeking. The end of the story is, however, only an end in
a sense; it is also a beginning, a basis for a new way of living, of thinking and acting.
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2.

Is Augustine a philosopher?— This is an annoying but seemingly unavoidable

question with respect to Augustine. By comparison, it would never occur to anyone to ask
whether, say, Descartes or Kant is a philosopher. Is it really so obvious in these cases, or
in any case? Of course Augustine is special for many reasons, and perhaps especially
because one may reasonably suspect that his primary concern is furthering a particular
church rather than philosophizing, that is, even if this particular church claims to be the
universal one. Augustine’s biographers, at least in the English-speaking world, tend to
agree that after writing the Confessions around 397 CE, Augustine’s thought became less
open, more dogmatic and authoritarian, at least in certain respects. Augustine’s extensive
involvement in writing polemics against competing belief-systems (especially
“paganism”) and “heretics,” such as the Manichees, the Donatists, and the Pelagians,
required him to take a hard line in many cases and to sacrifice a certain philosophical
openness. But philosophers of all stripes tend to dig in their heels and defend those
beliefs that they have come to hold, and I don’t think anyone would want to maintain that
just because philosophers disagree, none of them are really philosophers. Philosophy is,
after all, inseparable from a certain dogmatism (even the skeptics are to some extent
dogmatically skeptical).
Contemporaries may also find troubling such remarks of Augustine’s as that for
the love of god, “I should have given over even those philosophers who speak the truth”
(Conf. 3.6.10). This sentence is, however, clearly a rhetorical flourish. Since Augustine
believes that his god is the truth, there is certainly no question for him of sacrificing the
one to the other. Still, even in his most open-minded writings, Augustine might look
more like a theologian than a philosopher. But then, is the difference between theology
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and philosophy very well understood today? “Theology” as Gilson (1960, p. 241) at one
point characterizes it, “begins with the data of revelation and examines their content with
the aid of reason, and in doing so it consciously agrees to place itself on a level different
from that of the philosopher.” Clearly Augustine does take revelation as authoritative, but
he also tries to go as far as he can with reason alone. The question about whether
Augustine is a philosopher or not is vexing because in order to answer it fully one must
be able to say what philosophy itself is, and that is not an easy thing to do.123 In the
Introduction to this work I argued that philosophy is distinguished by seeking
comprehensive knowledge in theoretical and practical domains with the ultimate goal of
living a good life. Augustine is clearly interested in knowing god so far as this is possible,
and he is also undeniably committed to the pursuit of the happy life.
As to the general disregard of Augustine by philosophers, I think it is unfortunate
but also understandable. For, whereas contemporary philosophy is (at least publicly and
for the most part) unconcerned with the question of god, this question is central within
Augustine’s thought, and whereas a sort of mathematized logic is today one of the most
highly prized subjects of study (at least within the predominant philosophy of our age and
country), Augustine’s training as a liberally educated rhetorician makes him seem to have
more in common with the humanities (Geisteswissenschaften) than with philosophy.124 It
also seems reasonable to question Augustine’s philosophical credentials on the basis of
his failure to distinguish between philosophy and theology, and their correlates, reason
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and faith, respectively. This distinction is, however, anachronistic when applied to
Augustine’s thought, and as Augustine translator and commentator Edmund Hill remarks,
“Augustine made no distinction between theology and philosophy such as is involved in
the scholastic faith/reason distinction…He distinguished in fact between the true
philosophy, which is orthodox Christianity, and…the doctrines of the Platonists and other
pagan philosophers.”125 For Augustine, moreover, “the quest for truth is at heart a single
and not a multiple effort, and if it is not directed toward the discovery of the supreme
truth which is God, then it is not really a quest for truth at all.”126 This is not to say,
however, that Augustine recognizes no distinction between reason and faith, the limits of
the former, and hence the necessity for the latter. He does recognize such a distinction
and within the Confessions itself (cf. Conf. 6.5.8).127
However all this may be, Augustine seems to have thought of himself as a
philosopher and as remaining true to the inspiration to philosophize that he gained as a
young man from reading Cicero’s (now lost) Hortensius (Conf. 3.4.7-8). For Augustine a
philosopher is a lover and seeker of god. In The City of God, for example, Augustine
suggests that “If God, by Whom all things were made, is wisdom, as the divine authority
and truth have shown, then the true philosopher is a lover of God.”128 For Augustine god
is not only identical with wisdom but with being, truth, and goodness (cf. Conf. 1.2.2,
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1.5.5-6, 13.38.53), so god is the ultimate end of philosophy in every sense and that after
which all philosophers and indeed all human beings are striving. From a historical point
of view, however, Augustine’s god was not god “simple and plain,” but the trinitarian
(Athanasian) god of the Caecilianist Christian sect in Roman Africa, and probably most
philosophers working today would reject the idea that such a being is the concern of
philosophy, much less its ultimate telos. Probably most contemporary philosophers would
deny that Augustine’s god or any god has anything to do with what philosophers for the
most part do, so Nietzsche’s “god is dead” seems an apt characterization of the scene in
present-day philosophy.129
The Confessions themselves are a work of significant philosophical scope and
depth, wherein Augustine introduces and grapples with a wide range of theoretical and
practical problems, many of which are still widely recognized today as philosophical
problems. Among them are the problems of human happiness, of god’s nature, and of
evil, as well as the question of whether there is anything other than bodies in the universe,
investigation of the nature of memory and of time, and consideration of the relation
between form and matter. The three main philosophical problems of the Confessions are
the problems of god’s nature, of evil, and of human happiness. For Augustine these
problems and investigations are distinct and yet entirely interconnected, since they all
refer to the question about god’s nature, which is what Augustine strives above all to
understand. For Augustine knowledge of god and the happy life are connected: cum enim
te, deum meum, quaero, vitam beatam quaero (“when I seek you, my god, I seek the
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happy life,” Conf. 10.20.29). This interconnection of concerns raises a question about the
relationship between theoretical and practical philosophy in Augustine. In his study of
Augustine’s Christian philosophy, Gilson contends that practical concerns predominate in
Augustine, so human happiness, including his own happiness, constitutes Augustine’s
primary concern. This view finds support in a much-quoted passage from The City of
God, “nulla est homini philosophandi causa, nisi ut beatus sit,” “For a human being has
no reason to philosophize other than in order to be happy” (Civ. 19.1, my translation).
This passage and others like it surely suggest that Augustine is primarily a practical
philosopher, as Gilson contends.
Actually the matter is not so simple, since Augustine clearly devotes a great deal
of attention to what would be considered theoretical topics, in his or any age. Augustine
did not neglect the study of nature, and in fact some of his earliest doubts about
Manicheism were motivated by concerns he had about the Manichean teachings on
natural philosophy (cf. Conf. 5.3.6, 5.7.12). As a philosophically-minded rhetorician,
Augustine also devoted significant study to language, including significant reflections on
this subject that appear in the Confessions itself. As Gilson also recognizes Augustine
believes that happiness requires knowledge or truth, so that there is considerable overlap
of theoretical and practical concerns in the Confessions (and indeed in all of Augustine’s
writings).130 Even so, Gilson goes too far in asserting the primacy of the practical over the
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theoretical in Augustine, and I would rather say the concerns are equally important, or
even that Augustine’s theoretical concern is primary in the way that it is for Aristotle,
who sees the theoretical life as the superlative human good.
If philosophical economy of theory is a desideratum for philosophers, then there
is a sense in which Augustine’s theory, his answer to philosophical questions, and his
explanation of all phenomena, is the simplest and therefore the most economical of all,
since for him “god” is the single and sufficient answer to all philosophical questions, as
well as the explanation, or cause, of the entire phenomenal world, including the invisible
world of souls and the inner world of thoughts and emotions. For Augustine, the answer
to the ethical question is god; the answer to the epistemological question is god; the
answer to the ontological question is god; and so forth (e.g., if something is beautiful, it is
so because of god, because god made it, and because it indicates the creator). In Book 10
Augustine describes the happy life (beata vita) as a life of “joy in the truth (gaudium de
veritate)” (Conf. 10.23.33). And for him every particular truth has reference to truth
itself, which is for him identical with god (Conf. 10.24.35). Thus the goal of ethics
(beatum, happiness) and the goal of epistemology (veritas, truth) are ultimately united
and realized in god. God is thus the answer to all the questions of philosophy, with one
partial exception, since god is not responsible for evil which comes into the world rather
as a direct consequence of our, human misuse of god’s gift of free will (see, for example,
Conf. 7.3.5).
The fact that the answer to all philosophical questions is simple for Augustine
does not translate into a simple philosophy. On the contrary, Augustine sees it as a
done in order to be better and, if possible, to be happy. Speculation abounds in Augustine but its
aims are always practical and its term of reference is always man” (p. 3, my emphasis).
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problem how we human beings can know god at all, and he also realizes that it will be
difficult for us to live and to act on the basis of a knowledge that we do not fully possess.
Practical life, or the goal of living ethically, is, for Augustine, a struggle, and Augustine
claims that human life on earth is an unceasing trial, an uninterrupted struggle to live in
accordance with what is best, made all the more difficult by the fact that we do not even
know what the best is, at least not entirely. Of course faith, from our side, and grace, from
god, can intervene, since we can believe what we don’t understand and can act in
accordance with this faith. But, although he affirms the necessity of faith, Augustine is
not really satisfied with faith apart from knowledge.131 In fact Augustine’s pursuit of
knowledge is not only thoroughgoing, it is even critical in something like Kant’s sense of
the term. Of course Augustine and Kant reach very different conclusions, but it is
significant that both of them think that if we want to know anything at all, we need first
to examine our own cognitive powers, which are our means of knowing. Only when we
understand what these powers are, what they can do, and what limits they have, can we
know what it is possible for us to know. From this angle, one can see that Augustine’s
discussions of memory and time in books 10 and 11, respectively, carry out a kind of
critical philosophical investigation, because for Augustine memory and time are the
power and frame, respectively, within which alone human knowledge is possible.
Augustine’s discussion of memory follows upon an examination of the five senses by
which we perceive various things, and he devotes significant attention to the question of
the sources of our knowledge, distinguishing between what we learn through the senses
131

I see the exchange in Book 2, 16-19 of On Free Choice of the Will (De libero arbitrio
voluntatis) as particularly illustrative of Augustine’s desire not merely to believe but to
understand. Cf. J. Roland Ramirez, “The Priority of Reason Over Faith in Augustine,” in
Augustinian Studies, vol. 13, 1982, pp. 123-131.

113

and what we learn in some other way. Augustine pursues self-knowledge in order to
know what it is possible for humans to know, but also because self-knowledge
contributes to knowledge of god, since, as Wills notes, “even with all man’s
imperfections, the human person is the thing in all of earthly creation that most resembles
God.”132 What is even more remarkable from my point of view is that, by examining
memory and time in the Confessions, Augustine also includes reflections on the
conditions of the possibility of autobiography within his autobiography. Thus both
Augustine’s interests, outlined above, and his methods in the Confession seem to be
convincing evidence that Augustine is a sort of philosopher.133
3.

The structure of the Confessions with an eye to the question of genre.— The

Confessions is, in Garry Wills’ phrase, “a not very long work.”134 Yet even to its most
talented and assiduous students, the book can appear “disturbingly uncategorizable,” and
as presenting numerous interpretive difficulties.135 The Confessions is an extremely rich
and complex book, characterized by an intensity of language that layers significance
upon significance, Augustine managing to say much by saying little. The book is also full
of profound (and not so profound) philosophical arguments; it is densely populated by
biblical and other classical allusions, unusual expressions, and rhetorical flourishes; and
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its style is by turns poetical, lyrical, argumentative, and diegetical. As I have endeavored
to write about the Confessions, I have repeatedly thought of something Augustine himself
says in Book 12. Having turned to the study of Genesis in books 11-13, Augustine
catches himself up having spent a good many words and a great deal of time interpreting
only a few lines of scripture, and in astonishment he exclaims, “Behold, O Lord my God,
I beseech you, how many things we have written concerning these few words, how many!
What strength of ours, what tracts of time would suffice to treat all your books in this
manner?” (Conf. 12.32.43) So, although Augustine himself would no doubt regard the
analogy as profane, I cannot help but compare his experience of reading scripture with
my own experience of trying to interpret the Confessions. Of course this is a problem for
hermeneutics or the work of textual interpretation in general (e.g., 500-page books
devoted to interpreting 100-page books are not uncommon). This hermeneutical problem
seems, however, especially acute in the case of Augustine’s Confessions, because it is
such a curiously-wrought work, brimming with ideas and images, and offering countless
occasions for philosophical reflection.
The Confessions consists of thirteen books: in the first nine books Augustine
presents a narrative of the first part of his life, from infancy to adulthood, his conversion
to the Catholic Church, and a mystical vision that he shared with his mother, Monica, just
prior to her death. Through this narrative Augustine elaborates the long course of
experiences that he undertook and underwent in his search for truth, stating how he
progressed and often regressed, both intellectually and ethically. Like Petrarch later on,
Augustine describes how he spent a long time wandering amongst the foothills before
finally accomplishing the ascent of his own peculiar Mont Ventoux. The intellectual and
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the ethical conversion stories run through the first nine books of the Confessions like two
threads, at times intertwining, at others going each its separate way, only to meet again
later on. Only when he has achieved both ethical and intellectual conversion is
Augustine’s story of his earlier life in some sense complete. Considered from an
intellectual point of view, Augustine describes in the first nine books how, as a young
man, he was inspired to pursue philosophy by reading Cicero’s (now lost) Hortensius;
how he subsequently fell in with the Manichees and dabbled in astrology; how,
eventually, due to his discovery of the untenability of many Manichean teachings he
turned to the skeptical philosophy of the so-called New Academy; before then coming
under the influence of Ambrose the Catholic bishop at Milan and discovering the
Platonists, who helped him to conceive of an incorporeal, spiritual substance, thereby
opening the way for his final embrace of the Christian religion as the bearer of the truth
he had been seeking all along.136
From a practical point of view, Augustine in these same books traces his ethical
development, beginning with the sins of his infancy and childhood and showing how as a
youth and young man he succumbed to “the flesh’s urges, the eyes’ urges [to know], and
worldly ambition (concupiscentia carnis et concupiscentia oculorum et ambitione
saeculi)” (10.30.41), before finally freeing himself sufficiently (but not entirely) from
these vices to embrace baptism and a life involving celibacy and dedication to god and
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his particular church.137 O’Donnell’s brilliant elaboration of Horst Kusch’s discovery that
the Confessions has a kind of triadic and chiastic structure with respect to Augustine’s
conversion is very helpful for understanding the overall structure of the first nine books
(see OD I.xxii and 2005, pp. 66-70). According to this interpretation, Augustine describes
in the early books how he succumbed to these three temptations one by one. In Book 2,
sexual desire enters, and Augustine gives in to the urges of the flesh; in Book 3,
Augustine goes to Carthage and gives in to the urges of the curiosity for spectacles,
shows, and “people with hidden secret knowledge about god;” finally, in Book 4
Augustine shows himself puffed up with pride and giving in to worldly ambition. Then,
reversing the order in the Books 5-8, he shows how he freed himself first from worldly
ambition, then from idle curiosity to know, and lastly from the desires for sexual
gratification, a form of concupiscentia carnis that held special charm for Augustine (see
8.5.10-12 and 8.7.17).138
In Book 10, Augustine speaks from the point of view of the present, about “what
I am now, not what once I was (adhuc quis ego sim, non quis fuerim)” (Conf. 10.3.4, cf.
10.4.6). This is a very interesting book from my point of view. “The main function” of
137
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Book 10, is, according to Wills, “to mediate between the narrative of Augustine’s life up
to his baptism (Books One through Nine) and the contemplation of the role of the Trinity
in that life (Books Eleven through Thirteen).”139 From the point of view of time, Books 19 concern Augustine’s life in the past, Book 10 concerns his life in the present, and
Books 11-13 concern his future life. Book 10 is remarkable for many reasons, perhaps
above all because in it Augustine shows himself still struggling to know himself and also
to reform himself. As Brown points out, Augustine’s emphasis in Book 10 on his
ongoing struggle against various temptations, as well as his continual laboring to gain
knowledge, seemed strange from the point of view of an audience that wanted a
successful conversion story without qualifications. Brown quotes Pelagius, for example,
who was “deeply annoyed” by Book 10, presumably because Pelagius believed that
human beings could achieve an untroubled conversion and blessedness, if only they
would make proper use of their free will.140 Augustine, however, seems to suggest that
the hard work of pursuing knowledge and a good life continues ever after conversion.
In the last three books of the Confessions, Augustine no longer narrates his life
but turns instead to a contemplation of sacred scripture, specifically to Genesis and the
Mosaic narrative of the creation of the world. As O’Donnell notes, these last three books
have probably been responsible for the greatest interpretive difficulties pertaining to the
Confessions. These books deal with traditional philosophical problems, such as time,
form and matter, and the source of the world, all of which Augustine approaches for their
relevance to the interpretation and understanding of Judeo-Christian revelation. Here and
elsewhere, Augustine makes an important contribution to the Christian medieval project
139
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of synthesizing ancient philosophy and Christianity, a project that, for various reasons,
took many forms in the thousand plus years between Augustine’s Confessions and
Descartes’ Discourse on the Method in 1637. By including this theological-philosophical
meditation in his Confessions, Augustine models the transition from his search for
principles in his earlier life to a new way of life based on these same principles and
devoted to theoretical activity.
From the point of view of philosophical autobiography, a number of things are
important to notice in light of this summary of the Confessions. The narrative Augustine
gives of his life in the past occupies only the first nine books, and while these books are
clearly autobiographical, the remaining four books, and especially the last three, make the
Confessions seem at best a problematic autobiography. Even the first nine books do not
present us with a simple, straightforward narrative of Augustine’s life, and O’Donnell is
surely correct to observe that “the narrative is spotty and overembroidered with
meditation and reflection,” and that this feature of the work “should be a sign, often
missed, that narrative isn’t the whole purpose.”141 Augustine’s inclusion of meditation
and reflection, however, is consistent with the form of philosophical autobiography,
which aims not merely to recount a life but to do so for the sake of fostering
philosophical reflection in others. Showing how the philosophical life is the best life, and
presenting and accounting for principles in such a way that others can see how they
emerged in the course of a life, in response to the exigencies of a life, Augustine at the
same time shows in what sense such a principle can be radically first, that is, despite the
fact that human beings only discover truth through time, and in a sense because of this
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fact. If, however, philosophical autobiography is addressed to others for philosophical
reasons, the Confessions appears troublesome once again, because, on the face of it, it is
not addressed to other human beings but rather to the being Augustine calls “god.”
Having raised this issue above, we ought now to investigate more closely whether this
feature of the Confessions constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to our attempt to
interpret the book as a philosophical autobiography.
4. The question of god and whether the Confessions is addressed to human readers.—
Throughout the Confessions Augustine addresses himself to a being he calls deus meus,
“my god.” The entire book begins with Augustine attempting to establish a rapport with
this god, whoever or whatever it may be, and we also discover that Augustine is seeking
something like perfect communion with this being. Whatever exactly such communion
might be is open to question, but by the end of the Confessions all that is certain is that
Augustine is still seeking it, however hopefully. By then Augustine has presented himself
as having made progress through the course of his life toward the truth, but in some sense
he still hasn’t found what he’s looking for. Augustine often describes what he seeks as
“rest” or “peace,” with the idea of coming to rest in god, which implies that for him life
without the desired relation to god is full of turmoil and confusion.142 Famously,
Augustine confesses to god that, “our heart is restless until it rests in you (inquietum est
cor nostrum donec requiescat in te)” (Conf. 1.1.1, cf. 1.5.5, 13.35.50, 13.38.53).
Augustine’s desire to achieve this rest by establishing a relation with god is therefore
quite passionate, prompted by the distress he experiences in his life, but this desire is also
an intellectual one, since for Augustine to be united with god is to know (scire) god.
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From the first chapter of the Confessions, it is clear that for Augustine the desired
relation with god requires knowledge of god. He points out that if one doesn’t know god,
one might make a mistake and talk to the wrong being (!). In fact, Augustine will go on to
show in the Confessions that through a long stretch of his life what he thought was god
was not god; at one point, for example, he states that “error was my god” (4.7.12). At the
beginning of Book 1, Augustine’s situation actually looks rather bad. It is a problem for
Augustine that, in calling on god, he is in some way calling upon something (or someone)
that he doesn’t know. The situation is analogous to looking for a person you don’t know
and have never seen in a crowded street: it suggests Meno’s paradox, which asks, how
could one ever recognize someone or something one does not already know? (Even a
blind date says, I’ll be sitting at the café, wearing a blue hat, and reading Ulysses.) For
Augustine, faith and authority provide a starting point. A passage from Jesus’ “Sermon
on the Mount” figures prominently in the first chapter of the Confessions, where Jesus
says “seek, and you will find” (Matthew 7: 7-8), and Augustine takes this to be both an
exhortation to inquiry and a promise that diligent searching will not go unrewarded. The
last few sentences of the Confessions refer again to this passage from Matthew
(13.38.53), signaling the importance Augustine attached to this idea.143
Despite his faith, however, Augustine recognizes that there are many obstacles to
establishing a rapport with god, to say nothing of achieving a perfect union with him or it,
and it quickly becomes evident that he is greatly troubled by the problem of the
incommensurability between himself and god. It is worth seeing that Augustine’s
problem is in some sense a particular manifestation of a standard philosophical problem,
143
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which is that of how to understand the relation between the limit and the unlimited, the
finite and the infinite, the conditioned and the unconditioned, or the part and the whole.
Determinate beings (or beings in the sense of Heidegger’s Seinendes) are distinct yet
inseparable from the whole, from being as such, but what the being of these beings is, is
not something that lets itself be easily grasped. Augustine believes, if he does not fully
understand, that god is at once the creator of all beings, in some way present in all beings,
and yet at the same time separate from all beings. There is not more god in a sparrow
than there is in an elephant (Conf. 7.1.2). This is because god, as Augustine conceives it,
is not a body, but is the source of all bodies; neither is god for him a soul, though soul is
not a body either (Conf. 7.9.13). God is the source of bodies and souls, so many as there
are, but god is also distinct from every body and every soul. Augustine attributes this, his
ultimate understanding of the relation between god and everything else, to his reading of
the Platonists:
I read that the soul of man (hominis anima), although it gives testimony of
the light, is not itself the light, but the Word (verbum), God himself, is the
true light…that before all times and above all times your Only-begotten
Son remains unchangeably coeternal with you; and that souls receive of
his fullness, so that they may be blessed; and that they are renewed by
participation in the wisdom remaining in herself, so as to be wise (Conf.
7.9.13-14).
Mixing what he learned from the Platonists with the language of Christianity, Augustine
illustrates in this passage his belief that god, especially in the person of Jesus Christ or
“the Word,” is both above the soul and a source of happiness and wisdom for it.144
Human beings are, furthermore, like all other beings dependent for their being on another
being, the supreme being, god (see Conf. 1.2.2, 1.20.31, 7.10.16).
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For RP: notice that, structurally, “the Word” is in the same position relative to souls as are the
forms beyond the heavens in Plato’s Phaedrus.
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The opening chapters of the Confessions set the tone for the entire work while
also posing a philosophical problem whether or not finite human beings can think or
conceive the unconditioned.145 This problem takes on a special urgency in Augustine’s
work, because the ideas of limited and unlimited are personified in the Confessions,
taking “god” as the unlimited, and Augustine himself as the limited, principle. The
Confessions thus has the aspect of a dialogue attempting to establish a rapport or an
agreement between separate and radically unequal parties (in some sense there could not
be more unequal parties). Throughout the text Augustine refers to himself in the first
person and addresses God in the second person, and thus the entire work seems to be
conditioned by one of the two basic words identified by Martin Buber, by the “I-You”
(Ich-Du) word, as opposed to the “I-It” (Ich-Es) one.146 But the relation to the “you” of
god is a problematic one for Augustine, and the dialogue is also strange because one of
the interlocutors, god, never speaks except indirectly (through sacred scripture, but also
through Augustine himself and other human beings insofar as Augustine is able to satisfy
himself that some of the things he and others say really come from god, as a form of
gratia.)
Since the limited and the unlimited seem entirely incommensurate, Augustine
wants to understand how he and his kind can be in relation to god. He thus implores god,
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Lyotard emphasizes this important dimension of the Confessions in his unfinished and
posthumously published The Confessions of Augustine, trans. Richard Beardsworth (Stanford
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nothing; but (by saying You), s/he stands in a relation (Buber, Das dialogische Prinzip, p. 8, my
explication). For Augustine this means he doesn’t have or possess god, but by addressing god he
puts himself in a relation to him or rather, it. The question then is how to understand this relation.
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the unlimited, to show him how a relationship is possible and indeed to make such a
relation possible:
Too narrow is the house of my soul (domus animae meae) for you to enter
into it: let it be enlarged by you. It lies in ruins: build it up again. I confess
and I know (fateor et scio) that it contains things that offend your eyes.
Yet who will cleanse it? (1.5)
This metaphorical and pathetic passage exemplifies Augustine’s way of thinking about
the problem of his relation to god, while it also shows that for him there is an ethical
dimension to this problem, in addition to the logical (or, “ontological”) problem of the
relation. For Augustine he and his fellow humans are sinful or faulty in relation to god,
since the “house of the soul” contains things that offend god. Meanwhile, from a logical
point of view, the finite human soul is not large enough to accommodate the unlimited,
i.e., human cognitive powers are limited and so they seem to be incapable of grasping or
thinking an absolute being of god’s sort. For Augustine, god is above and beyond our
powers of understanding, but he also holds out hope that we can get closer to such
understanding. This hope sustains the strenuous and ongoing intellectual endeavor that
the Confessions portrays, just as it can be seen to characterize Augustine’s entire life and
work as a Christian philosopher.
If we look at the problem of Augustine’s relation to god now from another angle,
we come face to face with a consistent problem of interpreting the Confessions, namely,
the question of whom Augustine addresses in this work. Since god is clearly the explicit
addressee, how do human readers of the Confessions such as ourselves fit into the
picture? Are human readers mere interlopers and eavesdroppers who have stumbled upon
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a private, intimate, albeit somewhat one-sided conversation?147 Although different
addressees need not be mutually exclusive, it can seem troubling that Augustine only
addresses his fellow humans indirectly in the Confessions. Yet despite the fact that
Augustine addresses his Confessions to god, he clearly writes the book for the sake of his
fellow human beings. There are numerous reasons why this has to be the case, though
interpreters sometimes run into confusion on this question. Wills, for example, writes that
“The Confessions, we must be kept aware, do not address us. They have an audience of
One (or of Three-in-One), making them the longest literary prayer in our canon of great
works”148 In some sense, of course, it is true that the Confessions are a long literary
prayer, but if this were simply true without qualification, numerous difficulties would
follow. Why, for instance, would anyone write a book addressed to a being who is
omniscient, and who therefore has nothing to learn from such a writing? And why
reproduce and circulate, as Augustine did, a book that has nothing to say to human
beings?149 As a mere matter of historical fact, Augustine put no small effort into
publishing and preserving his writings, also taking them seriously enough to revisit them
toward the end of his life in the Retractationes. Furthermore, I tend to agree with
O’Donnell that someone who was indifferent to human beings and wholly devoted to
god, would be an “ideal self-effacing ascetic (who) would vanish into the faceless crowd
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O’Donnell (1992, Introduction) observes that the “opening (of the Confessions) can give rise
to the disconcerting feeling of coming into a room and chancing upon a man speaking to someone
who isn’t there. He gestures in our direction and mentions us from time to time, but he never
addresses his readers” (pp. 8-9).
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Garry Wills, Introduction to his translation of the Confessions (New York: Penguin, 2006), p.
xi.
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On the production, reproduction, and circulation of the Confessions and Augustine’s other
texts see the extremely informative entry “Manuscripts” by Kenneth B. Steinhauser in Augustine
through the Ages: An Encyclopedia (1999), pp. 525-533. See also O’Donnell (2005, pp. 135143).
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of the city or disappear over the horizon of the desert, never to be heard from again” (88).
Augustine was not the type to disappear in the desert, and we have not yet ceased to hear
from him, nor will we, I think, anytime soon.150
Wills’ statement contains a certain and undeniable truth, however. The
Confessions are in fact addressed to a being Augustine calls by many names, such as
“lord (domine)” and “my god (deus meus),” and furthermore Augustine never addresses
his human readers directly using the second person pronoun. At one point Augustine
addresses his own soul in the second person, but otherwise this inflection is reserved for
god (cf. 4.11-4.12). Yet god, as Augustine conceives god, is a highly problematic
audience, because, since god is omniscient, god always already knows everything
Augustine (or anyone else) might confess. Since, moreover, god’s perfect knowledge is
not limited by time, is eternal, god certainly does not require the kind of narrative that
constitutes the Confessions. Narrative is sequential, diachronic, but god’s knowledge is
eternal, all at once. Therefore Jean Starobinski correctly observes that it is really only
human readers who require and therefore justify the discursive, narrative form of
Augustine’s work: “the human reader…needs a narrative,” whereas god most
emphatically does not.151 Autobiography takes place in time, and its subject is also
something temporally extended, a life. But god sees and knows the entire life of each of
us eternally, so autobiography, the diachronic relating of a diachronic event, is, from
god’s point of view, wholly superfluous.
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Of the enduring influence of Augustine’s works, O’Donnell writes, “(Augustine) died almost
sixteen hundred years ago and there has been no decade in all that time in which he has not been
read, admired, controverted, and read again” (Augustine, 2005, cited in full above, p. 4). Jean-Luc
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reference point in the history of thought.”
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Jean Starobinski, “The Style of Autobiography,” trans. Seymour Chatman, in Autobiography:
Essays Theoretical and Critical, ed. James Olney (Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 78.
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Augustine himself is fully aware of the implications of his beliefs about god for
his writing of the Confessions. Book 5 opens with clear acknowledgment that god in no
way needs a confession narrative:
Accept the sacrifice of my confessions (sacrificium confessionum
mearum) from the hand that is my tongue, which you have formed and
aroused to confess to your name (confitetur nomini tuo)…No man who
makes confession to you teaches you what takes place within him, for a
closed heart does not close out your eye, nor does man’s hardness turn
back your hand (quia oculum tuum non excludit cor clausum nec manum
tuam repellit duritia hominum)…Let my soul praise you, so that it may
love you (te laudet anima mea ut amet te), and let it confess your mercies
before you, so that it may praise you (laudet te) (5.1).152
Augustine realizes that confession teaches god nothing, and he admits that he confesses,
at least in part, for his own benefit. He wants to relate a story about god’s role in his life
so that he can praise god, and he wants to praise god in order to love him. From the point
of view of this passage, then, the ultimate goal of the Confessions is Augustine’s love of
god, which is a rather ambiguous notion. It seems that Augustine is trying to enkindle his
own amor dei through confessing.
In fact, Augustine writes the Confessions primarily for himself and for his fellow
human beings, as another passage makes clear:
Lord, since eternity (aeternitas) is yours, are you ignorant of the things
that I say to you, or do you see only at a certain time what is done in time
(in tempore)? Why then do I set out in order before you this account
(narrationes) of so many deeds? In truth, it is not that you may learn to
know these matters from me, but that I may rouse up towards you my own
affections (affectum meum), and those of other men who read this, so that
all of us may say: “The Lord is great, and exceedingly to be praised.” I
have already said this, and will say it again: for love of your love I
perform this task (amore amoris tui facio istuc) (Conf. 11.1.1, my
emphasis).
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Cf. Conf. 10.2.

127

Augustine thus wants not only to enkindle his own love for god but also that of those who
read his book. God is ultimately the principle of Augustine’s philosophy, and he is telling
his life story primarily for the sake of interesting others in this principle.
In the course of the Confessions, the first time Augustine acknowledges human
readers is in Book 2, where the pedagogic intention of the book comes into focus:
To whom do I tell these things? Not to you, my god, but before you I tell
them to my own kind (generi meo), to humankind (generi humano), or to
whatever small part of it may come upon these books of mine. Why do I
tell these things? It is that I myself and whoever else reads them may
realize from what great depths we must cry unto you (Conf. 2.3.5).153
So, although it may not be entirely obvious, Augustine does after all address his
Confessions to his fellow human beings. Insofar as it is addressed to them (and us), we
can and should read the book not simply as a prayer, but also as an autobiography, the
purpose of which is to exhort human beings to pursue a better life. Augustine must hope
that his Confessions will help to make new converts to Christianity, while also sustaining
and encouraging those already within the Christian fold. As a philosophical
autobiography, Augustine attempts to turn readers toward god, to provide them with a
paradigm of philosophical conversion, and to instruct them about practical and theoretical
matters. And, although Augustine believes the proper paradigm for human beings is god,
he nevertheless provides readers with an example of a certain kind of philosophic life, of
how one may find truth through seeking it. This kind of humanlife is, in his own
estimation, preferable to every alternative. For Augustine humans can only be like god
and can certainly never become god, so the philosophic life as he conceives it is the best
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life possible for us, given what we are, limited and embodied and driven by passions as
we are.
Augustine worries, however, about how his fellow humans will read the
Confessions, because, as we have seen, he is quite taken with the idea that humans are
subject to concupiscentia oculorum, the improper desire to know. This desire, he laments,
manifests itself as a prurient curiosity to learn about the ethical and intellectual failings of
others:
What have I to do with men, that they should hear my confessions, as if
they were to heal all my diseases? A race eager to know about another
man’s life (curiosum genus ad cognoscendam vitam alienam), but slothful
to correct their own! Why do they seek to hear from me what I am, men
who do not want to hear from you what they themselves are? (Conf.
10.3.3)
Augustine thinks that autobiographical honesty has an ethical purpose, that selfknowledge and ethical improvement constitute the real purpose of his Confessions; he
expresses hope that those who read his work may come to understand better “from what
great depths” humans must set out on their journey toward happiness. In the
Retractationes, he writes, “The thirteen books of my confessions praise the just and good
God for both the bad and the good that I did, and they draw a person’s mind and
emotions towards him.”154
So Augustine writes for god, to praise god, but also for his own benefit and for
that of his fellow human beings. In Book 10, Chapter 4, Augustine clearly expresses the
idea that he is writing for both audiences. Sometimes he also thinks of his human
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audience as a specifically Christian audience, which is understandable in light of his
position as a bishop at the time of composing the book:
Such is the benefit from my confessions (hic est fructus confessionum
mearum)…that I may confess this not only before you in secret exultation
with trembling and in secret sorrow with hope, but also in the ears of the
believing sons of men (in auribus credentium filiorum hominum),
partakers of my joy and sharers in my mortality, my fellow citizens and
pilgrims with me, those who go before me and those who follow me. They
are your servants, my brothers, whom you will to be your sons; my
masters, whom you have commanded me to serve if I would live by you
(Conf. 10.4.6).
This passage illustrates Augustine’s sense of responsibility toward the Christian
community, but it also raises the question whether the book has anything to say to nonChristians. I think it stands to reason that Augustine would have hoped that his book
might contribute to making new converts to Christianity, since in the narrative of the
Confessions, Augustine suggests how other conversion stories played a significant role in
his own conversion. Whether from Augustine’s point of view the Confessions has
something to say to non-Christians is open to question: our concept of world literature
was certainly not his, and there is a hard edge in Augustine to the extent that he believes
Christianity is the one and only way to truth for human beings. This sectarian passion is
not mine, at least, but I nevertheless find the Confessions an indispensible book, as well
as a consummate example of what philosophical autobiography can be and do.
5. The relation between philosophy and humanlife in the Confessions.— Whereas the
Platonic autobiographies do not much concern the relationship between personal or
private life and philosophy, presenting philosophical development from an almost
exclusively intellectual point of view, Augustine emphasizes the importance of his
private life and personal relationships within the broader account of his own intellectual
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and ethical development. The fact that the Confessions is also a prayerful speech allows
Augustine to expose his inner life, his thoughts, emotions, and memories, in a truly novel
way. Prayer and thought are similar, insofar as both can be spoken as silent internal
dialogue. By writing down this dialogue, Augustine also, of course, publicizes it, and in
so doing he invites readers to witness an expression of his inner life.
Like later philosophical autobiographers, such as Nietzsche, Mill, Rousseau, and
(to a lesser extent) Vico, Augustine considers family, friends, and society to have played
an important role in his becoming what he is. The first nine books of the Confessions are
replete with discussions of family, friends, teachers, and acquaintances. Augustine
discusses his son, Adeodatus, who died young, and the mother of this boy, unnamed in
the Confessions, with whom Augustine lived for many years before a final and painful
separation. Philosophers of course tend to regard such particulars as irrelevant, and
although they do, from time to time, show interest in the family as such, the mother as
such, the friend as such, and so forth, they rarely concern themselves with this particular
family, this mother, this friend. This is perhaps consistent with the scientific character of
philosophy, insofar as science is understood as pursuing knowledge of the general rules,
forms, or laws that operate in our world. By contrast, particulars may have greater
importance in fields like psychotherapy and pastoral ministry, where this particular
family, this mother, and this friend are at issue, even if in these fields there is also no
question of dispensing with the use of general (and also normative) concepts. Yet perhaps
philosophy might be conceived as having an interest in such particulars as well? Plato at
least clearly presents philosophy as something undertaken by individuals in particular
situations, so philosophy might be said to have more interest in individuals than is usually
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supposed, and perhaps philosophy is not to be exclusively the mathematics lesson that
certain philosophers seem to think. Augustine, at any rate, clearly considers individuals,
and the particular relationships that form between them, to be philosophically important.
As a matter of historical fact, references to, and concrete descriptions of, family
and friends are not entirely unprecedented in ancient autobiographical literature prior to
Augustine. As we’ve seen, Plato’s Socrates refers to his mother in the Theaetetus and
claims that he inherited the art of midwifery from her (149a-151d6), and Socrates also
discusses his friends and associates, for example, in Apology, where he acknowledges the
special role that his friendship with Chairophon played in his life. In his Meditations,
Marcus Aurelius begins by mentioning family, friends, and others who influenced him by
setting so many examples of virtue.155 Yet Augustine’s way of bringing family, friends,
and others into his autobiography is innovative, both in the extent to which other people
become important within his life-story and in the various ways Augustine allows others
to become actors in this same story. What distinguishes Augustine’s treatment is not so
much the significance he attaches to the role of others in his life and growth (Marcus,
e.g., does that as well), but that he actually attempts to show how his development was
influenced by his interactions with others, i.e., in stories about concrete historical
situations and interactions. In other words, Augustine gives us a narrative, or rather
multiple narratives, that attempt to show how others acted on and influenced him and,
vice versa, how he acted on others. We don’t really find anything comparable prior to
modern times, for example, in Rousseau’s Confessions.
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Augustine’s emphasis on his relationships with other people contextualizes
philosophy within the social or political dimension of the human condition, and it makes
the Confessions an exemplary instance of Paul John Eakin’s concepts of “relational lives”
and “relational selves.” Starting from the idea of personal or individual identity, Eakin
argues for the thesis that “all identity is relational, and…the definition of autobiography,
and its history as well, must be stretched to reflect the kinds of self-writing in which
relational identity is characteristically displayed.”156 Human beings are by nature living in
some relation to both a political community as well as to various societies, including
family, friends, coworkers, and so forth. Contrary to the hypothetical principles of some
modern political philosophers, such as Hobbes and Rousseau, the political or social
character of human beings is essential to the concept of what it is to be human.157 Despite
the universality and importance of such relationships, they are rarely accorded significant
treatment in the canon of the history of philosophy, but Augustine makes these
relationships explicit in his own reflection about his self-development.
Augustine’s account of his interactions with others and their influence on him is
overwhelmingly positive, and for the most part, he presents others as playing a beneficial
role in his life with regard to what he has come to view as his proper end. There are,
156
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however, exceptions. He blames the unruly crowd he frequented as a young man for his
involvement in the famous episode of the pear tree, and warns that friendship can be
dangerous and a seduction of the mind (Conf. 2.8.16-2.9.17). He censures his parents for
the worldly ambition behind their desire that he become highly educated, an instance of
the ambitione saeculi mentioned above. At the same time, although he now views their
motives as misguided, he also sees that his education allowed him to pursue a goal his
parents did not anticipate, namely, a life dedicated to philosophy and ministry (Conf.
2.3.8). For Augustine the true and proper purpose of education is the acquisition,
contemplation, and expression of truth, which for him is god especially as manifested in
sacred scripture. He credits his mother at least with anticipating to some extent the better
use he will have made of his education. As many commentators have noticed,
Augustine’s father, Patricius, doesn’t come off very well in Augustine’s treatment of him.
In Augustine’s story, Monica is a far more intriguing and memorable figure than his
father, and she certainly plays a much more prominent role in Augustine’s life story than
Patricius does. Indeed, with the exception of Augustine himself, Monica plays a more
important role in the Confessions than any other human figure, and as the narrative of the
Confessions unfolds, one becomes increasingly aware of the importance Monica had for
Augustine and of her powerful influence over her son’s intellectual and ethical
development. Although it is undeniable Monica was ambitious and concerned for her
son’s worldly success, Augustine presents her as having been even more anxious that he
should become a good man and a Christian (the two terms being more or less
synonymous for her and, ultimately, for him as well).
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But how exactly did Monica influence Augustine’s development? It bears saying
that their relationship wasn’t, and could not have been, much of an intellectual one, as
Monica had little education and a more or less simple faith, whereas Augustine was both
intellectually gifted and had become, through his studies, a well-read intellectual, a
sophisticated reasoner, an eloquent advocate, and, by the standards of his hometown,
Thagaste, a broad-minded man of the world. Despite these disparities between mother
and son, Monica nevertheless seems to have had her advantages; she was tenacious and
unswerving in her faith, and she set an example for Augustine by her piety, however
untutored. Monica really appears quite formidable in Augustine’s telling; she displays a
Socratic indifference for what will become of her body after her death (Conf. 9.11.27),
and she is as calm as the Jesus of the Gospels during a storm at sea (Conf. 6.1.1). When
Augustine became a Manichee, Monica was the one person who offered serious
resistance. Augustine himself does not underestimate Monica’s contribution to his own
conversion. This goes to show what should perhaps be obvious, that not all influences in
the life of a philosopher are purely intellectual.
Augustine writes very beautifully and movingly about friendship, and his friends
play a great role in his life-story, especially Alypius, Nebridius, and an unnamed friend
whose early death Augustine discusses at length. I want to focus on Augustine’s
discussion of this unnamed friend who died, because it illustrates how Augustine
connects philosophy and life in his autobiography. Thinking back on the death of his
friend as he writes the Confessions, this memory elicits a series of philosophical
reflections that illuminate one of Augustine’s central teachings about the proper attitude
toward human goods such as friendship. Such goods can only be properly appreciated if
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we know them for what they are, which for Augustine means above all that we should not
mistake such goods for the true good, which is god. God is also the source of all these
lesser goods, and the main difference between goods such as friendship and god’s
goodness is that the former are conditioned by time and are hence ephemeral, whereas
god is eternal. In his reflection on the death of his friend, he suggests how he set himself
up for misery by loving a mortal good as though it were immortal. Augustine thus
enables us to see how philosophical reflection arises in response to such mundane events
as characterize normal humanlife, where philosophy appears neither as detached and
apathetic inquiry, nor as merely professional activity, but rather as a human endeavor to
come to an understanding about humanlife, with all of its vicissitudes and frailties.
6. Augustine’s conversions, intellectual and ethical.— In Augustine’s day, as in our own,
there were many competing schools and sects, both philosophical and religious, that
formulated theoretical doctrines about what is, as well as practical teachings about how
human beings should live. Theoretical and practical philosophy are different but not
unrelated, and the theoretical and practical doctrines of the various schools and sects
tended to be, as they still are, mutually reinforcing. One’s theoretical beliefs about how
things are tend to determine one’s practical beliefs about the best way to live, but
problematically the opposite relation may obtain as well, since practical beliefs may and
perhaps often do influence theoretical ones. It is now, as it was then, difficult to know
how far our desire for the world to be a certain way determines the way in which we see
or speculate about how the world actually is. However this may be, there is a close
connection between theory and practice, and Augustine’s life-story involves a compelling
presentation of how theoretical and practical concerns can converge.
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Following the opening chapters of the Confessions devoted to establishing a
rapport with god, Augustine begins the narrative of his life in chapter 6 of Book 1. He
calls his infancy “this age I hesitate to join to this life of mine which I have lived in this
world,” because he cannot remember it (1.7). This stage of one’s own life is problematic
because of our normal childhood amnesia. Our life begins before our humanlife begins,
since humanlife in some sense only begins with the emergence of memory. What we can
know of the time of our life before memory comes from the sources Augustine identifies,
namely, from the testimony of others such as parents and from our own observation of
other infants. Based on these sources, Augustine views infants as already active, striving
to express their wills that he famously says are not unqualifiedly good. Augustine
believes that infants are not innocents that become corrupted only later; rather, “it is not
the infant’s will that is harmless, but the weakness of infant limbs” (1.7). It is thus the
case that, for Augustine, the human quest for happiness is not about preserving or
recovering some original goodness as in Rousseau. It is rather a question of overcoming,
with God’s help, the original deficiency in our nature. Augustine’s position thus repeats
to some extent the general consensus among ancient philosophers, namely, that human
beings can only achieve perfection over time, through education, and perhaps requiring
an element of luck or divine intervention. Augustine presents his own life as a tortuous
quest to achieve whatever perfection is possible for human beings, and his conception of
infants as far from innocent already sets the stage for the tremendous obstacles Augustine
thinks we have to overcome to attain even a semblance of goodness.
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7. Augustine’s intellectual conversion.— It is well known that Augustine claims his
passion for philosophy was awakened by his reading of Cicero’s (now lost) Hortensius,
an encounter that Augustine describes in the fourth chapter of Book 3:
This book changed my affections. It turned my prayers to you, lord, and
caused me to have different purposes and desires. All my vain hopes
forthwith became worthless to me, and with incredible ardor of heart I
desired undying wisdom (immortalitatem sapientiae concupiscebam). I
began to rise up…by (Cicero’s) argument I was stirred up and enkindled
and set aflame to love, and pursue, and attain and catch hold of, and
strongly embrace not this or that sect, but wisdom itself, whatsoever it
might be (quod non illam aut illam sectam, sed ipsam quaecumque esset
sapientiam) (Conf. 3.4.7-8).
Importantly Augustine presents his search for truth as disinterested, as indifferent to
where or in what school or religion it is to be found; he sought, he says, only “wisdom
itself.” At the same time, Augustine proceeds to admit that even then he had a
predilection for Catholicism, and the only thing that bothered him about Cicero’s
exhortation to philosophy was that Christ’s name (nomen Christi) was not in it. Monica,
as we have seen, introduced Augustine to Catholicism at an early age, and to a very great
extent this was decisive for his entire development. One thing Augustine never really
questioned was his belief in the importance of Jesus Christ, which is one reason the
Manicheans attracted him, since they were continually talking about Jesus, as well as the
other members of the trinity, the holy spirit and god (Conf. 3.6.10). Obviously one can
and ought to question how such unquestioned presuppositions can be reconciled with
Augustine’s claim to have fallen in love with the disinterested pursuit of wisdom, but to
his credit Augustine examines his presuppositions in the Confessions and in subsequent
works, for example, in De Trinitate. (Books 11-13 of the Confessions themselves already
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initiate an investigation into the nature of the divine trinity.158) What concerns us at
present are the main reasons why Augustine did not accept Catholicism straightaway
upon becoming enflamed with the passion for wisdom.
In his early reading of them, it is not surprising that such a trained rhetorician and
humanist as Augustine found the sacred scriptures of the Christians vulgar, simpleminded, and “unworthy of comparison with the nobility of Cicero’s writings” (3.5.9) But
the reasons for his then falling in with the Manicheans are less clear. Obviously he was
attracted by the Manichean talk about god, Jesus, and the holy spirit, but clearly this does
not explain why he preferred the Manichees to the Christians who also spoke of such
things. We have therefore to seek an explanation elsewhere, and what we discover is that
for Augustine Manicheism was attractive primarily for two, interrelated reasons, namely,
because of the way that it understood substance and explained the existence of evil. Evil
is arguably more of a religious concept than a philosophical one, but certainly what
Augustine calls evil bears a strong resemblance to what practical philosophy speaks of as
vice, as well as to wickedness which is generally speaking a less extensive category than
viciousness (in Aristotle, e.g., all wickedness is vicious, but not all vices are wicked). Yet
despite the clear practical connotations of evil, Augustine regards evil as not only a
practical problem but considers it a theoretical one as well. It was the Manichees’ claim
to give what we might call an ontological explanation of evil that really attracted
Augustine.
The theoretical problem of evil is easy to formulate but very difficult to solve,
especially within the strictures of a theory that views god as unqualifiedly good and
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powerful. If god is both good and powerful without qualification, and if god is also the
source of the world and everything in it, then why is there evil in the world that god
creates? Clearly god cannot be the source of evil, because god is entirely good. So the
question inevitably arises, whence evil? The Manicheans offer an ingenious solution to
this problem, claiming that, although god is unqualifiedly good, god is not omnipotent.
Rather, god exists alongside an equiprimordial evil power, and this countervailing power
explains the fact of evil in the world. A peculiarity of this teaching, at least as Augustine
explains it, is that everything there is for Manicheism is a body, i.e., this doctrine is a
thoroughgoing materialism. Hence both evil and good are substances in the sense of
bodies, with the evil body being understood as a kind of earthy matter and the good one
as a kind of fine light. The evil body is always and everywhere waging war on the good
one, and the Manichee, in order to be as good as possible, attempts to turn away from the
earthy body and tries to live instead in accordance with the more spiritual but still bodily
light. The extreme emphasis on asceticism in Manichean practical doctrine finds its
justification in the Manichean theoretical worldview, and Augustine, despite his deeply
sensual nature and early devotion to fleshy pleasures, initially found much to admire in
both the theoretical and the practical teachings of the Manichees.
It might seem surprising that Augustine was at first persuaded to a materialistic
philosophy, but as Brown notes, “with the exception of the Platonists, most thinkers in
the ancient world, the most religious included, were ‘materialists’ in the strict sense. For
them, the divine was also an ‘element,’ though infinitely more ‘fine,’ more ‘noble’ and
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less ‘mutable.’”159 Augustine himself confesses that for a long time he was completely
unable to conceive of an incorporeal substance (this is a recurring theme in the early
books of the Confessions). It is interesting how, in this respect, Augustine’s subsequent
intellectual development mirrors Socrates’ account in the Phaedo. In both cases, the main
change is from a natural, materialist orientation toward a belief in incorporeal entities
such as soul, ideas, and god. As in Socrates’ case, Augustine seems to have abandoned
materialism due to his gradual discovery of the inadequacy of exclusively materialistic
accounts to explain what is, to save the phenomena. It is important to take seriously
Augustine’s claim that the major obstacle to his embrace of god was his long-enduring
incapacity to conceive an incorporeal substance, and it is hard to disagree with Brown
(2000, p. 76), when he writes that Augustine’s story “is one of the most dramatic and
massive evocations ever written of the evolution of a metaphysician.”
In Book 7, Augustine describes his decisive encounter with “certain books of the
Platonists” (7.9.13). As O’Donnell observes in his commentary, this is the middle of the
Confessions, “with six books before and after” (OD II: 413); he also notes that “the
present passage (7.9.13) has been the focus of every debate in the (twentieth) century
over the meaning of Augustine’s intellectual autobiography.” Obviously Augustine’s
encounter with the platonicorum libri looms large in the story he tells in the Confessions
about his intellectual conversion, and he clearly credits the Platonists with helping him to
conceive an immaterial substance. But no less obviously, Augustine expresses profound
reservations about the teachings of the Platonists. His comment about what their writings
lack is illuminating:
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Their pages do not have this face of piety (vultum pietatis huius), the tears
of confession (lacrimas confessionis), your sacrifice (sacrificium tuum), a
troubled spirit (spiritum contribulatum), a contrite and humbled heart (cor
contritum et humilatum), the salvation of your people (populi salutem), the
city that is like a bride (sponsam civitatem), the pledge of the spirit (arram
spiritus sancti), the cup of our redemption (poculum pretii nostri) (Conf.
7.21.27).
The Platonists have two main faults, namely, they have a false conception of human
nature and they lack a belief in the truth of the Christian religion. It is possible to see the
difference between the Christian conception of human nature and that of the ancient
Greek philosophers clearly delineated in this passage, for Augustine starkly contrasts the
tears, troubled spirit, and humility of the Christian with the pride and tranquility of the
Greek sage. Writing the Confessions in 397 or later, and already a Catholic bishop,
Augustine also emphasizes certain aspects of the Christian religion that the Platonists
lack, and in this context he especially stresses the importance of the incarnation, god’s
sacrifice, and the role of Jesus Christ and the sacrament of the eucharist as a mediator
between human beings and god. Book 7 contains the most prolonged discussion of the
son of god within the first ten books of the Confessions, so in praising the Platonists
Augustine is also careful to advance what he believes differentiates Christianity from
their teachings.
It is not, however, my intent to disentangle the complex argument of Book 7 here,
the intricate comparison and contrast Augustine makes between Christianity and
Platonism at this crucial juncture of the Confessions. What I want to emphasize is how
Book 7 functions structurally within Augustine’s autobiographical narrative. His
discovery of the platonicorum libri functions as an important event and turning point in
the story Augustine tells about his life. This episode reflects a pattern that we readers find
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again and again in philosophical autobiography. Augustine recognizes the inadequacy of
the skeptical position he has adopted, and perhaps it is even more accurate to say that he
feels this position to be inadequate. The reason is that he has a desire for truth, and
skepticism does not satisfy this desire. Meanwhile, he tells us, he had been becoming
more open to the possibility that the Christian religion contained the truth he was seeking.
He credits Ambrose’s preaching with having an important influence on him in this
regard. Obstacles, however, remained, at this point in the form of metaphysical doubts
relating to the existence of incorporeal substance and the problem of evil. The Platonists
helped Augustine to get beyond these obstacles, by teaching him how to think about
incorporeal substances and the strange dependence of the evil upon the good.
8. Tolle lege, tolle lege: Augustine’s ultimate conversion.— Even after the Platonists
quelled his doubts about an “incorruptible substance” and helped him to understand the
non-being of evil, Augustine tells us he was still wavering and unsure what to do. In light
of this continuing perplexity, O’Donnell observes that “Book 7 teaches, in the end, that
intellectual enlightenment, contrary to all Augustine’s youthful expectations, is not
sufficient” (OD 2: 415). At the beginning of Book 8, Augustine writes that “all (his)
doubts had been removed…but in my temporal life (temporali vita) all things were
uncertain, and my heart had to be cleansed of the old leaven” (8.1.1). According to
O’Donnell, Pierre Courcelle attempted “to minimize the moral dilemma and keep the
focus on the intellectual level,” whereas O’Donnell himself emphasizes the import of the
ethical problem, citing how Augustine “chose to see the issue as whether to espouse a
continent life” (OD III.7). Clearly the intellectual conversion is important but not the
whole story. As I stressed above, one aspect that makes Augustine’s Confessions unique
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is the extent to which he insists upon the importance of his emotional life in the story he
tells of his philosophical becoming. If by the beginning of Book 8 he presents himself as
intellectually prepared to accept Christianity as the truth he had been seeking, there is still
something in him that resists. It is also the case, however, that Augustine cannot attribute
his conversion simply or even primarily to himself, since he wants to give god the credit.
Augustine may be on the verge of reaching a decision, but he will only be able to do so
with god’s help.
The conversion story Augustine wants to tell involves his whole life, from his
infancy up to the moment of his conversion and on into the future, and the whole story
matters with respect to the central moment. Augustine works out a broader and in many
ways more psychologically sophisticated autobiography than any that had come before.
One might say that, just as Socrates drew philosophy down from the heavens and toward
concern with the human things, Augustine drew philosophical autobiography away from
the noble but also somewhat hagiographic image of Plato’s perfect sage and toward a
conception of the philosopher as a complex and flawed human being among others.160
The qualifying observation is, however, justified that prior to Augustine, philosophers
such as Plato and Aristotle worked out psychologically sophisticated accounts of human
nature, its complexity, and our tendency to become unhappy through ethical and
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intellectual failures. What distinguishes Augustine’s Confessions, however, is that he
elaborates this human complexity and frailty in terms of himself, in terms of his own life
and becoming.
Near the beginning of Book 8, Augustine confesses that at this point in his life, he
was “still tightly bound by the love of women” (Conf. 8.1.2).
Many, perhaps twelve, of my years had flown by since that nineteenth
year when by reading Cicero’s Hortensius I was aroused to a zeal for
wisdom. Yet still I delayed to despise earthly happiness, and thus devote
myself to that search. For the bare search for wisdom, even when it is not
actually found, was preferable to finding treasures and earthly kingdoms
and to bodily pleasures (corporis voluptatibus) swirling about me at my
beck. But I, a most wretched youth, most wretched from the very start of
my youth, had even sought chastity from you, and had said, “Give me
chastity and continence, but not yet!” (“da mihi castitatem et
continentiam, sed noli modo.”) For I feared that you would hear me
quickly, and that quickly you would heal me of that disease of lust (morbo
concupiscentiae), which I wished to have satisfied rather than
extinguished (Conf. 8.7.17).
Augustine had delayed making a decision to renounce one kind of life in favor of another.
He realizes that “the bare search for wisdom” is better than the kind of worldly life he
had been living, yet some obstacle remained in him. In Chapters 8 through 12 of Book 8,
Augustine describes a scene, now famous, in which his conversion took place. As Pierre
Hadot has noted (1995, pp. 51-52), Pierre Courcelle started a controversy within
Augustine studies when, in his 1950 book on the Confessions, he suggested that many
details of Augustine’s story—the garden, the fig tree, the child’s voice—might have
“purely symbolic value,” thus intimating that the story Augustine tells of his conversion
might not be literally true. That this observation should have caused such an uproar may
strike us today as rather quizzical, and yet it does point to the way that the distinction
between fiction and autobiography is often undecidable, as Derrida suggests (2000, p.
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16). This problem may be deeply troubling. And yet perhaps one should not be too
literal-minded. (There is some truth, after all, to the idea that the letter can sometimes
kill, whereas spiritus est qui vivificat.) Besides, for all of the allegorical overtones of
Augustine’s story, the struggle that he describes within himself seems authentic. The will,
which is central to his account here, can pull a person apart in different directions, even to
the point of making a decision impossible. For Augustine, it is only the miracle of god’s
grace that allows him to decide. When he heard the child calling out in the distance to
“Pick up and read, pick up and read,” he says he took it as “a divine command” and
immediately went over to where he had left his copy of Paul, took up the book (Romans),
and read: “Not in riots and drunken parties, not in eroticism and indecencies, not in strife
and rivalry, but put on the Lord Jesus Christ and make no provision for the flesh in its
lusts” (Rom. 13: 13-14, Chadwick trans.). Augustine describes his response to this
passage:
I neither wished nor needed to read further. At once, with the last words of
this sentence, it was as if a light of relief from all anxiety flooded into my
heart. All the shadows of doubt were dispelled (Conf. 8.12.29, Chadwick
trans.)
A central theme of Paul’s Letter to the Romans is that it is possible to know the right
thing and not to do it. A philosopher might add that it is also possible to believe one
knows what is right and nevertheless to fail to act in accordance with this belief. This is
exactly the position Augustine claims he was in at this time in his life. However troubling
it may seem to some of us, Augustine believes that it was god’s grace that entered into his
life and allowed him to do what he believed he ought to do. His new life began, he
claims, at that moment.
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9. Confessions Books 10-13: end and beginning, action and theoria.—
The true, fundamental interrelationships in any novel or drama can be disclosed only at the end.
Because of the very nature of their construction and effect, only the conclusion provides full
clarification of the beginning.—Georg Lukács161
“And we pass from this lower fruit of action to the delights of contemplation…” (Conf. 13.18.22)

Somewhat at odds with the aforementioned scholarly views, I think that the last
four books of the Confessions contribute to making the work an exemplary philosophical
autobiography. One of the central arguments of the present work is that philosophical
autobiography is protreptic, meaning that the goal of such works is to lead prospective
philosophers into actually doing philosophy. Philosophical autobiographies present
paradigms not only of how their authors searched for truth and arrived at principles, but
also of what a life of philosophizing can be. Socrates, for example, discusses not only his
search for truth and discovery of principles but also how he took these principles up and
made them the basis of his philosophical activity. This activity in turn came to
characterize his life. Later in history, we find the same basic pattern in such philosophical
autobiographies as Descartes’ Discourse on the Method and Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo,
where a search for truth leads to the discovery of principles that then constitute the basis
for future philosophical activity. In Confessions Books 10-13, Augustine enacts, literally
performs, the transition from a life of seeking truth to a life of trying to understand the
truth that has been found.
Thus the Confessions instead of merely describing the transition from a prephilosophical to a philosophical way of life actually perform this transition in book 10
and especially in books 11-13. Augustine’s conception of the philosophical life is, of
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course, peculiar, but that should neither blind us to the theoretical, speculative character
of the activity depicted in these later books, nor should it obscure the fact that minus the
emphasis on sacred scripture Augustine’s meditations concern topics that are still
recognized as philosophical, especially memory, time, form and matter, and so forth.
Noting the importance that sacred scripture came to have for Augustine, Brown writes
that, “a mind that had once hoped to train itself for the vision of God by means of the
Liberal Arts, would now come to rest on the solid, intractable mass of the Christian Bible.
For this reason, the last three books of his Confessions are in many ways the most strictly
autobiographical part of the whole book.”162
Augustine thus models for his readers the transition from conversion to a life of
theoria, which for him involves the attempt to understand sacred scripture. The principles
that it has been one of the central purposes of the Confessions to introduce form the basis
or starting point for this speculative activity. Augustine sees himself, at least in the
context of the last three books, as passing “from the lower fruit of action to the delights of
contemplation” (13.18.22).
Augustine’s Confessions are remarkable because, while patterning a paradigm of
the philosophical life, they still reflect the complexity of real humanlife; because, while
engaging in philosophical argumentation and meditation, they also attempt to put
philosophy in a full human context and in relation to a whole life; and finally because,
while providing a model of philosophical conversion, they also teach the hard truth that
even for the philosopher, humanlife is difficult and a trial. Whatever critics may say, or
however much one may question Augustine’s motives or even the truthfulness of his
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autobiography, the Confessions is certainly neither self-hagiography nor an altogether
unrealistic idealization of a human being.
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Chapter 4
New Sciences in Early Modern Philosophical Autobiography
Regarding the opinions to which I had hitherto given credence, I thought that I could not do better
than undertake to get rid of them, all at one go, in order to replace them afterwards with better
ones, or with the same ones once I had squared them with the standards of reason. I firmly
believed that in this way I would succeed in conducting my life (ma vie) much better than if I
built only upon old foundations (vieux fondements) and relied only upon principles (principes)
that I had accepted in my youth without ever examining whether they were true.—Descartes163
A science deriving from old principles (prìncipi) would not be a “new science.”—Vico164

1. Metaphysics in early modern philosophical autobiography.— Individually complex
and in comparison to one another quite topically diverse, Descartes’ and Vico’s
autobiographies nevertheless resemble each other in their explicit use of the language of
metaphysics and their claims to present specifically metaphysical principles in terms of a
life-story. Formally, too, and with respect to their function, their autobiographies
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correspond to the Platonic paradigm of philosophical autobiography and certainly to a
greater extent than has usually (or ever) been noticed. We shall have occasion to
demonstrate this formal correspondence in due time, but I want to focus first of all on the
metaphysical content of these autobiographies. This is a good way to gain access to these
works, while it also promises to reinforce our understanding of how philosophers use
autobiography in general.
Looking back on the previous chapters, we can see that the philosophical
autobiographies considered there concern two basic sorts of philosophical principles,
namely, theoretical and practical ones. Now, if we concentrate for the moment on
theoretical principles, asking if their form can be further specified, it should be fairly
clear that the principles at issue in Plato’s and Augustine’s autobiographical writings are
metaphysical ones. Yet, if disagreement about what something is proves that we lack
knowledge of that thing, then metaphysics is generally not too well known. The word
“metaphysics” is a coin of dubious extraction, emerging as it did sometime after the death
of Aristotle and traceable only to certain more or less obscure figures in the history of
philosophy and scholarship.165 In the countries of western Europe, the word only came
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into common use in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, among the highly educated, as a
result of the translation movement that arose together with the reawakened desire for
learning that took hold of Europe in the first centuries of the last millennium.166 It is
generally well known that Aristotle himself never referred to what he was seeking in his
famous treatise by the name “metaphysics” but called it instead by turns the study of
“being as being,” “first philosophy,” and “the science of god” (see Metaphys. E,
1026a18-32). Yet the metaphysical idea, to employ this phrase, certainly antedates the
word, particularly insofar as this idea points to first principles and is therefore closely
associated with the kind of investigation that Plato locates at the pinnacle of the so-called
divided-line (see Rep. 510b-511c).167 As opposed to the first things that appear to us
individual human beings during our lifetimes, such as colors, sounds, and feelings,
metaphysics is concerned with the ultimate principles, or principle, of beings (see
Metaphys. 1029b1-13). Now, despite the permutations of the idea of metaphysics
throughout the history of philosophy, there is still something to be said for the idea
Aristotle developed in his treatise that sees the primary concerns of metaphysics as the
account of being as being and the science of god. For Aristotle, the studies of being and
god are interrelated since both have to do with the ultimate causes, or principles, of the
multitude of organic and inorganic beings that we encounter in the world including, of
course, ourselves. At the same time, because the domain of metaphysics has been
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variously configured and reconfigured since Aristotle wrote, and also due to the fact that
we continue to rethink metaphysics today, it is necessary to take a historical view of
metaphysics and to recognize how the meaning of metaphysics has changed over time.
The philosophers whose autobiographies are considered in the present chapter made
significant contributions to the historical process of determining what metaphysics is.
Philosophical autobiography is concerned with ultimate philosophical principles,
since it is the story of a philosopher’s humanlife that necessarily involves his search for
principles as well as the presentation of the results of this search. In Plato’s Phaedo,
Socrates tells an autobiographical story about his search for a metaphysical principle in
some sense beyond being and, in any case, beyond the material reality that Socrates
claims to be the exclusive subject matter of the study of nature that he pursued as a young
man. Socrates’ turn to the study of speech or argument (λόγος) and his hypothesis of the
forms stem from his inability to find any better starting-point for his philosophical
activity. Likewise Augustine, in his Confessions, recounts his search for, and partial
discovery of, what he calls god, which as the sole source and sustainer of beings cannot
fail to be recognized as a metaphysical principle. For these philosophers, ultimate
philosophical principles are metaphysical, and their philosophical autobiographies are
therefore works especially devoted to the kind of principles that belong to first
philosophy. The metaphysical character of philosophical first principles is also explicit in
the two philosophical autobiographies written in the early modern period, those of Vico
and Descartes, and the comparative study of these works will provide further evidence for
interpreting philosophical autobiography as a genre determined by metaphysical
affinities. This study will also contribute to our understanding of how the task of
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metaphysics has been variously reconceived at certain junctures in the history of
philosophy.
The use of the term “metaphysics” had become well-established within the
learned communities of Europe by the seventeenth century, when its meaning underwent
a significant metamorphosis, primarily at the hands of René Descartes.168 For, whereas
Aristotle’s study focuses primarily on being as being and god, Descartes expanded the
subject matter of metaphysics to include the topics of soul or mind, the relation between
mind and body, and the questions of the immortality of the soul and free will.169 In the
Discourse, Descartes also initiates what, following Jean-Luc Marion, we might call “a
protology of the ego,” that is, a metaphysical account that makes the I (ego or je) the first
principle and first substance within philosophy.170 Within the autobiographical context of
the Discourse, the thinking-I appears as the first and most real being in the order of ideas
that constitutes Descartes’ philosophy, providing the foundation of Descartes’ entire
philosophical system. Since, moreover, Descartes is explicit in the Discourse (and
elsewhere) about the need for philosophy to ground all the other sciences, the first
principle that he articulates is meant to serve as the foundation of the entire mental
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the headings of philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind, and theory of action, respectively.
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Jean-Luc Marion, Cartesian Questions: Method and Metaphysics (University of Chicago,
1999), pp. 35-36.
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universe, or at least those parts of it that Descartes believes are susceptible of
philosophical treatment.
In contrast to Descartes’ system and to the metaphysical principle upon which it
rests, Giambattista Vico worked out an altogether different system rooted in a socialhistorical metaphysics, what in his autobiographical Life he calls a “metaphysics of the
human race (una metafisica del genere umano)” (FB 167/N 62). Vico’s metaphysics has
been far less influential within the history of philosophy than that of Descartes, and it
cannot but appear largely foreign to both traditional and contemporary conceptions of
metaphysics. For Vico, the ultimate character of being is not, as with Descartes, rooted in
individual self-certainty, but rather in the social and historical nature of humankind that
reflects divine providence. Like other modern philosophers, Vico views the entire world
as being divided between the domain of nature and the domain of freedom understood as
the human, historical world. For Vico, knowers only know what they make, and since
god alone is the maker of nature, nature is only really known by god. With history things
are different. Divine providence and human action combine to make the historical, human
world, and therefore we humans, as co-creators of history, are in a position to know it in a
way that we can never know nature. Yet despite the divergence between their teachings,
Vico and Descartes nevertheless agree in putting human beings at the center of their
respective metaphysical doctrines, either individually, as in Descartes, or collectively, as
in Vico.
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As with Plato and Augustine, so with Vico and Descartes, we find autobiography
at the origin of something new in philosophy.171 In all these cases, autobiography
functions as a means of presenting ultimate philosophical principles that constitute the
starting-points of certain unprecedented and epochal philosophical itineraries. This fact
provides further evidence for our thesis, that there is an integral connection between
philosophical autobiography, philosophical principles, and philosophical paradigm shifts
(some people call them “revolutions”), such as those initiated by Plato and Socrates,
Augustine, Descartes, and Vico. The reason for this is that major changes in (the history
of) philosophy depend almost entirely on the adoption of new philosophical principles,
and philosophical autobiography is specially suited to presenting such principles. Since
principles determine the character of subsequent philosophical activity, a true paradigm
shift in philosophy is unthinkable without the introduction of at least one new principle.
As Vico says, a new science can hardly be based on old principles, and at the very least,
old principles have to be given new applications in order for philosophical innovation to
occur. Consideration of Vico and Descartes’ autobiographies further confirms the thesis
that philosophers write autobiographies in order to present philosophical principles, while
it also shows the importance of starting points for what follows, demonstrating how
different starting points lead to very different philosophical systems.
2. Epistemological underpinnings of an opposition, with respect to the question of
philosophical method.— At the root of the differences between Vico and Descartes’
philosophies we discover a disagreement about what human beings can and cannot know.
Vico and Descartes posit opposite knowables and unknowables: for Descartes, certain
171

In fact, this claim always holds for philosophical autobiography, though it needs to be
qualified to avoid being trivial. Every unique articulation of philosophy, after all, presents us with
something new, and there is thus a sense in which philosophy is always being “revolutionized.”
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metaphysical principles, such as the thinking-I and god are knowable, while he also
believes that we can significantly increase our knowledge of the natural world; on the
other hand, he seems to dismiss the possibility of knowledge of the social-historical realm
of humanlife. To put it somewhat bluntly, this is because for Descartes the knowable and
the certain are coterminous, and he believes that there is nothing certain in human affairs
and human history. Thus, in the words of Karl Löwith (1949, p. 118), “Historical
sciences are, for Descartes, no sciences at all.” Descartes thus maintains that we can only
have certain knowledge of metaphysical principles and mathematical propositions,
though he also believes that we can apply our mathematical knowledge to the study of
nature for the purpose of manipulating natural beings to human ends. (Whether or not
Descartes believes that mathematics gives us knowledge of nature in itself remains, for
me, an open question.) Even Descartes’ ethical teaching, such as it is, is qualified by him
as “provisional,” alongside some vague promises that the application of his principles
will eventually lead to the establishment of a perfect moral science.172
Vico, by contrast, maintains exactly the opposite position with respect to nature,
arguing that it is a veritable thing-in-itself, known only to god, its maker. Excluded in
principle from knowledge of the inner workings of nature, Vico believes that we humans
know only what we make, namely, the socio-historical world of customs, laws,
institutions, and languages. God, too, is ultimately unknowable for Vico, since there is no
sense in which human beings can be conceived as making the true god, as opposed to the
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See, however, the paper by Ron Polansky and Joe Cimakasky, which questions the common
belief that Descartes’ provisional morality is really provisional. According to Polansky and
Cimakasky, Part Three of the Discourse presents us with Descartes’ “final ethical position
universally applicable.” This paper is entitled “Descartes’ ‘Provisional Morality’” and can be
found in the Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Sept. 2012, 93, pp. 353-372.
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many false gods that we have made historically. Thus both natural sciences and positive
theologies such as Descartes’ are, for Vico, no sciences at all.
Although Vico and Descartes surely employ autobiography to introduce
metaphysical principles, their autobiographies also range across broader philosophical
territory, encompassing practical philosophy, physics, and especially the question of
philosophical method. The question about method asks how to establish a procedure that
will aid us in reliably discovering truth, and both Descartes and Vico believe they have
made important discoveries in this area. Descartes’ emphasis on method is, of course,
pronounced. Method appears in the title of his autobiography, and he presents his method
as the answer to the many doubts that plagued him before he discovered it. Yet there is a
certain ambiguity here. As Jean-Luc Marion has shown, there is a serious question about
the relationship between method and metaphysics in Descartes. One reason Descartes
presents metaphysical principles in the Discourse is to show how these principles
illustrate his method, and from this point of view his metaphysical principles might be
seen to derive from his method. Descartes wants to show how his method can be applied
to every domain of human knowledge, notably, morality, metaphysics, and physics,
including especially the study of medicine. There is also, however, a sense in which
Descartes’ method might be seen to derive from his metaphysics, since in Part Four he
relates how it was in the domain of metaphysics that he discovered the criterion of clarity
and distinctness that serves as the first rule of the method, presented in Part Two.
Whether or not Descartes’ metaphysics is the source of his method (and there are reasons
to resist this conclusion, for example, the possibility that the clarity and distinctness of
mathematical propositions is the source), for him metaphysics is identical with
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philosophy, and philosophy grounds all of the other branches of knowledge, as he claims
in Part Two.173
Less explicit than in Descartes’ case, Vico’s emphasis on method in his Life (and
elsewhere) is nonetheless significant. Vico speaks expressly of “a new critical method
(una nuova arte critica)” (FB 167/N 61), which no less than the method of Descartes,
though in a very different way, promises to provide human beings with the power to
comprehend the truth in every domain of human endeavor. What is this critical method?
Max Fisch memorably calls it the “genetic method,” while James Goetsch describes it as
a logic of descent that seeks to understand things, especially “civil things,” in terms of
their origins.174 Vico’s method is essentially historical and a forerunner of the historical,
genealogical, etiological, and archeological approaches adopted by many modern and
contemporary philosophers in their attempts to explain what things are in terms of how
they came to be. For Vico knowledge of anything is always knowledge of its causes. This
method depends upon massive erudition, imagination, and the ability to reason carefully.
Although Descartes serves as a standard foil for Vico (and Vico scholars), there is
a sense in which any attempt to compare these philosophers is deeply problematic. Vico
and Descartes were motivated by largely disparate goals and interested in very different
subject matters; as a consequence they adopted divergent methodological approaches. In
the tension between Vico’s and Descartes’ philosophical systems, it is also possible to
discern an early figuration of one of the basic oppositions (or, as Žižek puts it, modes of
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For Descartes’ belief that philosophy or metaphysics grounds all the other branches of
learning, see the Preface to the French edition of the Principles of Philosophy, CSM 186-87/AT
9: 14-15.
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James Robert Goetsch, Jr., Vico’s Axioms: The Geometry of the Human World (Yale, 1995),
pp. 2-3. Max Harold Fisch, Preface to his and Bergin’s translation of Vico’s Autobiography
(1944), p. v. For full citation see note 2 above.
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parallax) within modern philosophy itself, namely, that between the “two cultures” of the
human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) and the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften).
Descartes directs philosophy toward nature, Vico toward spirit or mind as it expresses
itself historically. Across a persistent divide, Descartes’ and Vico’s autobiographical
writings bear on the inquiry within modernity about what philosophy is and is supposed
to be. Based on two very different lives, approaches to philosophy, and sets of
philosophical principles, Vico and Descartes present us with alternate philosophical
visions. Descartes’ philosophy opposes the authority of tradition and emphasizes the selfreliance of the individual who uses her reason as a principal source of human wisdom.
Vico, by contrast, emphasizes the social, civic, and historical character of humanlife and
grants tradition a prominent role within human wisdom. In the “Idea of the Work” that
serves as a preface to the 1744 New Science, Vico asserts that human nature “has this
principal property: that of being social (d’essere socievoli)” (§2/N 367). The Discourse
on the Method introduces Descartes’ essays on light, meteors, and geometry, indicating
the way in which Descartes’ entire philosophical project points in the direction of
nature.175 Vico’s Life, by contrast, confronts us with a philosophy that concerns itself
primarily with humanity’s social, civil, and historical being. The difference in subject
matter has multiple corollaries, from different ideas about method to divergent teachings
about practical philosophy and education. In both cases, however, autobiography figures
centrally in the presentation of philosophy.
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Paul J. Olscamp has provided a useful service to scholarship by reminding Descartes’ Englishspeaking readers of the importance of viewing the Discourse in relation to the essays it originally
introduced. In general, because we today focus almost exclusively on Descartes’ Meditations, our
view of Descartes is rather skewed toward the metaphysical side of his thought.
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3. Modern philosophy begins with an autobiography.— If modern philosophy begins, as
is often thought, with Descartes, then it also begins with an autobiography.176 For,
whether by conscious design or historical accident, Descartes’ first published statement
of his philosophy is a philosophical autobiography, in which he discusses his search for
truth, his educational formation, his dissatisfaction with existing modes of knowledge, his
discovery of new philosophical principles and, of course, his famous method.177 The
Discours de la méthode pour bien conduire sa raison et chercher la vérité dans les
sciences, published anonymously in 1637, is in many ways a model philosophical
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One should, I think, take this claim with a grain of salt, but Descartes was clearly the first to
provide a comprehensive literary expression of many of the basic propositions and attitudes of
modern philosophy. For some critical discussion of the belief that Descartes initiates modern
philosophy, see Stephen Gaukroger, Descartes: An Intellectual Autobiography (Oxford, 1995),
Introduction, especially p. 3. With certain qualifications, Gaukroger basically accepts the
common view that Descartes founds modern philosophy. See also the Preface to Gaukroger’s
more recent book, Descartes’ System of Natural Philosophy (Cambridge, 2002), where he writes
that “Descartes and Bacon are two of the founders of early modern thought, in many respects the
founders of early modern thought.” Bertrand Russell also endorses the view of Descartes as the
founder of modern philosophy in his 1945 A History of Western Philosophy (see pp. 557-568). In
his Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie (vol. 20 of the Moldenhauer/Michel
edition) Hegel, although he attributes important contributions to Bacon and Jacob Boehme (15751624), argues that Descartes was the true initiator of modern philosophy: “René Descartes ist in
der Tat der wahrhafte Anfänger der modernen Philosophie, insofern sie das Denken zum Prinzip
macht” (p. 123). Also (memorably): “Hier, können wir sagen, sind wir zu Hause,” (p. 120) i.e.,
here we (moderns) are at home. See pp. 120-157.
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As Ian Maclean (2006, p. xxiii), for example, notes: “the Discourse and the essays which
accompany it are a substitute for something else, which would have been more comprehensive,
more coherent, and more ‘scientific’ in character.” Descartes had originally intended to publish
The World (Le Monde) as his first work, but withheld it after learning of the condemnation of
Galileo by the Inquisition at Rome on June 22, 1633, a development that Descartes discusses in
many letters and, obliquely, in the Discourse itself. See Part Five and especially the beginning of
Part Six (CSM 141-142). For an illuminating discussion of Descartes’ projected treatise and its
cultural context, see Stephen Gaukroger’s Introduction to his translation of The World
(Cambridge, 1998). FYI: Descartes at some point intended Le Monde to be a three-part work, but
he only completed the first two parts: the Traité de la lumiere and L’homme (found in vol 11 of
AT). He seems to have intended the third part to deal with the soul. Alongside Gaukroger’s
edition, Thomas Steele Hall’s translation and commentary on L’homme is highly informative
(published in the Harvard Monographs in the History of Science series, 1972).
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autobiography.178 Beyond question, the Discourse on the method has been one of the
most important and influential texts in the history of modern philosophy, and it is
undoubtedly central to the interpretation of Descartes.179 According to the great
nineteenth-century Descartes scholar, Francisque Bouillier, the Discourse contains “the
entire philosophy of Descartes…in abbreviated form (en abrégé).”180 A comprehensive
treatment of the Discourse must, therefore, take many factors into account, not least of all
its autobiographical form, which is of course our primary concern here. Since, moreover,
the autobiographical character of the book has been relatively neglected, the following
treatment addresses a gap in the usual story that philosophers tell about Descartes.181 This
approach may unsettle somewhat the conventional opinion about Descartes, but in any
case, one has reason to hope that it will contribute to a clearer understanding of what he is
up to in the Discourse and in his philosophy in general.
The philosophical comprehensiveness of the Discourse is rather remarkable,
especially given the brevity of the text: in the little summary of the work with which the
Discourse opens, Descartes promises to show “the principal rules” of his method, the
178

Stoothoff translates the title as Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One’s Reason
and Seeking the Truth in the Sciences. Stephen Menn (2003, p. 143) notes that the title is slightly
ambiguous: “It should mean ‘discourse on the method for rightly conducting one’s reason and
searching for truth in the sciences.’ But it might just mean ‘discourse on the method for rightly
conducting his reason,’ the author’s: as Descartes says, ‘my aim is not to teach here the method
which everyone must follow for rightly conducting his reason, but only to show how I have tried
to conduct my own’ (AT VI, 4).”
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The Discourse and the Essays that it introduced were by all accounts tremendously influential
and had an almost immediate, and very powerful, effect on the western European intellectual
scene. As Hugh Kearny writes in Science and Change 1500-1700 (McGraw Hill, 1971), “For a
century at least (1640-1740), Cartesianism was a powerful influence upon western European
science” (p. 160).
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Francisque Bouillier, Histoire de la philosophie cartésienne, 2 vols., (Hildesheim & New
York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1972; originally published Paris: Delagrave, 1868) p. 61. My
translation.
181
One notable exception here is Ann Hartle’s treatment of the Discourse in her Death and the
Disinterested Spectator: An Inquiry into the Nature of Philosophy (State University of New York
Press, 1986), pp. 137-189.
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morality he has derived from this method, “the foundations (fondements) of his
metaphysics,” and the application of his method to various questions in physics,
including such specialized topics as “the movement of the heart” and other “difficulties
pertaining to medicine” (CSM 111/G 1). From the very onset of the work, therefore,
Descartes prepares readers to expect that his method will apply widely, covering the
concerns of both practical and theoretical philosophy. Whereas Parts Three, Four, and
Five of the Discourse attempt to show various applications of Descartes’ method, and
Part Six looks to the future, in Parts One and Two Descartes portrays his search for this
method and the gradual process of his conversion to the primary principle of his
philosophy. He articulates this principle, of course, in Part Four.
Yet only in Part Six does Descartes seriously address the question why he is
publishing the Discourse and the Essays it serves to introduce. Like Nietzsche, as we
shall see, Descartes claims that he is publishing his researches out of a sense of duty to
his fellows. He writes and plans to publish, he says, for the general good of all human
beings (le bien général de tous les hommes, 61: 27-28), especially because he believes
that the “general notions touching on physics” he has acquired might have an even wider
application than he has so far been able to give them. Famously he claims that these
principles might ultimately allow human beings to become “like masters and possessors
of nature” (comme maîtres et possesseurs de la nature, 62: 7-8), fundamentally altering
the very fabric of humanlife through an immense increase of human power. Strongly
rooted in a mechanistic physics and the application of mathematics to the study of nature,
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and aiming at the transformation of nature, this is the so-called Cartesian project that
Descartes communicates first of all in the form of an autobiography.182
4. Is the Discourse on the method really a philosophical autobiography?— Descartes’
title in no way indicates that the work is to have an autobiographical character, and there
is little in his oeuvre outside the Discourse itself that suggests he devoted significant
thought to autobiography. There is, however, one tantalizing exception that should be
noted. In a 1628 letter from Guez de Balzac (1597-1654) to Descartes, Balzac reminds
his correspondent of a work Descartes may have promised to write, referring to it as “De
l’histoire de vostre esprit,” or about the history of your mind (AT 1: 570). Balzac goes on
to say that Descartes’ friends are eagerly awaiting the book. Now, whatever became of
this projected history, the only such account that we have from Descartes’ pen is the
Discourse, which appeared about a decade after Balzac’s letter. Descartes ultimately
refrained from calling this book his “life,” “confessions,” “history,” or anything else of
the sort, and this is notable because we know he gave some thought to the title. In a
much-quoted letter to Marin Mersenne (1588-1648), Descartes claims that the Discourse
on the Method is called discourse because he doesn’t claim to teach (enseigner) the
182

The predominantly mechanistic and materialistic bent of Descartes’ philosophy is probably
insufficiently appreciated by most contemporary philosophers, but there has probably never been
a better time, within the English-speaking world at least, to study Descartes’ natural philosophy.
This is primarily thanks to Stephen Gaukroger’s translations and monographs. In light of
Gaukroger’s work, Stephen Menn’s (2003, p. 141 and see below) contention that Descartes’
natural philosophy is simply a “wreck” is unhelpful. Nor is it even true, as Menn suggests, that all
of Descartes’ contributions to natural science and mathematics have been altogether overturned or
surpassed. In many cases Descartes’ principal doctrines stand up well, even though the details of
those doctrines have been falsified, for example, his teaching in the Dioptrique that, contrary to
Aristotle, the senses do not give us an accurate picture of the way the world actually is. This
doctrine prefigures the common knowledge of our own era, even though Descartes’ account of
how sense-perception actually works has been proven false in many ways, for example, by
contemporary chemistry and physics. For a more balanced account of Descartes’ contributions to
natural science and mathematics, see S. V. Keeling, Descartes (Oxford, 1968), esp. pp. 22-29.
See also Gaukroger’s contribution to The Cambridge Companion to Descartes (Cambridge,
1992), pp. 91-114.
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method there but only to talk about it (parler) (CSMK 53/AT 1: 349). From a slightly
earlier letter, also to Mersenne, we also know that Descartes initially gave some
consideration to another title:
The Plan of a Universal Science (le projet d’une Science universelle)
which is capable or raising our Nature to its Highest Degree of Perfection,
together with the Optics, the Meteorology, and the Geometry, in which the
Author, in order to give proof of his universal Science, explains the most
abstruse Topics he could choose, and does so in such a way that even
persons who have never studied can understand them (CSMK p. 51/AT
339).
Clearly Descartes had something very different from an autobiography in mind in
designing the work that became the Discourse, and the absence of any indication in the
title that the work is autobiographical is a first sign that Descartes’ philosophical
autobiography is of a peculiar sort.
That the Discourse is nonetheless autobiographical and a kind of history of the
progress of Descartes’ mind, there can be no doubt. Descartes clearly presents a story
about his life that is developmental and progressive, and the work bears all the primary
features of philosophical autobiography mentioned above. Specifically, and despite
Descartes’ coy protestations to the contrary, the Discourse is meant to be exemplary and
to serve a pedagogic function (see, for example, CSM 142). In Parts One and Two,
Descartes tells a story of his search for truth, and there is a conversion story, an inward
turn that precipitates Descartes’ discovery of the first principle of his philosophy. Above
all, the Discourse expresses and gives an account of an ultimate philosophical principle in
terms of a life-story. The thoroughly personal character of the Discourse is, moreover,
marked by Descartes’ use of the first person pronoun throughout the text. The remarkably
personal tenor of the entire work gives a palpable sense of the author’s character.
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Obviously Descartes himself is crafting and hence controlling the way that he presents
himself, but it is certainly possible for readers to come away from the Discourse with a
sense of Descartes as a serious and careful person. The work ends with a personal
declaration, in which Descartes announces his intention “to devote the rest of my life” to
the study of nature, especially for the sake of improving medicine (CSM 151). Like other
philosophers (Plato’ Socrates, Augustine, Vico, and so on), Descartes emphasizes that
leisure is necessary for him to accomplish his goals, and because he believes that
humanity as a whole will benefit from his work, he feels justified in asking others to do
what they can to give him the leisure he requires.
All the same, the Discourse is a special philosophical autobiography that calls for
interpretation in terms of its unique features. It clearly differs significantly from
philosophical autobiographies that pursue an account of philosophy in terms of a
comprehensive account of a humanlife, such as Augustine’s Confessions, Mill’s
Autobiography, Rousseau’s Confessions, and others. Descartes hardly speaks about his
emotional development or his private life, and he passes over in silence the role of other
persons in his philosophical development. Specific individuals other than Descartes do
not figure at all in the life-story he tells, and one will look in vain for any discussion of
Descartes’ close intellectual relationships with persons such as Isaac Beeckman, Marin
Mersenne, and others, to say nothing of his family and other personal relationships (about
which we know very little). Descartes talks abstractly about other people, the “learned
men” with whom he studied, his “fellow students,” and so forth, but no individuals
besides himself play any part in his story. Verene calls the Discourse an “abstract
autobiography” (1991, p. 60), and certainly Descartes abstracts his account of his life
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from particular relationships with particular people who may have influenced him
(historically speaking, it’s clear that certain individuals, such as Beeckman, did influence
him). Even his account of his education is presented rather abstractly and in broad terms,
a fact which Leibniz found cause to complain of in a 1714 letter to Louis Bourguet,
quoted below. Based on the information Descartes gives readers about his education, it
would be impossible to reconstruct, much less retrace, the specific steps he took to arrive
at his philosophical position. Although Vico, like Descartes, concentrates on his
intellectual development, Vico’s Life is markedly less abstract and appreciably more
specific, involving a great deal of attention to the particular intellectual influences he
received from both persons he encountered and authors he merely read. Vico also tells us
something about his personal life and relationships, mentioning his parents, friends, and
so forth. This is not to say that the Discourse is a completely depersonalized
autobiography, because Descartes does speak about his manner of living, his financial
independence, the role of travel in his life, and so on. Yet one can hardly fail to notice
that much of Descartes’ life remains offstage in his autobiography.
On the other hand, the Discourse is very similar to the autobiography of the
Phaedo, and like Socrates’ autobiography, Descartes’ text highlights the search for truth
and the importance of starting-points within philosophy.183 Descartes was clearly alive to
the importance of philosophical principles, and in the Discourse (and elsewhere), he
repeatedly emphasizes how much philosophy depends on good foundations, while also
insisting that philosophy itself is to serve as the foundation of all the other sciences (CSM
121-122). As Bernard Williams suggests, the foundation is “Descartes’ favourite
183

The difference between intellectual autobiography and general autobiography is exemplified in
twentieth-century philosophical autobiography by Bertrand Russell’s My Philosophical
Development and his three-volume Autobiography, respectively.

167

metaphor,” and in Part Two of the Discourse Descartes elaborates on the meaning that
this metaphor has for him.184 Descartes interest in the foundations (fondements) of
philosophy leads to the principle of his own philosophy that he articulates in Part Four, a
principle encapsulated in that most famous of philosophical formulas, je pense, donc je
suis (I think, therefore I am, CSM 127/G 32). Descartes immediately calls this principle
le premier principe de la philosophie que je cherchais (the first principle of the
philosophy I had been seeking).185 It is important to note, however, that Descartes does in
fact reserve the expression of this principle for Part Four, which is to say that he doesn’t
begin with his first principle but rather builds up to it. Significantly, autobiography
precedes the expression of the principle.
In light of the position of autobiography at the beginning of Descartes’
philosophical enterprise, a question arises about how integral autobiography actually is to
Descartes’ philosophy. With respect to the Discourse we should ask with Verene: “Is the
life-narrative of the philosopher part of his philosophy itself, a form of its verification?”
(p. ix) Since there are clearly two possible answers to this question, there are also two
possible interpretations of the role of autobiography in Descartes’ philosophy.
5.

The interpretation of Descartes as the philosopher of depersonalization par

excellence.— At first it might seem obvious that autobiography contributes nothing
important to Descartes’ philosophy. Many philosophers and scholars, especially in recent
times, have viewed Descartes as the anti-autobiographical philosopher par excellence, as
184

Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (Penguin 1990/originally published
in Pelican Books, 1978), p. 30.
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Jean-Luc Marion notes that Descartes’ choice of wording can be read in two ways: “(it) can be
taken to mean a philosophical principle that is being sought…but it can also be taken to mean a
philosophy that is itself being sought. In this sense, in his search for a first principle, Descartes is
in search of philosophy.” Or one might say, I think, a philosophy, with real emphasis on the
indefinite article. From Cartesian Questions: Method and Metaphysics (Chicago, 1999), p. 26.
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paradigmatically embodying philosophy’s aversion to the autobiographical discussed in
the introduction. On this interpretation, Descartes uses autobiography only in order to
dispense with it, as a rhetorical means to achieve effects that contributes nothing to his
philosophy as such. If “je pense, donc je suis” is the foundation of Cartesian edifice, then
autobiography is at most a way of clearing the ground for this foundation. Like other
philosophers who write autobiographies, Descartes employs autobiography in order to
present ultimate philosophical principles, setting the stage for an account of his
subsequent philosophical activity. Especially in Descartes’ case, philosophy seems to
move away from its initial autobiographical articulation toward an impersonal and
ahistorical philosophy, based on an equally ahistorical and impersonal conception of self.
“Give little thought to Socrates,” Plato has him say, “and much more for the truth”
(Phaedo 91c1-2). Yet it isn’t after all so clear that we are justified in viewing these
autobiographies as entirely extrinsic or superfluous to the philosophies they serve to
introduce. Socrates, after all, asserts his own insignificance in relation to truth in the same
dialogue that he narrates a story about his life.
If we are justified in speaking of Cartesian disdain for the autobiographical
dimension of humanlife, this looks to be a corollary of Descartes’ much broader
repudiation of history as a source of knowledge and wisdom. In his thought-provoking
book, J. M. Bernstein provides a compelling argument for reading the Discourse itself in
this way, as a movement toward the depersonalization of both philosophy and the
philosopher:
The self that comes to self-recognition in the cogito is not…the self whose
narrative we have been following; indeed, it is not the kind of self for
whom self-knowledge and the questions of identity could ever be at issue
for any empirical predicates, predicates which would give empirical
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specificity to this self…The universality of the cogito is guaranteed by its
ubiquity and anonymity; but as ubiquitous and anonymous it fails to name
the self, “my” self.186
On this reading of the cogito, a universally realized Cartesian philosophy would seem to
result in the belief that philosophical autobiography contributes nothing important to
philosophy. If the “I” or “je,” is nothing but a self, certain of its own being and
possessing, as Descartes suggests in the Meditations, certain cognitive capacities, then
there is no philosophically significant difference between one self and another. The life
stories of individuals would therefore be completely irrelevant, not even contributing to
self-knowledge, since the Cartesian conception of self demands no “empirical predicates”
beyond the assertion that the thinking self is and can do certain things, such as sensing,
imagining, willing, and understanding (CSM vol. 2, pp. 19, 24). With the Cartesian “I” as
principle, and armed with the criterion of clarity and distinctness that this principle
exemplifies, Descartes seems able to dismiss the social and historical human world as so
much unknowable rigmarole. Since, furthermore, the primary focus of Descartes’
philosophy is arguably nature (that is, after he’s got his metaphysical position squared
away), philosophical autobiographies hardly contribute anything of importance to our
understanding of the natural world. The project of making humans “masters and
possessors of nature” would appear to have no use for autobiography, philosophical or
otherwise.
So does Descartes’ own autobiography serve as a form of verification of the
philosophical worldview he articulates in the Discourse? It would seem that even if
autobiography is nothing more for him than a rhetorical means to achieve effects,
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Descartes chose not to dispense with this means. Descartes’ use of autobiography may be
partially, or even wholly, explained by his stated intention to give the Discourse a
popular form; this is also why he wrote the Discourse and the Essays in French, i.e., so
that they would be accessible to a wider audience. Autobiography is an appealing literary
form, and Descartes was not insensitive, as we shall see, to the charm of autobiography as
a species of fable or history.
6. The interpretation of Descartes as a philosopher of humanlife.— On the other
interpretation, autobiography does in fact provide Descartes with a certain verification of
his philosophy, and it is this interpretation that, if valid, should unsettle the standard
conviction that Descartes’ philosophy is wholly depersonalized and ahistorical. If we take
the autobiographical character of the Discourse seriously, it points to a very different
foundation from the one Descartes ultimately advances, since it turns out that the “I
think” is itself founded in the humanlife of René Descartes. This foundation is less
simple, certain, and stable than the one Descartes ultimately advances, but it is also
arguably truer. On this reading, what the Discourse actually shows us is that the self’s
realization of the certainty of its being as a thinking being turns out to have a history,
however vaguely and abstractly this history may appear in Descartes’ telling.
One might be tempted to point to the Meditations at this juncture as showing that
Descartes is able to present his philosophy and philosophical principles disencumbered of
autobiographical elements. To some extent, this is a valid point, but it also fails to
recognize both the autobiographical cast of the Meditations itself, as well as the extent to
which the Meditations might be seen to presuppose the narrative of the Discourse.
Bernstein has argued that the “pre-systematic crisis of reason” presented in the Discourse
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is “a necessary condition for Descartes’ systematic doubt” in the Meditations. Bernstein
further observes that:
The very first sentence of the Meditations harks back to the prephilosophical crisis of reason recorded in the Discourse. The Discourse,
then, is both temporally and logically prior to the Meditations for it
provides, in pre-philosophical terms, the grounds and reasons necessary
for reason to engage in the systematic questioning of the grounds of
reasoning which alone, in Descartes’ view, can terminate the crisis of
reason (p. 159).
For Bernstein, the Discourse is pre-philosophical, but if in fact this pre-philosophical
narrative is required to establish Descartes’ properly philosophical project, then at the
very least its status appears more problematic. In fact, philosophy never comes to be, nor
does one become a philosopher, without a pre-philosophical crisis. Philosophical
autobiography bears out pointedly the truth of this claim, since it shows that philosophy
begins with a principle and that a principle is the result of a search, often tortuous and in
any case protracted. Since the principle is first, it is, as we have often remarked,
indemonstrable in the sense of a proof that establishes one thing on the basis of prior
ones. In this case, there is a sense in which nothing can be prior. It is the function of lifestories within philosophy to offer some account of ultimate principles where strictly
logical, demonstrative accounts are inapplicable. Now of course Descartes might say that
the first principle of his philosophy is self-evident and therefore needs no such support.
But assuming this to be true, why has he couched the presentation of the principle in an
autobiography? Isn’t it because, even if his principle is self-evident, Descartes still has to
explain why a new principle is necessary in the first place? And isn’t this exactly what
Socrates tries to show in his autobiography in the Phaedo, namely, that the things he did
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and suffered in the course of his search for truth made him realize that a new startingpoint was required?
There is also a case to be made that humanlife is a more important concept for
Descartes than has hitherto usually been recognized. Staying with the Meditations for the
moment, it is worthwhile to notice that Descartes appeals to humanlife as a criterion
within philosophy, especially at the very end of the work, when he identifies our
memories of the events of our lives as the ultimate touchstone that allows us to
distinguish dreams from reality. In the Meditations, of course, the apparent reality of
dreams, and our consequent inability at times to distinguish dreaming from waking states,
is one important ground for the radical doubt that Descartes advances in the First
Meditation. In the Sixth Meditation, at the close of the work, Descartes points to
humanlife in order to show how it is in fact possible to distinguish dreaming from waking
states:
…the exaggerated doubts of the last few days should be dismissed as
laughable. This applies especially to the principal reason for doubt,
namely my inability to distinguish between being asleep and being awake.
For I now notice that there is a vast difference between the two, in that
dreams are never linked by memory with all the other actions of life as
waking experiences are (in eo quòd nunquam insomnia cum reliquis
omnibus actionibus vitae a memoriâ conjugantur, ut ea quae vigilanti
occurrunt)…when I distinctly see where things come from and where and
when they come to me, and when I can connect my perceptions of them
with the whole of the rest of my life without a break (ullâ interruptione
cum totâ reliquâ vitâ connecto), then I am quite certain that when I
encounter these things I am not asleep but awake. And I ought not to have
even the slightest doubt of their reality if, after calling upon all the senses
as well as my memory and my intellect in order to check them, I receive
no conflicting reports from any of these sources (CSM2, pp. 61-62/ AT 7:
89-90, my emphasis).
Thus even in the Meditations, life (vita) and the memory of the actions of a single
humanlife fulfills a significant function within Descartes’ philosophy.
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If, however, humanlife figures more prominently in Descartes’ thought than is
usually recognized, and if autobiography does provide a form of verification within his
philosophy, it is nonetheless true that Descartes’ philosophy as a whole concentrates
primarily on the natural world, with a special emphasis on how we can manipulate nature
for the sake of technologies that will “facilitate our enjoyment of the fruits of the earth
and all the goods we find there,” while also improving healthcare, since health is
“undoubtedly the chief good and the foundation of all the other goods in this life” (CSM
143).
There is, then, a sort of puzzle about how to regard the role of autobiography and
of humanlife in the Cartesian philosophy, and in order to solve this puzzle it is necessary
to attend to what Descartes himself has to say about the form of the Discourse. Like
Augustine, Descartes offers an account and criticism of autobiography within his own
autobiography, though of course he doesn’t any more than Augustine speak of
autobiography by its name. Just as Augustine’s remarks pertain to what he calls
confession, Descartes’ discussion concerns what he calls histories and fables. Since,
however, autobiography is either a species of fable or, what is more likely, of history,
Descartes’ remarks concern autobiography and provide something like a poetics of
autobiography avant la lettre. How, then, does Descartes himself understand
autobiography, its powers and its limits? I now pursue this question.
7. Descartes’ poetics of autobiography.— In Part One of the Discourse, Descartes
describes his goal, which is, “to reveal…what paths (chemins) I have followed, and to
represent my life in it as if in a picture (représenter ma vie comme en un tableau), so that
everyone may judge it for himself” (CSM 112/G 3-4). But in addition to the simile of the
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picture (tableau), Descartes proceeds to invite two other ways of characterizing his text,
namely “as a history (une histoire) or, if you prefer, a fable (une fable)” (CSM 112). In
the account of his studies that he subsequently gives, which comprises the bulk of Part
One, he devotes special attention to histories and fables, concentrating on the question of
what they can contribute to education and human knowledge, while also highlighting
their limitations in this regard. His critical remarks about the strengths and weaknesses of
histories and fables constitute a kind of poetics of autobiography within his own
autobiography, and it is important to grasp that Descartes highlights both the weaknesses
and the strengths of these kinds of narratives. In general, Descartes argues that fables and
histories must be read warily, and he therefore cautions readers about his own means of
presenting his philosophy. If the presently beloved adjective “critical” means anything, it
means at least that an intelligent, educated person should be aware of the limitations of
the various ways and means by which we pursue knowledge. From this point of view, it
is entirely appropriate for a philosopher such as Descartes to foster questioning in readers
about his way of presenting material. Critical examination of autobiography need not
detract from its effectiveness as a means of presenting philosophy, and in fact it is only
through criticism of the autobiographical form that we can truly appreciate what it can
and cannot do.
Even allowing for the recurrent ironical notes Descartes strikes in the Discourse,
it’s clear that he is far from being insensible to the attractiveness of fables and histories.
According to him, “the charm (la gentillesse) of fables awakens the mind (esprit), while
the memorable deeds told in histories uplift it and help to shape one’s judgment if they
are read with discretion (avec discrétion)” (CSM 113/EG 5). Fables and histories thus go
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to work on the mind (esprit), and fables are particularly charming (or, more literally, kind
to readers). As Derrida has written apropos the Discourse: “the fable bears truth, exhibits
it or displays it in an attractive fashion. It makes the truth desirable.”187 Descartes
certainly recognizes the appealing character of fables and their capacity to direct human
beings toward truth, even if he remains doubtful about the truth of such stories. Such
stories are not, according to him, strictly speaking true, that is, even though they may
indicate the truth helpfully. Histories are similar to fables in Descartes’ estimation,
because they uplift the mind and help to improve the judgment of readers who read “avec
discrétion.” Descartes certainly aims to charm readers in order to instruct them; he seeks
to earn readers’ trust, to be kind (gentil), and so to make the truth he has to teach more
attractive and convincing. If one reads the autobiographical story of the Discourse with
discretion, one may reasonably hope to improve one’s judgment in both practical and
theoretical matters.
What, however, does it mean to read with discretion? According to Descartes,
reading with discretion requires an appreciation of the limitations of stories such as
histories and fables. These critical remarks act as a counterweight to the preceding
laudatory ones:
Fables make us imagine (imaginer) many events as possible when they are
not. And even the most accurate histories, while not altering or
exaggerating the importance of matters to make them more worthy of
being read, at any rate almost always omit the baser and less notable
events; as a result, the other events appear in a false light, and those who
regulate their conduct by examples (exemples) drawn from these works are
liable to fall into the excesses of the knights-errant in our tales of chivalry,
and conceive plans beyond their powers (et à concevoir des desseins qui
passent leurs forces) (CSM 114/G 6-7).
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As with so many passages in the Discourse, the succinctness of Descartes’ expression
calls for exegesis. Descartes offers the Discourse itself as a history or fable, so the above
comments on these narrative modes must make us wonder whether the Discourse itself
presents things that only appear possible while being impossible in fact. It is difficult to
read this passage and not to think of the eponymous hero of Cervantes’ novel (Part One
published in 1605, Part Two in 1615). By the time he came to write the Discourse in the
mid-1630s, Descartes had probably heard of Don Quixote and had possibly read it.188 But
however this may be, there is an analogy. For, as the tales of knights-errant enkindle Don
Quixote’s imagination and prompt his fantastic quest, so fables and histories in general
can excite the imagination and make us believe in impossible fantasies. Does Descartes
really want to suggest that the Discourse itself, whether in certain respects or as a whole,
presents things that only appear possible? The mere suggestion that this could be the case
is troubling, but then perhaps this is precisely the effect Descartes wants to bring about.
Notwithstanding his lifelong protestations of willingness to submit to certain authorities,
above all the Catholic Church, Descartes generally repudiated the practice of basing
beliefs on authority, his own or anyone else’s. He seems to have thought that human
beings should only assent to beliefs that they could “square with reason,” each one for
herself. Descartes not only wants to present compelling arguments for his philosophical
positions, he also wants to cast doubts about his entire way of presenting his philosophy,
and the reason for this is that he wants readers to think for themselves (to use a sadly
hackneyed expression). Descartes develops an autocritique of the Discourse within the
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Discourse itself because he wants to foster critical thinking (alas, another hackneyed
phrase).
But this is not all. According to Descartes, histories can uplift the mind and
improve judgment, but they cannot provide an adequate guide to the conduct of life. The
same could be said for autobiographies insofar as autobiography is a kind of history. Why
not, however? Descartes intimates that humanlife as the totality of sufferings and doings
of a person far exceeds the capacity of autobiography to represent it, and it necessarily
follows that the events such narratives relate must appear in a “false light.” Omitting, as
they must, (at least most of) the baser and less notable events within a humanlife,
autobiographies cannot help but give us a distorted picture of real life. And this is in the
best case scenario, that is, in the case of “the most accurate histories” and
autobiographies. Less scrupulous authors will exaggerate and idealize their subjects, nor
is it so easy to distinguish the accurate accounts from the idealized ones. In any case,
history and autobiography require the author to be selective, and Descartes contends that
the very necessity of this selectivity guarantees that such narrative modes can never
capture the whole truth. Descartes’ comments about histories point to the artificiality of
autobiography and other such stories; for him, humanlife surpasses biography and
autobiography. Descartes thus points to the insufficiency of his own text where it might
claim to provide a guide for humanlife, but then he also claims that the inadequacy of
histories, autobiographies, and other such stories can be mitigated if readers keep their
inherent limitations in mind. This is precisely what it means to read such works with
discretion. We should be careful about making judgments that affect our lives on the
basis of the stories we find in such works.
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Descartes also notes a further danger inherent in reading the histories and fables
of the ancients, which is that one can lose touch with one’s own age and lifetime by
becoming too involved in such studies. With this warning, Descartes anticipates an
important aspect of Nietzsche’s critique of history in the second of the Unzeitgemäße
Betrachtungen (Nietzsche knew something about this due to his training as a philologist.)
Descartes warns that, “one who is too curious about the practices of past ages usually
remains quite ignorant about those of the present,” and like the traveler who spends too
much time abroad, the antiquarian risks becoming a stranger to his own country” (CSM
114/G 6). This warning is aimed, not surprisingly, at the learned. Descartes nevertheless
has a serious point and manages to tell us something about his approach to studies in the
process, which is, that learning should be in the service of humanlife and not an escape
from it. This is an idea that appears already in Francis Bacon and again and again in
modern times, but neither is it entirely foreign to earlier philosophers who also, it turns
out, had some regard for the living.
Descartes represents his life selectively, and it’s clear that he makes no attempt to
tell the story of his life as a whole. As I explained in the introduction, and as Descartes,
too, suggests, there is an important difference between an individual humanlife and the
autobiography that makes this life its theme, a difference that is ultimately rooted in the
nature of time. In the case of Descartes’ Discourse, however, the difference between life
and autobiography is quite pronounced, which is no doubt one of the reasons why the
autobiographical character of the work has been so little appreciated. Vico’s Life, as we
shall see, is open to the same judgment, since Vico also focuses almost exclusively on his
intellectual history, leaving the other sides of his life for the most part out of the story.
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But in Vico’s case, this “for the most part” is important, because Vico does mention his
parents, his own family, his friends, and so forth, as well as noting certain aspects of their
character. Vico also attends to the stages of his intellectual development with much
greater specificity than Descartes, who speaks in generalities about his education.
Descartes’ broad approach, however, doesn’t prevent him from providing often poignant
remarks about the strengths and weaknesses of the various studies he undertook. If
nothing else, his account of his studies is all the more memorable for being simplified.
8. Descartes’ autobiographical presentation of his philosophy.— Although the whole
Discourse is autobiographical, the most conventionally autobiographical passages are to
be found in Part One, where Descartes focuses on his education, giving an account of his
studies at school and then his travels in the world. His decisive turn to the study of
himself comes at the end of this part, and the personal history that Descartes relates
clearly serves to justify the inward turn.
Descartes becomes an autobiographer in order to show how his method and the
principles of his philosophy developed out of his lived experiences. Like Socrates in the
Phaedo, he explains that he arrived at his position first of all through recognizing the
shortcomings of the various approaches to truth on offer from his childhood. Similar to
Socrates’ philosophical practice based on his second sailing, Descartes’ philosophy
initiates a radical new beginning that depends on a thoroughgoing repudiation of his
predecessors’ approaches to wisdom. According to Descartes, the recognized course of
study in the arts and sciences, as well as his own, extracurricular investigations into “the
books that fell into my hands concerning the subjects that are considered the most
abstruse and unusual,” led him to the belief that all of these studies were riddled with

180

insurmountable limitations and confusions.189 Recalling the anguish he felt upon the
completion of his formal education, Descartes writes, “I found myself beset by so many
doubts and errors that I came to think I had gained nothing from my attempts to become
educated but increasing recognition of my ignorance (sinon que j’avais découvert de plus
en plus mon ignorance)” (CSM 113/G 4). Echoing Socrates, he says that he came to
believe that “there was no knowledge in the world such as I had previously been led to
hope for.” His subsequent account of his attempts to reach certainty involve his
observations of the strengths and deficiencies of the various studies he undertook, both at
school and by reading in “le grand livre du monde” (the great book of the world). By
surveying what he takes to be the limitations of all extant forms of knowledge, including
the practical knowledge of worldly people, Descartes aims to make his own philosophy
more understandable and convincing.
Descartes speaks much of roads, ways, and paths in the Discourse, and although
Williams is probably correct that the foundation is Descartes’ favorite metaphor, the road,
way, or path comes in a close second.190 In the first paragraph of Part One, Descartes
emphasizes how important it is for a person to follow le droit chemin (the right path),
cautioning that it is better to go slowly (lentement) along the right path than it is to “hurry
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and stray from it” (CSM 111/G 2).191 The diversity of human opinions, furthermore, has
little or nothing to do with the fact that some human beings possess reason to a greater
degree than others; on the contrary, Descartes maintains that this diversity has only to do
with the “different paths (diverses voies)” that we follow in our thoughts. In other words,
we attend to different things and hence follow different trains of thought. According to
Descartes the human world is “largely composed of two types of minds (le monde n’est
quasi composé que de deux sortes d’esprits),” and for neither of these two is it advisable
to leave “the common path (chemin commun)” (CSM 118/G 15). The difference between
these two sorts is that the one, thinking himself more clever than he actually is,
impetuously leaves the common path, whereas the other is content to go along it,
following the customary authorities and opinions. Descartes claims he would have
counted himself among those who follow the common path, except for the diversity of
opinions he encountered.192 (This might raise the question why all those other contented
ones are oblivious to this diversity, but Descartes simply assumes that most people follow
the wonted ways contentedly.) Implicit in his discourse is the hope that his autobiography
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will prove harmless to those who go along the common path and a help to those who, for
whatever reason, stray from it.
Earlier, in Part One, as he turns to consider himself, Descartes continues with the
metaphor of the path:
I consider myself very fortunate (beaucoup d’heur) to have happened
upon certain paths (certains chemins) in my youth which led me to
considerations and maxims from which I formed a method (j’ai formé une
méthode) whereby, it seems to me, I can increase my knowledge (ma
connaissance) gradually and raise it little by little to the highest point
allowed by the mediocrity of my mind (la médiocrité de mon esprit) and
the short duration of my life (ma vie) (CSM 112/G 3).
Descartes expresses the idea that the paths he has traveled in his life go some way toward
explaining his philosophical practice, and it follows that his autobiography should make a
significant contribution to our understanding of why he embraces the philosophy he has
come to hold. The history of the vicissitudes of his life prior to his discovery of the
method will in some way justify Descartes’ new way of life guided by it. Now all
philosophical autobiographies demonstrate that the order of philosophy differs from the
order of life, and an important implication of this is that the two orders have different
starting points in time. For Descartes, life according to the method comes not at the
beginning of life but in media vita, and as the result of a process.
Descartes recognizes that the divergence between the two orders has important
consequences for our understanding of what it is to be human, and above all that it is
necessary for us to become what we are. In an interesting turn in the text, he expresses
regret about the limitations imposed on human beings by the natural order of life, wishing
that we had been fully rational from birth and had never been subjected to our own
appetites or to the guidance of any authority:
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We were all children before being men and had to be governed for some
time by our appetites and our teachers (par nos appétits et nos
précepteurs), which were often opposed to each other and neither of
which, perhaps, always gave us the best advice; hence I thought it virtually
impossible that our judgments should be as unclouded and firm as they
would have been if we had had the full use of our reason from the moment
of our birth (si nous avions eu l’usage entier de notre raison dès le point
de notre naissance), and if we had always been guided by it alone (CSM
117/G 13).
However desirous of the impossible, this passage nonetheless suggests an entire
philosophy of education and mind. It also provides a stark contrast with Vico’s
philosophy of mind and education, as these appear in the Life and elsewhere. Vico insists
that children are capable of obtaining some of the principal building blocks of human
wisdom from an early age, but Descartes confesses, wittingly or not, to a certain
extremism of reason here. Although the reasons for Descartes’ dislike of the limitations
of childhood are understandable, he goes very far toward relegating the entire period
prior to the age of reason to the status of an unfortunate gap. For Descartes, our adult
judgment is, to quote Gaukroger (1995, p. 106, slightly altered), necessarily clouded by
the limitations of our childhood and youth, and it is in order “to circumvent this
problem,” as Gaukroger says, “that we must get rid of our opinions and start again from
foundations.”
The first stage on the way to Descartes’ formation of the method is by
happenstance: he is fortunate to have found himself on certain paths. In other words, he
was born at a certain time and place, into a certain family, and so forth. Descartes thus
recognizes that accident, fate, or providence play an important role in the lives of
particular persons, especially at the beginning of life, which idea is captured very
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memorably in Heidegger’s concept of Geworfenheit (thrownness).193 Descartes’ early life
led him to the formation of a method that will allow him to increase his knowledge, and if
readers can be brought to accept this method, they will share in the benefits of Descartes’
good fortune. They will get on “the right path” quickly and make more progress than
Descartes who had to wrestle with alternatives before developing his own philosophy.
Unlike some, of course, Descartes seems to have discovered his method at a fairly young
age, though he claims he waited nine years before applying it to questions in metaphysics
at least (CSM 125-126).
Starting from these lucky beginnings, the paths Descartes followed led him to
“considerations and maxims” from which he was able to form his method (CSM 112/G
3). This method applies to his future life in that it will allow him to increase his
knowledge “to the highest point” possible given the limitations of his own abilities and
his mortality. Descartes’ emphasis on the shortness of life is striking; he suggests the
Hippocratic maxim: art takes a long time, and life is short. Yet Descartes also recognizes
that our projects may continue after we are gone. It emerges clearly that Descartes hopes
for and anticipates the continued application of his method after his death.
At the same time, he believes he is already in possession of knowledge about the
most important things, and in an amazingly bold passage from Part Five he claims that:
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I have found a way to satisfy myself within a short time about all the
principal difficulties usually discussed in philosophy. What is more, I have
noticed certain laws which God has so established in nature, and of which
he has implanted such notions in our minds (en nos âmes), that after
adequate reflection we cannot doubt that they are exactly observed in
everything which exists or occurs in the world (en tout ce qui est ou qui se
fait dans le monde) (CSM 131/G 41).
Descartes believes that he has already discovered an absolutely certain metaphysics and
has therefore resolved all the main puzzles within philosophy. Thus progress using the
method after his death will ostensibly confront fewer obstacles than those Descartes
himself has already surmounted by the time of writing the Discourse. If his philosophy is
final, then future generations can concentrate on technical mastery of nature without
worrying about philosophical principles.
The primary factor in Descartes’ account of his discovery of a new philosophy is,
as he says, his experience of disagreements. As the nineteenth-century historian Henry
Hallam wrote apropos Descartes, “the discrepancy of opinions among the generality of
mankind…rendered it probable (to him) that no one had yet found out the road to real
science.”194 Descartes explains that his philosophy arose in response to his experience of
disagreements among the learned as well as worldly persons. The disagreements among
different persons about truth is a powerful motive that also plays a large part in Plato’s
Socratic philosophy, in Augustine’s Confessions, and in philosophy in general. As Plato’s
Socrates often remarks, disagreement suggests that the truth about a given topic is not
known.195 For his part, Descartes contends that “(philosophy) has been cultivated for
many centuries by the most excellent minds and yet there is still no point in it which is
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not disputed and hence doubtful” (CSM 115/G 8).196 Unlike the Academic skeptics of
antiquity, however, and like Socrates, Augustine, and others, Descartes does not rest
content with the belief that the diversity of opinions shows the impossibility of ever
obtaining knowledge of the truth.
Descartes’ story of his life begins with the statement that, since childhood, he had
been “nourished upon letters (lettres).” He says that, “because I was persuaded that by
their means one could acquire a clear and certain knowledge of all that is useful in life, I
was extremely eager to learn them” (CSM 113-14/EG 4). By “letters” (lettres) Descartes
means the study of languages, primarily Latin, but also “great books” and the literature of
the learned disciplines in general.197 He proceeds to discuss what he learned of the
various fields that he studied through the course of his education. He explicitly mentions
fables, history, rhetoric, poetry, mathematics, morals, theology, philosophy, law, and
medicine; and he alludes to “superstitious” disciplines cultivated outside of school,
namely, the “false sciences” of astrology and alchemy (CSM 115/AT 6: 9).198 For various
reasons, however, Descartes found all of these studies altogether disappointing, and as we
saw, Descartes says that upon completing his formal education he found himself plagued
by errors, doubts, and ignorance. This outcome was especially frustrating for him, he
says, because he had reasons to expect a much happier result, having studied at “one of
the most famous schools in Europe,” at which he proved himself no less competent a
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pupil than his peers. There, at la Flèche, he could reasonably expect to find “learned men
if they existed anywhere on earth,” but the implication is that he did not. Nor does he
believe that the fault was on his side, since, comparing himself with his fellow students,
he claims he had no reason to think that he was in any way inferior to them. Far from it.
For not only did Descartes learn everything the others did, but he even went outside the
curriculum to study “subjects that are considered most abstruse and unusual.” He says,
moreover, that he realized how his masters judged him, and he says, “I saw that they did
not regard me as inferior to my fellow students, even though several among them were
already destined to take the place of our teachers.” He remarks, finally, that he found his
sad state of mind at that time especially perplexing in light of the surfeit of “good minds”
in his age. For all these reasons, his dissatisfaction with the progress of his education
appeared painfully unaccountable and led him to the conclusion that “there was no
teaching (doctrine) in the world such as I had previously been led to hope for” (CSM
113/G 5, translation altered by me, reading “teaching” for “doctrine”).
Descartes further explains the doubts and errors that plagued him by cataloging
the strengths and deficiencies of each of the arts and sciences listed above. Having
already considered Descartes’ account of the strengths and weaknesses of fables and
histories, it will be useful to examine his judgments about some of the other subjects of
study that he mentions. Although he claims to admire poetry and rhetoric, Descartes
identifies them as natural gifts and not the products of study. In fact he actually dismisses
rhetoric as superfluous, subordinating it entirely to reason, since for him the most
reasonable discourses are also the most persuasive. Descartes regards theology as similar
to poetry, as based on special gifts and concerned with revealed truths “beyond our
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understanding (au-dessus de notre intelligence” (CSM 114/7-8). Perhaps unsurprisingly,
he reserves his most laudatory remarks for mathematics, and his most damning ones for
philosophy and the philosophical writers on morality. Later, in Part Two, Descartes
explicitly singles out algebra, geometry, and logic as subjects that contributed something
to his method, but even here he goes on to explain how he had to simplify and recombine
certain principles and elements from these studies in order to arrive at his method.
His remarks about philosophy show how powerfully the experience of
disagreement among philosophers affected Descartes’ intellectual development:
Seeing that (philosophy) has been cultivated for many centuries by the
most excellent minds and yet there is still no point in it which is not
disputed and hence doubtful, I was not so presumptuous as to hope to
achieve any more in it than others had done. And, considering how many
diverse opinions learned men may maintain on a single question—even
though it is impossible for more than one to be true—I held as almost
(presque)199 false everything that was merely probable (CSM 114-15/EG
8).
According to Descartes, whenever there is pronounced disagreement among alternatives,
all beliefs look like mere opinions and hence doubtful. Philosophy thus appeared to him
as a mere “means of speaking plausibly about any subject,” good only for “winning the
admiration of the less learned.” As opposed to the merely probable conjectures of the
philosophers of his time, Descartes seeks solid knowledge; “my whole aim,” he says,
“was to reach certainty – to cast aside the loose earth and sand so as to come upon rock or
clay” (CSM 125). In fact Descartes opposition to traditional philosophy is tinged with
invective, as can be clearly observed in the antagonism to his own principles that he
imagines will come from that quarter:
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These philosophers, I may say, have an interest in my refraining from
publishing the principles of the philosophy I use (les principes de la
philosophie dont je me sers). For my principles are so very simple and
evident that in publishing them I should, as it were, be opening windows
and admitting daylight into that cellar where they have gone down to fight.
But even the best minds have no reason to wish to know my principles.
For if they want to be able to speak about everything and acquire the
reputation of being learned, they will achieve this more readily by resting
content with plausibility (la vraisemblance), which can be found without
difficulty in all kinds of subjects, than by seeking the truth (la vérité)
(CSM 147/G 71).
In fine, the best he can say for his formal education is that “it is good to have examined
all these subjects, even those full of superstition and falsehood, in order to know their
true value and guard against being deceived by them” (CSM 113/EG 5). In other words,
Descartes’ estimation of the worth of his education is primarily negative.
Now Descartes goes on to describe how he discovered even more discrepancies of
opinion when he left his formal education behind and took up his studies in what he calls
“le grand livre du monde” (i.e., the great book of the world) (CSM 115/EG 9). Because
of the uncertainty he found in the arts and sciences, Descartes claims that as soon as he
was old enough, he left the learned world behind in order to get what we call real world
experience (CSM 115/EG 9). He explains how he pursued his search for knowledge by
traveling and associating with all kinds of people, and he admits that he expected worldly
people to have better judgment than he had found among the scholars he encountered:
…visiting courts and armies, mixing with people of diverse temperaments
and ranks, gathering various experiences (experiences), testing myself in
the situations fortune offered me, and at all times reflecting upon whatever
came my way so as to derive some profit from it. For it seemed to me that
much more truth could be found in the reasonings (raisonnements) which
a man makes concerning matters that concern him than in those which
some scholar makes in his study about speculative matters. For the
consequences of the former will soon punish the man if he judges
wrongly, whereas the latter have no practical consequences and no
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importance for the scholar except that perhaps the further they are from
common sense (sens commun) the more pride he will take in them, since
he will have had to use so much more skill and ingenuity in trying to
render them plausible. And it was always my most earnest desire to learn
to distinguish the true from the false in order to see clearly into my own
actions and proceed with confidence in this life (marcher avec assurance
en cette vie) (CSM 115/G 9-10).
This passage illustrates the distinction between theory and practice that Descartes
reiterates at several junctures throughout the Discourse and in his other writings.
Drawing a stark contrast between scholars and worldly persons, he argues that the latter
seem to have more at stake in making judgments, since their judgments actually affect
their lives and fortunes. Alas, to his dismay he discovered that normal people turn out to
be no better than scholars where knowledge is concerned. Regarding “the customs of
other men” he noticed on his travels, Descartes says, “I observed in them almost as much
diversity as I had found previously among the opinions of the philosophers” (CSM
115/EG 10). Descartes shows once again how finding diversity of opinions and
disagreements among persons motivated him to seek certain truth elsewhere. As Žižek
has suggested, it is also possible to describe “the grounding experience of (Descartes’)
position of universal doubt” as a “multicultural” experience, and it’s true that Descartes
goes on to discuss the diversity of beliefs and customs and how these “persuade us”
rather than giving us “certain knowledge” (CSM 119).200 It wasn’t only this multicultural
experience that turned Descartes in a new direction, however, and his experiences of
disagreements within philosophy itself as well as among those he observed in everyday
life were equally decisive.
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To adopt Žižek’s way of speaking about this, it does seem that Descartes proved
unable, or unwilling, to identify with any of the schools of thought or socio-cultural
identities on offer in his milieu, kind of like someone today who for whatever reason
cannot identify himself as a phenomenologist, an analytic philosopher, a Catholic, a
nationalist, or whatever. Yet, whereas Aristotle and others might say that each of these
groups grasps a part of the truth, Descartes’ tends to take the disagreements between
them as proof that they are all wrong. At the same time, Descartes remained a devoted
Catholic throughout his life, at least so as far as we can tell from his writings, and in the
Discourse itself he avows that the “truths of the faith…have always been foremost among
my beliefs” (CSM 125).
Descartes concludes Part One by describing the major turning point (περιπέτεια)
in his intellectual development. His education and travels, he claims, led him to his
resolve “to undertake studies within myself too and to use all the powers of my mind in
choosing the paths (le chemins) I should follow” (CSM 116/EG 10). This resolution leads
him by another path to the discovery of his method and the first principles of his
philosophy. The inward turn is decisive for Descartes’ discovery.
At the beginning of Part Two, Descartes places himself in Germany, where he
was serving in the army of Maximilian of Bavaria around the beginning of the Thirty
Years War. The onset of winter detained him there, he explains, and he found himself
alone in quarters without “conversation to divert me and fortunately having no cares or
passions to trouble me” (CSM 116).201 In the famous stove-heated room, Descartes says
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he took the freedom of the occasion to converse with himself about his own thoughts.
The chain of thoughts that Descartes then proceeds to recount in Parts Two and Three
stems directly from his decision to turn inward in the hope that there, if anywhere, he
might find the truth that had eluded him in his studies at school and in the book of the
world. The first consideration that he makes is “that there is not usually so much
perfection in works composed of several parts and produced by various different
craftsmen as in the works of one man (un seul)” (CSM 116/G 11). He submits that the
truth of this consideration is borne out by the better ordering and greater perfection of
those buildings, cities, and laws that have been made by one person alone: a single
architect, city planner, or “wise law-giver.” The solitary craftsperson makes a more
perfect product than those that are put together by many people. Likewise, “the
constitution of the true religion, whose articles have been made by God alone…(is)
incomparably better ordered than all the others” (CSM 117). From this example,
Descartes draws an analogy to the world of learning, arguing that the “sciences contained
in books…are compounded and amassed little by little from the opinions of many
different persons,” and so they do not approach truth so nearly as “the simple reasoning
which a man of good sense (un homme de bon sens) naturally makes concerning
whatever he comes across” (CSM 117/EG 12-13).
Although few of Descartes’ contemporaries showed much interest in the
autobiographical dimension of the Discourse, I have focused on this dimension, in order
to show how it confirms the theses of the present study. By attending to the
autobiographical form of the Discourse, it has also been possible to elaborate a new way
that Freud, asked to interpret the three dreams, parried the request and said little. The account of
the three dreams comes from Baillet’s Vie de Monsieur Descartes (1691), reprinted in AT 10.
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of reading Descartes, as a philosopher who grounds his philosophy, however
ambiguously, in humanlife. Because he articulates his philosophy, and the coming-to-be
of this philosophy, autobiographically, Descartes offers us a way of reading his famous
first principle as less abstract and impersonal. The self’s certainty of its own being turns
out to have a history. Thus Descartes’ first principle, and the subsequent principles based
upon it, develop out of a humanlife and lifeworld, and he himself chooses to express
them in terms of a life-story. These principles are metaphysical (or, if one prefers,
ontological), and as such they are meant to be applicable not only for Descartes but for
beings as a whole. This insight into being is a human insight, an insight for those
Descartes famously calls thinking things. Descartes believes that his principles lead to a
new kind of philosophy and hence a new way for human beings to view the world. Here,
as elsewhere, the conversion described in philosophical autobiography is to principles
that lead to a new kind of activity based on these same principles.
Descartes depreciates almost the entirety of the established curriculum in Part
One, but there is a sense in which the humanities (Geisteswissenschaften, human
sciences) fare worst of all. For, despite the criticisms of traditional philosophy and
morality with which he begins, Descartes ultimately restores these disciplines by putting
them on a new basis. Granted he presents his moral teaching as provisional, but some
have argued that this “provisional morality” is in fact Descartes’ ultimate ethical
teaching, and in any case Descartes certainly believes that he has found suitable ethical
maxims that will take him safely through his life, that is, whether or not he ever discovers
“the highest and most perfect moral system” that he mentions in his letter to the Abbé
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Picot (CSM 186/AT vol. 9, p. 14 of the Principes).202 Where philosophy is concerned,
Descartes identifies philosophy with metaphysics and believes his first principle and the
further principles he derives from it establish philosophy on a hitherto unprecedented
basis characterized above all by certainty. Having established metaphysics, Descartes
goes on to outline his philosophy of the physical world, and he concludes by
contemplating the redemption and improvement of medicine, which he understands as a
unique department of physics wherein greater knowledge promises to make the greatest
contributions to human happiness. Thus Descartes restores philosophy, morals, and
medicine, or perhaps it is better to say that, in his view, he completes metaphysics and
morals while also initiating a program whereby humanity can incrementally increase its
knowledge of, and power over, the natural world. In Descartes’ philosophy, however,
there is no such redemption for history, rhetoric, poetry, jurisprudence, and so on. They
are left behind, finding no clear place in the Cartesian world. Certainly theology is
recovered to the extent that Descartes develops proofs for the existence of god both here
in Part Three and in the Meditations, and perhaps fables and histories have some role in
the Cartesian universe provided they are read with discretion. As Descartes’ develops his
argument, however, the reader gradually comes to see that the paradigm shift in
philosophy he undertakes means to reorient philosophy to concern with the natural world,
understood as a mechanical and material order that is susceptible of explanation and
manipulation through the combination of mathematical and experimental methods.203 The
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subject matter of the Essays, to which the Discourse serves as a preface, demonstrates
this orientation quite perspicuously, but it is already evident in Parts Five and Six of the
Discourse itself. Philosophy is to be primarily philosophy of nature.
9. The anti-Cartesian manifesto.— Descartes was not the only important philosopher in
the early modern period to write an autobiography. Less than a century later (and about
forty years prior to Rousseau’s writing of the Confessions), Giambattista Vico wrote an
autobiography in which he explicitly repudiated the model of philosophical
autobiography found in Descartes’ Discourse. In his Vita di Giambattista Vico scritta da
se medesimo, published in 1728, Vico asserts that, “We shall not here feign what René
Descartes craftily feigned as to the method of his studies simply in order to exalt his own
philosophy and mathematics and degrade all the other studies included in divine and
human erudition (la divina ed umana erudizione)” (113/N5). As Donald Phillip Verene
notes, “the only model that Vico explicitly claims to have before him in writing his life is
Descartes’ Discourse, and he regards this not as an example to be followed but as a text
to write against.”204 The contrast with Descartes is pronounced and continuous throughout
the Life. Vico sees how Descartes uses autobiography to discredit various arts and
sciences that Vico himself considers indispensible sources of human wisdom, and in the
Life, Vico attempts to defend what he calls “divine and human” erudition against
Descartes’ attempted reduction of the legitimate domain of philosophy to mathematics
and his philosophy alone (solamente).
Although Descartes’ philosophy elicited a number of powerful criticisms during
his lifetime, as well as in the century following his death in 1650, there is a definite sense
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in which Vico’s critique of Descartes (and Cartesianism) is the most thoroughgoing and
poignant of all.205 While other critics conceded the importance of the naturalistic and
epistemological concerns that Descartes emphasized and also generally accepted
Descartes’ characterization of the subject matter of metaphysics, Vico argued that
Descartes’ philosophy fails to take the most important philosophical subject matter into
account. Vico saw, correctly, that the Cartesian emphasis on mathematics and physics
comes at the expense of the human sciences, especially history and jurisprudence, and on
Vico’s view of things this entire emphasis is grossly misguided because it is based on a
false apprehension of what humans can and cannot know. According to Vico, Descartes
fails to recognize that the only knowledge available to us is the knowledge of ourselves
as historical beings, as beings that literally make history. With its emphasis on nature,
Descartes’ philosophy is too focused on the external world that according to Vico we can
never truly know.
But although the main point of his disagreement with Descartes concerns the
proper subject matter of philosophy, whether history or nature, Vico also advances his
criticism of Descartes on a number of different fronts. He rejects, for instance, Descartes’
conception of human cognitive powers and their relation to one another, contending that
Descartes’ method relies exclusively on deductive reasoning from clear and distinct
propositions while neglecting other, for Vico equally important, cognitive powers.
Descartes’ faulty conception of the human mind results, furthermore, in a perverse and

205

For a useful summary of the major lines of criticism pertaining to Descartes’ philosophy up to
Vico’s time, see L. M. Palmer, Introduction to her translation of On the Most Ancient Wisdom of
the Italians (Cornell, 1988), especially pp. 4-7. This is a translation of Vico’s important work, De
Antiquissima Italorum Sapientia, originally published in 1710. With respect to Descartes’
metaphysics, meanwhile, some of the earliest and also central lines of criticism are to be found, of
course, in the Objections appended to the Meditations on First Philosophy.

197

debased philosophy of education, which to Vico’s dismay gained great currency in
Naples during his lifetime. In opposition to Descartes’ repudiation of the traditional fields
of study, Vico holds up Plato as a model of his own educational ideal, since Plato “was
the equivalent of an entire university of studies of our day, all harmonized in one system”
(FB 199). He believes that Cartesian education, by contrast, promotes an unnaturally
restricted human intellect, advancing the studies of math and physics at the expense of
other essential studies and cultivating reason at the expense of cognitive powers such as
memory, imagination, and intellectual perception. For Vico, in fact, Cartesian reason is
really a denatured reason, since Vico believes that reason can only reach its full potential
through the cooperation of other cognitive powers, particularly memory, imagination, and
ingegno, which I translate as intellectual perception.206 In contrast to Descartes who
depreciates the studies of language, history, eloquence, law, and poetry, Vico formulates
a conception of these studies that regards them as indispensable sources of knowledge for
human beings.
Finally, Vico challenges the coherence of the entire Cartesian philosophical
edifice, raising what remains today a perplexing question about Descartes’ dualism,
especially as this pertains to the question of the relationship between Descartes’
metaphysics and physics. “In respect of the unity of its parts,” Vico says, “the philosophy
of Descartes is not at all a consistent system” (FB 130/N 23).
Vico thus opposes Descartes on many fronts: on the question of the proper subject
matter of philosophy; on the nature of human cognitive powers and the view of education
that stems from this; and on the coherence of his metaphysical and physical doctrines. He
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even takes exception to Descartes’ ethical doctrine, claiming that Descartes’ metaphysics
do not “yield any moral philosophy suited to the Christian religion” (FB 130/N N 23).
For all these reasons, Giorgio de Santillana’s comment appears apt that “Vico is the antiCartesian manifesto.”207
Because of their fundamental disagreement about the very subject matter of
philosophy, the comparison of Vico and Descartes is not without its difficulties, and on
some level the two philosophies have so little in common that one may reasonably
wonder how they can both be entitled to the name of philosophy. This disparity of
interests is reflected in their respective autobiographies, so that, despite their similar
form, one cannot fail to be struck by their great difference with respect to content.
Formally, both are concerned to present philosophical principles in terms of a life-story,
but the actual principles involved differ greatly, as does their conception of philosophical
method. Yet despite the great differences between the two philosophies, comparisons
between the two seem inevitable, at least from Vico’s point of view. Even a casual glance
at the Vico scholarship reveals that comparisons between Vico and Descartes are a
commonplace of the field, and those who write and think about Vico regularly attempt to
define Vico’s thought against that of Descartes. In this, the scholars follow Vico’s lead,
for Vico himself repeatedly invites the contrast with Descartes, especially in his Life. At
the same time, the disagreement between Vico and Descartes has paradigmatic value,
exemplifying as it does an ongoing inquiry into the nature of philosophy itself.
10. The central topic of Vico’s Life.— It is important, in light of the foregoing remarks,
not to lose sight of the fact that Vico’s critique of Descartes and Cartesianism is not the
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primary objective of his Life. Descartes serves as a useful foil for Vico, and certainly
Vico’s disagreement with Descartes is serious and significant. Yet Vico’s main concern
in the Life is decidedly positive, his primary goal being to account for the principles of
his own philosophy. Hence the Life deals essentially with the stages Vico traversed in
order to create the new science of history, which has long been recognized as his great
contribution to the progress of ideas in modern times. Vico describes this new science as
“a rational civil theology of divine providence,” “a history of human ideas,” and a
“philosophy of authority” (NS sections 342, 347, and 350). His Life is primarily devoted
to showing how the central ideas of this new science emerged in the course of his life and
as a result of his studies and interactions with other intellectuals.
Thus Vico’s Life has many claims on our attention and not only because of the
informative comparison with the Discourse. Although Vico is (unjustly) neglected by the
majority of contemporary philosophers, especially in the English-speaking world, his
importance has been recognized by some of the foremost scholars of the past two
centuries.208 A comprehensive study of philosophical autobiography could hardly ignore
Vico’s Life.209 Vico is a significant philosopher in his own right, and his Life is an
exemplary instance of philosophical autobiography. His importance as a thinker rests
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primarily on his contributions to the philosophy of history, especially as Vico develops
this topic in the third (and final) New Science of 1744, the same year that he died. One of
the main differences between modern and premodern philosophy is the peculiar historical
sense shared by many modern philosophers, and Vico is generally considered to be the
founder of the modern philosophy of history.
It is necessary to note that Vico scholars have tended to make rather exaggerated
claims for the importance of Vico’s Life as an exemplary instance of philosophical
autobiography. In his excellent study, Verene advances two propositions that epitomize
the kind of exaggeration I have in mind. I argue that one should reject both of these
claims for reasons that should be apparent in light of the preceding studies.210 Verne’s
first contention is that “Vico offers the first philosophical autobiography done in modern
terms” (p. 73). When one looks more closely to determine what this means, it becomes
apparent that Verene is reaffirming Fisch’s claim that Vico is the first philosopher to
apply the so-called “genetic method” in the composition of an autobiography (FB,
Preface, p. v). For example, he argues that “In Vico’s view to understand something is to
discover its origin and to recreate its genesis, bringing forth the causes of its
development. Only when we can remake the thing in thought in accordance with how it
was itself made can we have a true doctrine of it” (Verene 71). Now, however one
defines modernity or the genetic method, it should be clear that, from the point of view of
my own argument, Vico’s Life hardly constitutes a significant departure from the
paradigm of philosophical autobiography laid down by Plato and further developed by
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Augustine. Remarkably Verene himself, in comparing Vico’s Life and Augustine’s
Confessions, doesn’t indicate any significant difference between the two works and
certainly not at the formal level. He doesn’t do this, moreover, because no one can,
because the texts themselves forbid such a move, outside of grossly misrepresenting the
character of these works. On the contrary and somewhat at odds with his own position,
Verene’s comparison of the two works tends to highlight their similarities as opposed to
their differences. At the very least more work needs to be done to make the case that
Vico’s Life should be considered specifically “modern” in contradistinction to earlier
philosophical autobiographies, but I doubt that such a case can be convincingly made.211
For one thing, we would have to know what modernity is, which is no small task; for
another, even assuming we knew that, it would not be an easy matter to isolate features of
Vico’s Life that could be characterized as specifically modern. Vico’s Life serves the
same purpose as Descartes’ Discourse, Augustine’s Confessions, and Plato’s
autobiographical writings, and these works are formally identical, as x = 2y is the same
whatever values one gives to y and x.
Verene’s second claim is that Vico’s text “offers, implicitly, the first conception
of autobiography as a philosophical idea” (p. 73). But Vico is hardly the first to make
autobiography thematic, and both Augustine’s Confessions and Descartes’ Discourse
have better claims to developing autobiography as a philosophical idea (for Vico’s word
on autobiography, see FB 182 and below). On the other hand, none of these works makes
autobiography, much less philosophical autobiography, a subject of study in itself. On the
contrary, we are almost justified in maintaining that this study is a prerogative of twenty-
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first century philosophy. As Verene himself recognizes, the philosophical idea of
autobiography was first suggested, though hardly worked out, by Wilhelm Dilthey.
Dilthey’s discussion is unique as one of the first philosophical discussions of
autobiography outside of an actual autobiographical context. As we have seen, Dilthey
and his student (and son-in-law) Georg Misch took some of the first tentative steps in the
direction of recognizing autobiography as a subject matter for serious study. It’s really
only in the twentieth century that autobiography emerges as a theoretical or philosophical
idea.
Yet, although Vico’s Life shares the basic form of other philosophical
autobiographies, it has its uniqueness and provides particularly strong points of contrast
with Descartes’ Discourse. First of all, as a counterpoint to the highly general character
of Descartes’ discussion of his education, Vico provides a very specific and concrete
account of his own intellectual development, citing particular teachers and others who
influenced him, as well as particular books that he studied. Second, whereas Descartes’
judgment about his education is fundamentally negative and serves to justify a radical
new beginning, Vico’s approach is more cumulative or synthetic. Although like
Descartes he wants to present new principles, Vico shows how he gradually put the
principles of the new science together from different ideas and studies that he undertook
at various stages of his life. He writes, “the constant reading of orators, historians, and
poets his intellect took increasing delight in observing between the remotest matters ties
that bound them together in some common relation” (FB 123). Finally, Vico’s use of the
third, as opposed to the first, person in writing his autobiography is unique in the history
of philosophical autobiography. Whereas other philosophical autobiographies bring
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subjectivity to the foreground, Vico’s practice of referring to himself throughout the work
in the third-person allows him to assume a more objective attitude toward his own life.
Thus Vico’s account of his education is more specific, more synthetic, and more
concerned to assume an attitude of objectivity than the account we find in Descartes’
Discourse.
11. The historical origin of Vico’s Life.— The story of how Vico’s Life came into being
sheds some light on the emergence of an autobiographical consciousness in western
Europe. The initial impetus to the project seems to have come in a roundabout way from
Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716), who, in the aforementioned 1714 letter to Louis Bourguet
(1678-1742), advanced the idea of encouraging philosophical innovators to write
histories of their discoveries. His complaints about Descartes’ Discourse, alluded to
above, are also of some interest:
Descartes would have had us believe that he had scarcely read anything.
That was a bit too much. Yet it is good to study the discoveries of others
in a way that discloses to us the source of the inventions and renders them
in a sort our own. And I wish that authors would give us the history of
their discoveries and the steps by which they have arrived at them. When
they neglect to do so, we must try to divine these steps, in order to profit
the more from their works.212
Leibniz’s idea seems to be that by following the steps an author has made on the way to
her discoveries, we can appreciate these discoveries in a more profound way and, in a
sense, make them our own. This is a powerful claim for the educational value of
philosophical and, we might add, scientific autobiographies, and as such it is in harmony
with one of the central ideas of the present work, which is that one big reason
philosophers write autobiographies is to educate others, especially prospective
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philosophers. Like Leibniz, the philosophical autobiographer believes that autobiography
can make an important contribution to philosophical education.
Now Bourguet apparently communicated Leibniz’s idea to a number of Italian
scholars, including Count Gian Artico di Porcía, under whose auspices a proposal for a
volume of lives of Italian scholars was worked out and sent forth to various scholars,
including Vico, around 1721. Vico was somewhat reluctant to undertake the proposed
project but relented upon repeated appeals from Porcía. Also, as Fisch notes, Vico’s wellattested devotion to pedagogy must have provided him with a strong incentive to
compose his Life (FB 12). The original plan to produce a volume of lives was never
realized, however, and in 1728 Vico’s Life was published on its own, in a Venetian
academic journal, in the hope that it would serve as a paradigm and encourage others to
write similar works. As Verene describes the thing, the “volume of lives did not
materialize, and Vico’s manuscript instead appeared in the first issue of a new journal,
among articles on the birth of vipers and a history of the city of Prato” (p. vii).213 This
incident is emblematic of Vico’s strange career, which as many scholars have remarked
was that of a genius unrecognized in his lifetime.214
As the term had not yet been coined, Vico did not call his work “Autobiography,”
and it is worth noting that reference to the book by this title is a misleading scholarly
convention that began in Italy and has been carried over into English-language Vico
studies. As noted above, Vico himself called his work Vita di Giambattista Vico scritta
da se medesimo, that is, the Life of Giambattista Vico Written by Himself (or even: “by
himself, the very same”). Now, although it is not the acme of wisdom, it is good to call
213
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things by their right names, and so in the present chapter, I jettison (as scholars should)
the usual practice and refer to Vico’s work by its actual title.215 This title is notable and
impressive, since Vico basically articulated the definition of autobiography prior to the
coming-to-be of the name. The “Life of Giambattista Vico Written by Himself” combines
the ideas of self, life, and writing that define autobiography and constitute,
etymologically, the name.
12. Vico’s poetics of autobiography as a philosophical genre.— The specificity of
Vico’s account of his education in the Life provides a stark contrast with the broad,
general terms in which Descartes recounts his own education in the Discourse. Early on
in the text, Vico claims he will write “with the candor proper to a historian (con ingenuità
dovuta da istorico),” and he indicates that this means, “we shall narrate plainly and step
by step the entire series of Vico’s studies, in order that the proper and natural causes (le
proprie e naturali cagioni) of his particular development as a man of letters may be
known” (113/N5). In the 1731 continuation of the Life, only published after Vico’s death
in 1818, Vico characterized what he believed himself to have done in the earlier version:
As may be seen, he wrote it as a philosopher, meditating the causes,
natural and moral, and the occasions of fortune; why even from childhood
he had felt an inclination for certain studies and an aversion from others;
what opportunities and obstacles had advanced or retarded his progress;
and lastly the effect of his own exertions in right directions, which were
destined later to bear fruit in those reflections on which he built his final
work, the New Science, which was to demonstrate that his intellectual life
(la sua vita letteraria) was bound to have been such as it was and not
otherwise (FB 182/N 75).
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Although less abstract than the Discourse, Vico’s Life is like it in being primarily
concerned with the author-subject’s intellectual becoming.216 Whereas, however,
Descartes almost universally rejects his prior education, Vico is far more selective.
Vico’s procedure is both more synthetic and more specific, showing step-by-step how he
acquired the basic ideas that he later combined and developed in order to arrive at his
new science. In accordance with Leibniz’s wish, Vico attends to the particulars of his
education, so that in principle another could follow the same progression and make the
same discoveries. At the same time, the specificity of Vico’s account demonstrates how
difficult it would be to follow in Vico’s footsteps, particularly given the breadth of his
learning. How many scholars today can claim to have studied extensively Plato, Tacitus,
Francis Bacon, Hugo Grotius, Suarez, Cicero, Virgil, Horace, Boccaccio, Dante,
Petrarch, Aristotle, Lucretius, not to mention Descartes and a host of others?
Vico’s account of his intellectual becoming is much more synthetic than
Descartes’, in the sense that he devotes a lot of space to discussing his discovery of ideas
he accepted, and not only to ideas he rejected. There are clearly synthetic aspects in
Augustine’s Confessions, too, for example, in Augustine’s descriptions of how he
incorporated Cicero’s basic injunction to seek wisdom or how reading the Neoplatonists
helped him to grasp the idea of an incorporeal substance.217 By contrast, the Platonic
autobiographical writings adopt a predominantly negative stance toward alternative
doctrines, and the negative approach of Descartes’ Discourse could hardly be more
striking. Vico speaks of the highly associative character of his mind, and in his Life he
216
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attempts to show how he synthesized the ideas gleaned from various sources into the
philosophical worldview that he ultimately formulated.
13. The new science as the purpose of Vico’s Life.— Vico’s New Science aims to
establish a philosophy of history. Vico wrote two continuations to the original 1725 text
of the Life, the first in 1728, which was published in the same year together with the 1725
text, and the second in 1731 that wasn’t published in Vico’s lifetime. The continuations
of 1728 and 1731 are significant because they followed upon the publication of the first
two editions of the New Science in 1725 and 1730, respectively. Since Vico’s main
purpose in writing his Life is to show how he discovered the principles of the new science
through the course of his studies and over time, an examination of the central elements of
this science will prove useful. The Life and the New Science are closely connected, each
throwing light on the other, and as Verene observes, the principles that ground and guide
the new science are also the principles that ground the Life. In other words, Vico’s
autobiography is determined by the same principles it is intended to introduce, especially
the idea that it is possible to grasp historical truth only by understanding how the human
things change over time. Vico also asserts that a central goal of his philosophy is to
reconcile the particulars of history with the universal genera (or kinds) of metaphysics,
and thus, where his autobiography is concerned, he cannot fail to recognize his own
humanlife as a chapter within universal history. His humanlife, and in fact any humanlife,
is a part of the historical whole, and this whole cannot be understood independently of its
parts. But neither can the parts be apprehended without a knowledge of the whole.
Vico’s most famous idea is that we know what we make (the so-called verumfactum principle), and according to him, that which humans make and are therefore in a
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position to know is history. With this making-knowing idea, Vico attempts to give
epistemological justification for his attempt to establish history as a philosophical
science. Science, at least insofar as it is philosophical, requires some account of how its
objects can be known, and for Vico humans have access to the objects of the new,
historical science that he has discovered because history itself is literally made by human
beings. History is made in texts such as the epic poems of Homer and Virgil, but also in
the written codes of laws that have been handed down from antiquity. It is also made in
the actions that such texts reflect, and in such artifacts as these texts describe and that are
sometimes preserved in their material being down through the ages. Whereas Vico
maintains that our knowledge of nature remains external, he argues that we can know the
works of history from the inside. The reason for this is that he believes human beings
know what it is to be human. As Isaiah Berlin puts it, Vico’s “deepest belief was that
what men have made, other men can understand.”218
All this is not to say that on Vico’s view we humans have been completely
conscious creators of ourselves throughout history; rather, quite the contrary is true
according to him. “Men,” he writes, “first did things through a certain human sense,
without attending to them, and then, much later, they applied reflection to them and, by
reasoning about their effects, contemplated their causes” (FNS pp. 21-22). In the course
of history that Vico envisages, human beings are unconscious creators of civilization who
gradually become conscious.
For Vico, moreover, humans do not make history alone. Rather, he claims an
important place in history for the workings of what he calls “providence,” which can be
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understood as the design of the supremely intelligent god that brings about the
preservation of humankind. This raises a number of questions, perhaps the most pressing
being the question of how to distinguish god’s role in making history from specifically
human contributions. Jules Michelet (1798-1874) and Croce (1866-1952), both of whom
were greatly influenced by Vico, attempted to resolve this problem by simply dismissing
the notion of providence. For them, human beings alone make history, and divine
providence plays no role. It is important to keep in mind that this was not Vico’s view, as
Karl Löwith, for example, emphasizes in his fine short study of Vico. In contrast to the
tendency of secularizing thinkers such as Croce and Michelet, Löwith believes that Vico
“saw the course of history much more adequately, namely, as a world made by men and,
at the same time, everywhere surpassed by something which is closer to fate than to free
choice and action” (my emphasis).219 According to Löwith, Vico understood that, “history
is not only deed and action but also and even primarily event and happening. It is not
single minded but double minded” (ibid.).
The question of who or what makes history is really a question of causality,
which has as good a claim as any to being a perennial philosophical question, whether
this question is addressed within the time-honored framework of the God-human
relationship or in the near-contemporary formulations of evolutionary theory,
psychoanalysis, and neuroscience that investigate the relation between voluntary and
involuntary, conscious and unconscious processes (with an emphasis in evolutionary
theory and neuroscience on the materiality of these processes, i.e., trying to understand
them in terms of brain function). Taking his cue from Augustine, Vico himself saw this
219
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problem in traditional terms, but he nevertheless outlines the basic positions that continue
to characterize philosophical debate about historical causation, namely, determinism,
compatibilism, and voluntarism.220 In the Life, he suggests that his early studies of the
debate about grace within Catholic theology led him to accept the Augustinian position
and to reject the opposed extremes of deterministic Calvinism and voluntaristic
Pelagianism (119).221 Like Augustine and others (such as Boethius), Vico thinks that a
belief in god’s providential design does not preclude a belief in human free will. The role
of god appears most clearly in the unconscious aspect of human history, because on
Vico’s account human beings began making institutions without knowing what they are
doing. As Jacques Lacan says, “Dieu est inconscient,” and Vico sees the workings of god
in the unconscious aspect of human history, especially early on when humans make the
historical world through the “human sense” without really knowing what they are
doing.222 Indeed, on Vico’s account, the earliest humans were not doing what they
thought they were doing.
Despite the fact that for him humans are not always the conscious creators of
history, Vico nevertheless thinks that once we, as a species or as a particular “nation,”
reach the age of reflection and reason, we are able to reconstruct intellectually our
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historical becoming in a way that makes this becoming comprehensible to us. Such
understanding is proper to what Vico calls the human age, as opposed to the first age of
gods and the second the age of heroes.
As with Descartes, Vico’s concern with the question of principles stems from a
deep appreciation of the importance of starting points within philosophy. In his Life, he
claims that his goal is “to unite in one principle all knowledge human and divine (che in
principio unisse egli tutto il sapere umano e divino)” (FB 146/N 39). Vico further
specifies this principle as a “principle of the natural law of the nations (un principio di
dritto natural delle genti)” (FB 119/N12). This is the primary principle of the new
science itself, but what is it? In fact, the principle might be better understood as three
tightly interconnected insights, although one of the three is primary. According to Vico,
certain fundamental human institutions serve as the font of natural law and hence form
the basis for all historical development. As Leon Pompa puts it, Vico discovered “the
indispensable nature of the institutions of religion, marriage, and burial of the dead”
(FNS, p. xxx). For Vico the human discovery of the gods is closely linked with human
fear of them, and on his view the earliest human societies, those of the family, grew up
around the principle of propitiating the gods. The nations of the world grew up around
this principle, with the fathers of the first families acting as the primary intermediaries
between the various gods and the human communities of which they were the leaders.
Not unlike Plato and Aristotle, Vico argues that “the time of the families…certainly
preceded cities among all nations,” and indeed the cities arose from the families (FB
169). The unique relationship between the fathers of the various nations and their gods
formed the basis for a communal identity to emerge, an identity that was enhanced and
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guarded by the fundamental human institutions of marriage and burial of the dead.
According to Vico, these institutions were the first laws as well as the basis for all future
laws. The story of history is the story of the development of law from these first
foundations, especially in light of the conflict that gradually emerged between the
founders of the nations and their clients. These clients were those people who came to the
sanctuaries of law and order established by the first families in order to escape the bestial
wilderness. Vico was therefore one of the earliest theorists of what came to be known in
the nineteenth century as class conflict.223
The history of his own life that he narrates is a part of human history as a whole
and can only be understood within the context of this whole: “there remains his own
particular story, which exists within that of humanity and which includes the discovery of
the principles of humanity’s life and is itself recountable as a philosophical history by
applying these principles to it” (73). Furthermore: “Vico conceived his life as having a
providential structure” (Verene 1991, p. 1).224 The Autobiography is founded on the same
basic principles that Vico articulates in the New Science. “Vico’s life of nations and
Vico’s own life of letters share the principle that what they each describe had to be such
and not otherwise; the events narrated in both are products of neither chance nor fate” (p.
1).
Because he believes that we only know what we make, Vico’s assessment of
autobiography is far more positive than that of Descartes. Whereas Descartes calls into
question whether history and autobiography can present us with truth, Vico attempts to
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argue and to show that we can know the truth about history and hence life-histories better
than we can know the natural world.
14. The order of Vico’s Autobiography with an eye to topics.— Vico’s exposition is
chronological, which is the natural mode of history and hence autobiography. Vico
repeatedly insists that chronology and geography are the two eyes of history (e.g., at FB
167), and in order to understand something we must track the changes it undergoes in
space and time. Whereas Descartes divides the Discourse into parts, with each one
devoted to a specific theme, Vico’s Life forms a continuous whole.225 Vico’s portrait of
his intellectual development conforms, moreover, to Leibniz’s wish, inasmuch as it really
is possible to reconstruct Vico’s specific studies on the basis of the Life. Perhaps
surprisingly, given Vico’s career as a teacher of rhetoric and his insistence on the
importance of eloquence within the Life itself, the Life is both more difficult to follow
and less memorable than the Discourse. How are we to account for this? Well, a simpler
story may be easier to follow and remember but that doesn’t mean it’s truer. Vico’s
account of his life is far more faithful to the particulars, less stylized and streamlined than
that of Descartes.
Vico’s Life is a fascinating book that rewards close study. It teaches a great deal
about the history of intellectual life in late seventeenth-century and early eighteenthcentury Naples, which forms an intriguing and important chapter in the history of ideas.
By most accounts, Naples existed on the periphery of the learned world in western
Europe during Vico’s lifetime, yet the intellectual milieu in which Vico grew up and
worked presents us with an illuminating case study of the way that modern ideas spread
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and took hold alongside other, older strains of thought associated with the so-called
Middle Ages and the Renaissance. In the Life, Vico shows the coexistence of medieval,
renaissance, and modern elements in the Naples of his lifetime, where Neoplatonic ideas,
refracted through the lens of Renaissance Neoplatonists like Ficino and Pico, persisted
alongside the growing influence of the mechanistic worldview, an important impetus to
which had been Descartes’ publication of the Discourse and the Essays a century earlier.
At the same time, we see how the medieval curriculum, and many of the problems that
preoccupied the so-called scholastic philosophers, were still alive and influential during
Vico’s childhood. Vico tells us how, as a child, he studied various summulae, for
example, those of Petrus Hispanus and Paulus Venetus; how he studied Suarez; and how
he was affected by the debate between realism and nominalism. In light of the rich and
diverse intellectual world he depicts, Vico describes how he gradually amassed and
synthesized a plurality of ideas out of this abundant manifold, transmuting and
recombining them in the smithy of his mind to produce his new science of history.
The key point to grasp about Vico’s life-story is how the two primary concerns
that were to govern his intellectual life, the study of metaphysics and the civil institutions,
emerged already during his boyhood. Vico thus accounts for his endeavor to harmonize
“the metaphysical mind (la mente metafisica)” with the study of the particulars of human
history (FB 117, 138). Two key events in Vico’s story set the course for all of his future
studies. The first was his introduction to philosophy by two Jesuits, Antonio del Balzo
and, a little later, Giuseppe Ricci. The philosophical side of his education gradually led
Vico to the momentous discovery of Plato and the Neoplatonists, whom Vico interprets
as metaphysical realists teaching not only that ideas, or certain “metaphysical genera,”
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are real, but that they are the causes of the particulars humans encounter in the actual
course of history and life. The Jesuit Balzo, the first of Vico’s teachers mentioned by
name in the Life, was a nominalist philosopher, and Vico admits that he was never taken
with the nominalist worldview. Thus, although Vico takes particulars seriously, he
believes in the reality of universals, which he sometimes calls “metaphysical genera”
(see, for example, the comparison of metaphysics and Euclidean geometry at FB 123/N
16). In fact it was Ricci, a Scotist and hence a realist, whose teaching first captured
Vico’s mind:
From him he was greatly pleased to learn that ‘abstract substances’ had
more reality than the ‘modes’ of the nominalist Balzo. This was a presage
that he in his time would take most pleasure in the Platonic philosophy, to
which no scholastic philosophy comes nearer than the Scotist does (FB
114).
After studying with Ricci, Vico reports he left school for a year in order to study Suarez’s
Metaphysics, since he had heard that Suarez “discussed everything that could be known
in philosophy in a distinguished manner such as becomes a metaphysician, and in an
extremely clear and easy style” (FB 114/N 6-7). This study further informed Vico’s
“metaphysical mind,” and it was also to prove decisive in that it caused him to prefer
Platonic to Aristotelian metaphysics, as I discuss below.
The second event was when, luckily, his “good genius” led him to pop in on a
class being taught by the law professor Felice Aquadia, just at the moment when Aquadia
was lecturing on the merits of Hermann Vulteius. In Aquadia’s opinion, Vulteius was,
“the best who had ever written on the civil institutes” (FB 115/N 7). This led Vico to ask
his father, a bookseller, for Vulteius’ book, “difficult to obtain in Naples.” His father
recalled having acquired a copy for a professor of law by the name of Nicola Maria
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Giannettasio, and he asked Nicola Maria to borrow the book for his son. That such a
young boy wanted this book piqued Nicola Maria’s curiosity, and he desired an interview
with Vico to ask him why he wanted to study Vulteius. The story of this interview that
Vico tells suggests that, even as a boy, he had also begun to appreciate an important
difference between the cognitive powers of memory and intellect. He explained to Maria
that he wanted to study Vulteius because his current teacher of law, a man named
Francesco Verde, gave lessons in which “only the memory (memoria) was exercised and
the intellect (intelletto) suffered from lying idle” (FB 116/N 8). On the basis of this
remark, Nicola Maria was so satisfied with this interview that he “gave outright to the
youth not only the Vulteius but also the Canonical Institutes of Henricus Canisius” (FB
116/N 8). As Vico says, this set him on “the good road to both the laws (ragione),” that
is, the civil law as well as the canon law of the Catholic Church. Thus by discussing his
introduction to philosophy and jurisprudence, Vico recounts how already in his youth he
began the two courses of study that would eventually converge to produce the new
science.
With respect to his study of the civil law, Vico notes that “he found a great
pleasure in two things” (FB 116). The first was what may be described as the inductive
method of the scholastic jurists, who “abstracted into general maxims of justice the
particular considerations of equity which the jurisconsults and emperors had indicated for
the just disposition of cases” (FB 116). Because it emphasized the general truths about
many particular cases, this method suited “the metaphysical mind (la mente metafisica)”
that Vico says he had already begun to acquire. The second was seeing how the
jurisconsults carefully examined the wording of the laws, which led Vico to the serious
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pursuit of philology, including the comparative study of the great Latin and Italian
writers. As Vico says: “Each of these pleasures was a sign: the one of all the study he was
to give to investigating the principles of universal law (princìpi del dritto universale), the
other of the profit he was to derive from the Latin language, especially from the usages of
Roman jurisprudence.”
Having already discovered the two decisive concerns that were to shape his
philosophical vision, Vico says he felt “an ardent desire for leisure to continue his
studies” (FB 118). Vico’s accidental meeting, in a bookstore, with Geronimo Rocca, a
bishop, provided the leisure Vico sought, when Rocca recommended that he become tutor
to his nephews, who lived in Vatolla (according to Verene, about a three-day carriage
ride south of Naples). There, Rocca said, “he would have all the leisure he needed for
study,” and Vico says it turned out to be so. Thus he entered into a period of relative
seclusion and leisure to study that lasted nine years (1686-1695), during which, he says,
he made “the greatest progress in his studies, digging into laws and canons, as his duties
obliged him to” (FB 119). Like Descartes, Vico suggests that a long period of study and
meditation was required for his philosophy to germinate.
During this period, Vico says that the study of canon law led him to study
dogmatic theology, the two clearly being closely related, and as already mentioned,
through this study he was attracted to the debates about freedom and grace. In light of
what is perhaps the central paradox of Vico’s philosophy, that humans make history,
even while history is also determined by divine providence, his remarks on this topic are
of great interest. Again, a Jesuit played an important role in Vico’s life, for through
reading the writings of Richardus (the French Jesuit Étienne Deschamps), Vico says he

218

was led “by a geometrical method” to see that “the doctrine of St. Augustine is midway
between the two extremes of Calvin and Pelagius” (FB 119). According to Vico, it was
his appreciation of Augustine’s teaching that:
enabled him later to meditate a principle of the natural law of the nations
(un principio di dritto natural delle genti), which should both be apt for
the explanation of the origins of Roman law and every other gentile civil
law in respect of history, and agree with the sound doctrine of grace in
respect of moral philosophy (FB 119/N 12-13).
Vico believed he could reconcile a belief in providential causes with a belief in
humanity’s freedom to create itself historically. History would have to be “doubleminded” on his account.
Vico goes on to devote a significant portion of the Life to a discussion of his
studies during his tenure with the Rocca family. In a memorable passage that illustrates
Vico’s dedication to the study of language and the reading of poets and eloquent writers,
he notes how the study of Lorenzo Valla (c. 1407-1457), the Italian humanist and
champion of Latin eloquence, motivated him to cultivate the study of certain great Latin
authors, “beginning with the works of Cicero” (FB 119). Further reading caused him to
discover the opinion that Virgil was a model of Latin elegance in poetry.
Vico also began to contemplate his philosophy of education during this period. He
excerpts a portion of an oration that has not come down to us, in which he advocates a
conception of childhood education rooted in the cultivation of memory, imagination, and
what he calls ingegno, as Fisch notes, a difficult term to translate. It is related to the
English word ingenuity and, as Fisch suggests, might be translated variously as
“invention” or “the faculty of discerning the relations between things” (FB ft. nt. 141 to
p. 123). Perhaps the best translation is intellectual perception, along the lines of what
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Aristotle means by νοῦς (nous), since it is the power that is responsible for our ability to
make analogies, similes, metaphors, and scientific hypotheses, as Fisch again notes
(ibid.). According to Vico, the studies that exercise memory, imagination, and intellectual
perception are those of languages, history, and geometry, respectively. It is worth noting
that this entire meditation on education comes in the context of Vico’s recollection of his
own, unsuccessful attempt to study geometry while living with the Rocca family. The
reason for his failure, he claims, is that the study of geometry is suited to “minute wits”
and not to minds such as his own that are “already made universal by metaphysics” (FB
123). For Vico, “it was easier to grasp all those minute truths (of geometry) together, as
in a metaphysical genus, than to understand…particular geometrical quantities.” He
argues that children’s minds are much better suited to such minute studies and that indeed
the study of geometry possesses many distinctive benefits for children, exercising not
only intellectual perception (ingegno), but also memory and imagination.
In the course of discussing his intellectual development, Vico famously singles
out four figures as his own special authors—Plato, Tacitus, Francis Bacon, and Hugo
Grotius—whose writings served him as constant sources of guidance and inspiration.
Vico took something different from each of these authors, while he also judged each of
them to have certain limitations. His critical beliefs are indicated by a passage devoted to
his discovery of Grotius, the last one of the four that Vico adopted. Here Vico
summarizes the limitations of Plato, Tacitus, and Bacon in order to explain why he took
Grotius as having something crucial to contribute to his own thought:
Plato adorns rather than confirms his esoteric wisdom with the common
wisdom of Homer. Tacitus intersperses his metaphysics, ethics, and
politics with the facts, as they have come down to him from the times,
scattered and confused and without system. Bacon sees that the sum of
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human and divine knowledge of his time needs supplementing and
emending, but as far as laws are concerned he does not succeed with his
canons in compassing the universe of cities and the course of all times, or
the extent of all nations. Grotius, however, embraces in a system of
universal law the whole of philosophy and philology, including both parts
of the latter, the history…of facts and events, both fabulous and real, and
(the history) of the three languages, Hebrew, Greek, and Latin; that is to
say, the three learned languages of antiquity that have been handed down
to us by the Christian religion (FB 154-155/N
According to Vico, Plato does not appreciate the historical origin of human wisdom in
poetry; Tacitus is unsystematic, allowing the historical particulars to overwhelm a generic
and hence metaphysical understanding of history; and Bacon does not adequately
comprehend the importance of laws within history or the necessity of a historical
understanding of laws. Grotius in some way remedies all these shortcomings, and yet
even Grotius does not achieve the understanding required for a new science of human
history.
With the exception of Tacitus, Vico gives an account of how he discovered each
of his four authors, but I will focus on his discovery of Plato because it illustrates the
importance Vico placed on a metaphysical understanding of history and civil institutions.
It also shows the roundabout way in which Vico made many of his intellectual
discoveries. Vico’s road to Plato began with Horace. Studying Horace, whose Ars
Poetica emphasizes the edifying character of poetry, Vico discovered the idea that “the
richest source of poetical suggestion is to be found in the writings of the moral
philosophers” (FB 120).226 This hint inspired him to take up the study of Aristotle’s
ethical writings, since Vico “had observed in his reading” that “the authorities on the
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various principles of the civil institutes frequently referred” to Aristotle’s ethics (ibid.).
This study threw new light on two different approaches to the study of the law, the one
inductive and drawing general principles from particular cases, the other deductive,
starting from metaphysical principles. Vico associates Aristotle with the deductive view,
namely, with the view that particular laws and institutions followed from “a few eternal
truths” (FB 120-121). By contrast, “Roman jurisprudence was an art of equity conveyed
by innumerable specific precepts of natural law which the jurists had extracted from the
reasons of the laws and the intentions of the legislators.” Vico finds both of these
approaches necessary to the proper study of law, and this made him redouble his efforts
in the study of metaphysics.
Although his ethical doctrines were influential for Vico, Vico rejected Aristotle’s
metaphysics on the grounds that it leads “to a physical principle, which is matter, from
which the particular forms are drawn” (FB 121). Surprisingly Vico associates Aristotle’s
philosophy with the materialistic view of the universe advocated in modern times by
Descartes, Gassendi, and others, and Vico even seems to think of Aristotle as something
of a mechanist, opining that Aristotle’s metaphysics “makes God a potter who works at
things outside himself.” His dissatisfaction with Aristotle’s metaphysics led him to take
up the study of Plato, in which he found a metaphysics that leads to “the eternal idea,
drawing out and creating matter from itself, like a seminal spirit that forms its own egg”
(ibid.). This doctrine would perhaps be more accurately characterized as Neoplatonic
than Platonic, but the important point to grasp is that for Vico the principle, or source, of
material beings is an immaterial principle.
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Vico opposed the naturalistic bent of Descartes’ philosophy and criticized
Descartes’ conception of metaphysics, which he viewed as a watered down version of
Platonic metaphysics. For Vico, Plato’s philosophy remained the consummate expression
of metaphysics and the true domain of what Vico calls “the metaphysical mind.” As he
shows in his Life, at every turn his studies reconfirmed Vico as “a partisan of the Platonic
metaphysics” (FB 130). Vico attempts to marry the metaphysical mind with the study of
the particulars of human history. Although he values physics, or the ability to give an
account of nature, Vico objects to the primacy of physics within Cartesian philosophy,
and it is important to note that as his career progressed Vico, at odds with his age,
became increasingly opposed to the mechanistic view of the cosmos that came to
predominate in Naples and elsewhere. In line with this, he also contends that Descartes’
metaphysics is inconsistent with his physics. According to Vico, Descartes’ “physics
calls for a metaphysics that should set up a single kind of substance, the corporeal,
operating…by necessity” (FB 130). Thus Vico anticipated the common nineteenthcentury criticism of Descartes that viewed his philosophy as essentially a materialism that
makes only tactical concessions to an immaterial principle.227 Vico further argues that
Descartes’ philosophy is amoral: “his metaphysics do not yield any moral philosophy
suited to the Christian religion…and his treatise on the Passions is more useful to
medicine than to ethics” (FB 130). Vico makes no mention of Descartes’ provisional
morality in the Life.
Where Vico seriously takes issue with Plato is in regard to his political
philosophy. He remarks how Plato, in the spirit of his metaphysics, “founds a moral
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philosophy on an ideal or architectonic virtue of justice.” Vico proceeds to criticize
Plato’s ideal commonwealth, showing in the process how the new science began to take
shape in his mind:
From the time that Vico felt himself dissatisfied with the metaphysic of
Aristotle as an aid to the understanding of moral philosophy, and found
himself instructed by that of Plato, there began to dawn on him, without
his being aware of it, the thought of meditating an ideal eternal law (un
diritto ideale eterno) that should be observed in a universal city after the
idea or design of providence, upon which idea have since been founded all
the commonwealths of all times and all nations. This was the ideal
republic that Plato should have contemplated as a consequence of his
metaphysic; but he was shut off from it by ignorance of the fall of the first
man (FB 121-122/N 15).
What is Vico’s criticism of Plato’s ideal city? Whereas Plato’s republic is ideal, outside
history, and thoroughly rooted in the belief that human beings can become philosophers,
Vico sees the ideal eternal law expressing itself in the actual historical becoming of the
various nations of humanity. His reference to the fall, and Plato’s ignorance of the fall,
shows the tremendous significance of the belief in human imperfection for his philosophy
of history. As Vico writes in the 1744 New Science, the principal property of human
beings is that they are social. Due to human imperfection, however, there are obstacles to
sociability, and this is precisely the point at which Vico’s belief in divine providence
comes in, explaining the alchemy by which god transforms the meager earth of human
licentiousness to the glittering gold of lawful societies:
In providing for this property (i.e., the sociability of human beings) God
has so ordained and disposed human institutions (le cose umane) that men,
having fallen from complete justice by original sin, and while intending
almost always to do something quite different and often quite the
contrary—so that for private utility they would live alone like wild
beasts—have been led by this same utility and along…different and
contrary paths to live like men in justice and to keep themselves in society
and thus to observe their social nature (la loro natura socievole) (NS/N
367-368, my emphasis).
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Like Erasmus of Rotterdam and Vico’s contemporary Bernard Mandeville (1670-1733),
Vico sees divine providence transmuting human selfishness and vice into justice. He
therefore objects to Plato’s vision of an ideal republic, first of all, because it is
superfluous, and it is superfluous precisely because Vico sees divine providence actually
realizing an ideal justice through history. Vico’s debatable but reasonable assumption is
that Plato takes his ideal commonwealth seriously, that he views it as a real possibility
that a society could come into being governed entirely by virtue, in which the family is
abolished and each class of the city does its proper work thereby securing the harmony of
the whole. On this assumption, Vico believes that Plato needs to be corrected to reflect a
different view of human nature, one that takes into account human fallenness and hence
the fundamental imperfection of human beings. Vico therefore has a less optimistic, more
negative view of human nature than Plato, at least on Vico’s interpretation of Plato. At
the same time, Vico has a more positive estimation of the way things actually work out in
history. For Vico, the selfishness of individual human beings and their injustice toward
one another constitutes a basic fact of human nature, at least for the greater part of human
history. The miracle brought about by providence is the transmutation of private vice into
increasingly just societies over time. At the same time, Vico thinks that there are limits
inherent to human nature that make a republic like Plato’s impossible. In particular,
Vico’s belief that marriage is one of the three principles of human society is diametrically
opposed to Plato’s abolition of marriage in the Republic (see FNS §269).
Vico’s devotion to Plato was also tempered by his commitments to his other three
authors, especially Tacitus. According to Vico, “the wise man should be formed both of
esoteric wisdom such as Plato’s and of common wisdom such as that of Tacitus” (FB
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139). For him, Plato represents the importance of metaphysical principles, and Tacitus
stands for the import of particulars where historical understanding is concerned. Despite
his reservations about Plato’s political teaching, Vico remains a dedicated Platonist in
metaphysics.
Vico’s opposition to mechanism in physics extended to Descartes, and he
recounts his study of Lucretius in order to suggest that his repudiation of Epicureanism
and its modern forms (for example, in Pierre Gassendi) is not uneducated (FB 126). He
opposes the Stoic idea of fate as inconsistent with his belief in the divine governance of
the world. For this reason, too, Vico professes himself to have been completely at odds
with the metaphysical materialism of Epicurus, as he discovered it through his study of
Roman philosopher-poet Lucretius. With respect to materialistic atomism, Vico
unequivocally asserts that “this is a philosophy to satisfy the circumscribed minds of
children and the weak ones of silly women” (FB 126). Vico repeatedly says that his
various forays into the domain of materialist philosophy and physics served only to
confirm him more profoundly in his attachment to Plato.
Vico presents the gradual genesis of his main idea: a philosophy of history that
marries metaphysics to the historical particulars. At the same time, Vico also maintains
that he always wanted a philosophy of history that would be consistent with the best
ethical doctrine, and he notes that he continued to prefer the philosophical writings of
Cicero, Aristotle, and Plato, because these philosophers demonstrated a concern for “the
good ordering of mankind in civil society” (FB 122). He rejects the moral philosophies of
Stoicism and Epicureanism for the same reason, because he thinks they are not concerned
with civil society, but instead “they are each a moral philosophy of solitaries.”
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Following the nine years he spent as tutor to the Rocca family at Vatolla, Vico
returned to Naples, and he claims that he discovered, to his dismay, the metaphysics of
Descartes’ Meditations were very much in fashion. Vico found Descartes’ metaphysics to
be little more than some simplifications of ideas cribbed from Plato and decked out in
new garb. He does not consider the Meditations a profound metaphysical work, and he
attributes the popularity of the work to the overriding preoccupation with the study of
physics in the Naples of his early adulthood. Because of the attention they devoted to
physics, Vico argues, his contemporaries were almost entirely unaccustomed to
metaphysical thinking, and his point is that only such a debased audience could view
Descartes’ metaphysics as difficult and profound.
15. The orations, the first publications, and the discovery of the new science.— In the
Life, Vico devotes fairly extensive discussion to the major works he undertook prior to
his discovery and formulation of the new science. He includes remarks on the six orations
he gave to inaugurate the academic year beginning in 1699; the seventh oration, more
extensive and published under the title De nostrii studiorum de temporiss; and the major
works of 1710.228 It is common for philosophers to include in their autobiographies
reflections on their other, previous works, since these works certainly constitute an
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A number of the works that Vico discusses in his Life are available in English translation. The
six inaugural orations have been translated under the title On Humanistic Education, trans.
Giorgio A. Pinton and Arthur W. Shippee, with an introduction by Donald Phillip Verene
(Cornell, 1993). De nostri temporis studiorum ratione has been translated by Elio Gianturco as
On the Study Methods of Our Time (Cornell, 1990). De Antiquissima Italorum Sapientia has been
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important part of their lives. Thus Augustine includes some discussion of his previous
works in the Confessions, and Descartes summarizes the unpublished treatises on light
and the human body in Part Five of the Discourse. Nietzsche, as we shall see, included a
substantial discussion of the works he published in his lifetime in Ecce Homo.
Vico’s characterization of these orations indicates his understanding of
metaphysics and the human mind, as well as his philosophy of education and the ethical
dimension of his thought. His discussion also exemplifies how his thought was
developing toward the invention of the new science, showing, as he says, how “Vico was
agitating in his mind a theme both new and grand, to unite in one principle all knowledge
human and divine” (FB 146). Vico’s most specific characterization of the overall plan of
the orations comes when he says that he considered them an opportunity to take
“universal arguments from metaphysics” and give them “social applications” (FB 139140).
Just as Descartes outlines a “provisional morality” in the Discourse, Vico
elaborates a practical philosophy in the Life. Basing his ethical teaching on the three
pillars of virtue, knowledge, and eloquence (virtù, scienza, eloquenza) (FB 144/N37),
Vico argues that these achievements are necessary to correct the defects in human nature.
Returning to the theme of human fallenness, Vico contends that because of “sin…man is
divided from man by tongue, mind, and heart” (ibid., slightly altered by me). His account
of how humans are divided in each of these aspects stresses the disagreements that arise
among people from the misuse of language, the diversity of opinions and tastes, and,
perhaps above all, the viciousness of individuals that makes them pursue their private
interests against each other, making conciliation (concilia) and social harmony difficult to
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achieve. Virtue remedies this viciousness in the heart; knowledge transcends the diversity
of opinions that derive from the diversity of tastes; and eloquence corrects the defects of
the tongue, giving human beings the capacity to communicate with one another in such a
way as to promote mutual understanding.
In the 1728 continuation, Vico discusses the First New Science, which had been
published, as he says, in Naples in 1725:
In this work he finally discovers in its full extent that principle (principio)
which in his previous works he had as yet understood only in a confused
and indistinct way. For he now recognizes an indispensable and even
human necessity to seek the first origins of this science in the beginnings
of sacred history (le prime origini di tal Scienza da’ princìpi della storia
sacra) (FB 166/N 61).
Thus Vico announces his discovery of the principle of the new science, namely, that civil
society began with religion. The characteristics of the first religion form, of course, one
of the main subjects of the New Science.
13. The question of an opposition as a way of concluding.— The basic conflict between
Vico and Descartes is representative of a conflict within modern philosophy itself, one
that continues to shape our understanding of ourselves and the world and that we shall
have to negotiate for the foreseeable future. Wilfrid Sellars, in a more specialized context,
described this as the conflict between the manifest and scientific images of humanity.
This is the conflict between the world as it appears from our human point-of-view and as
it appears in light of the progressive unfolding of natural science, which is also a human
endeavor though of a special kind. Descartes’ Discourse announced a project that
continues to this day. Vico thought that greater sources of truth were to be found
elsewhere, in the contemplation of humanity’s historical becoming, while he also
believed that the understanding his new science would promote would be beneficial to
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human beings in what he took to be the essence of humanity, namely, its social or
political character. Although Descartes is often regarded as the founder of modern
philosophy, there is a sense in which Vico’s central ideas can be viewed as more germane
to the philosophical concerns of our own age, since the most pressing questions today are
arguably political or social ones. Both visions have their strengths and limitations.
The philosophical autobiographies of Vico and Descartes enhance the genre
without constituting a major reconfiguration of its form and function. Certainly the
difference between Augustine’s Confessions and Plato’s autobiographical writings is
significantly more pronounced than is the difference between the Platonic
autobiographies and those of Vico and Descartes. We have to wait for Rousseau for
anything comparable to Augustine’s achievement. Vico’s Life is not, as Verene claims,
“the first instance of philosophical autobiography in its modern form” (p. x). That honor,
if it is to go to anyone, must be accorded to Descartes, even if it is yet more appropriate
in the case of Rousseau. In modern philosophical autobiography, insofar as it is distinct
from the classical exemplars, the individual philosopher comes to be more and more
identified with the truth he teaches.
Modern philosophy begins with Descartes’ autobiographical Discourse, and it is
fitting that it should begin this way. A salient characteristics of modernity is its
autobiographical awareness. If we want to understand what this awareness is, then it is
necessary to know its cause or at least to have a theory about it. Such a theory has to take
into account how autobiographical awareness is tied to the way in which the “I,” or
“ego,” comes to the foreground in modern thought. Clearly the “I” is prominent in
Descartes’ philosophy in more ways than one; it is identified with the first principle of
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the Cartesian philosophy, but it is also the peculiar “I” that is René Descartes and the
humanlife of this “I” is significant at the origin. Now there is something to be said for the
view of many scholars that autobiography is a distinctly modern literary genre, but there
is even more to be said for the view that awareness of autobiography as a genre is
modern.229 In fact, as many scholars have noted and as this study goes to show,
autobiography emerged avant la lettre and prior to modernity. This is also true of
philosophical autobiography in particular, that is, as a distinctive literary genre, since it
clearly antedates our so-called modernity and Descartes, beginning as it does with Plato.
Some scholars have argued that Descartes had other models of intellectual autobiography
in mind when composing the Discourse.230 Despite the clear historical precedents,
however, there can be no doubt that autobiography, as both a practice and a product,
proliferates in modern times, and this goes for philosophical autobiography too.
Beginning with Descartes, it is worthwhile to raise the question whether there are
important differences between modern and pre-modern philosophical autobiography.
Does philosophical autobiography change in significant ways beginning with Descartes
and in subsequent modern philosophical autobiographies such as those of Vico,
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Rousseau, Mill, and Nietzsche? Does it become something fundamentally different from
what it was for Plato and Augustine? It may be surprising, but I think the answer to this
question is a qualified no. My contention is that, where philosophical autobiography is
concerned, the continuities over time are more pronounced than the disparities.
One feature that does distinguish modern from pre-modern autobiographies,
however, is an increased emphasis on individuality, in particular, on the individuality of
the philosopher who writes his life. In modern philosophical autobiography, insofar as we
can speak of such a thing, the truth itself gradually becomes more and more closely
identified with the philosopher who writes his life. This trend is most pronounced, of
course, in Rousseau and Nietzsche, but it emerges already in Descartes.
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Chapter 5
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nietzsche
The wise Rabbi Bunam once said in old age, when he had already grown blind: “I should
not like to change places with our father Abraham! What good would it do God if Abraham
became like blind Bunam, and blind Bunam became like Abraham? Rather than have this happen,
I think I shall try to become a little more myself.”
The same idea was expressed with even greater pregnancy by Rabbi Zusya when he said,
a short while before his death: “In the world to come I shall not be asked: ‘Why were you not
Moses?’ I shall be asked: ‘Why were you not Zusya?’”231
Was sagt dein Gewissen?— “Du sollst der werden, der du bist.”—Nietzsche232

1. The difficulty of interpreting Nietzsche and its relation to the dual program of Ecce
Homo.— Nietzsche was aware of the interpretive difficulties his writings pose for
readers. Since Nietzsche himself raises this issue in Ecce Homo, and because Nietzsche
scholarship has long focused on “metainterpretive” questions about how to approach
Nietzsche’s texts, it seems sensible to begin our discussion of Nietzsche’s autobiography
with some consideration of how to read Nietzsche’s.233 In a passage from Ecce Homo,
famous among Nietzsche scholars, Nietzsche writes:
Ultimately, nobody can get more out of things, including books, than he
already knows (als er bereits weiss). For what one lacks access to from
experience (vom Erlebnisse) one will have no ear (kein Ohr). Now let us
imagine an extreme case: that a book speaks of nothing but events
(Erlebnissen) that lie altogether beyond the possibility of any frequent or
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even rare experience (Erfahrung)—that it is the first language for a new
series of experiences (Erfahrungen). In that case, simply nothing will be
heard, but there will be the acoustic illusion that where nothing is heard,
nothing is there. This is, in the end, my average experience (meine
durchschnittliche Erfahrung) and, if you will, the originality of my
experience (die Originalität meiner Erfahrung). Whoever thought he had
understood something of me, had made up something out of me after his
own image—not uncommonly an antithesis to me; for example, an
“idealist”—and whoever had understood nothing of me, denied that I need
be considered at all (EH “Books” §1, Kaufman translation/KSA 6: 299300, my emphasis, translation slightly altered by me).234
Nietzsche’s average experience is of readers reading themselves into his texts, and he
even ventures to say that this constitutes the originality of his experience. Like the
rightwing Prussian newspaper, which amused Nietzsche by interpreting Beyond Good
and Evil as something clearly inimical to his own thought, namely, “as the real and
genuine Junker philosophy,” Nietzsche’s readers regularly read their own beliefs, hopes,
and prejudices into his books (EH “Books” §1). They (we) make an image of themselves
(ourselves) out of Nietzsche’s texts, and this image, Nietzsche claims, is not uncommonly
antithetical to what he really is. At least during his lifetime, he insists, his philosophy has
been subject to nothing but misinterpretations.
For a thoughtful reader, the passage cited above suggests a number of questions.
For example, if one cannot learn or experience anything that one does not already know
from experience, then how is learning or new experience possible at all? (A very Greek
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In most cases, I either use Walter Kaufmann’s translation or make my own. I have consulted
three translations of Ecce Homo: Kaufmann’s (1967), Judith Norman’s (2005), and that of
Duncan Large (2007). All translations have shortcomings. Gadamer: Jede Übersetzung ist wie ein
Verrat (GW 8: 279). In my opinion, however, Kaufmann is still the best. One reason is that
Nietzsche himself placed so much emphasis on the musicality of his style (see EH “Books” §4
and below), and I find that no translator captures the rhythm and tonality of Nietzsche’s German
better than Kaufmann. Kaufmann’s translations are sometimes questionable but usually accurate.
KSA stands for Kritische Studienausgabe (critical student edition), the standard critical edition of
Nietzsche’s works in German, edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de
Gruyter, 1999, in 15 volumes). I refer to volume and page number, hence 6: 299-300 refers to
volume 6, pages 299-300. Ecce Homo appears in volume 6 of the KSA.

234

question.) Here, however, the question that will interest us is whether Nietzsche’s
experience is really so original as he claims. Are Nietzsche’s writings, as he suggests,
truly an exception when it comes to individual readers making something out of them
after their own image? Don’t readers always in some sense do this? Don’t they, in any
case, always bring their beliefs and prejudices, their desires and fears, to the texts they
read? One of the central points in Gadamer’s hermeneutics, it is worth remembering, is
that it is impossible, even in theory, to approach a text entirely outside a certain
framework of prejudices and beliefs. Rooted in the Heideggerian concept of
Geworfenheit, or thrownness, Gadamer’s idea is that we are always already immersed in
a lifeworld, prior to the encounter with a text. The lifeblood of this lifeworld is,
moreover, made up of beliefs and prejudices, and not only according to Gadamer.235 Isn’t
it inevitable that we as readers interpret every text after our own image, at least in the
beginning, before we have made some progress within the hermeneutic circle? And, even
then, is there not an irreducible subjective element in everything toward which a human
being turns her attention?236
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One could cite texts endlessly in this connection. Rousseau (1990, p. 64) refers to “the natural
game of amour-propre: one sees what one believes and not what one sees.” In a talk on Ecce
Homo, Derrida suggests that “everything comes down to the ear” with which each one of is able
to hear. John Stuart Mill, in his Autobiography (Ch. 1), shows how the Socratic method relates to
popular prejudices and “the understanding which has made up all its bundles of associations
under the guidance of popular phraseology.” In other words, individuals always come to
philosophy full of unexamined presuppositions.
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There is a wonderful passage in John Venn’s The Principles of Inductive Logic, originally
published 1889, 1973 reprint by Chelsea Publishing Company New York, New York, wherein he
demonstrates the proposition that “the complete attainment of the ideal position of the mere
observer is nowhere to be secured even in Physics” (p. 21). Basically his proof is that, if one
accepts the universality of the law of gravitation, it follows that the observer affects or exerts a
force on that which he observes, for example, planetary bodies in astronomy. Of course, we can
say that the force exerted by the observer is negligible and can be discounted, but that doesn’t
mean it isn’t real.
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In Nietzsche’s case, it is a matter of historical record that his writings have been
interpreted and made use of in a remarkable variety of ways over the last hundred and
some odd years, and not only by scholars and philosophers. Indeed, if we consider the
history of Nietzsche’s reception, his remark about his average and original experience
starts to take on an aura of plausibility. During World War I, the British, French, and
American presses regularly attributed a goodly share of blame for the war to Nietzsche,
and indeed, some bellicose Germans found in him a warlike jingo and preacher of
heroism on the battlefield.237 He was admired by poets and romantics and revolutionaries,
who saw their own concerns and desires reflected in his writings. In Germany, “his initial
and most explosive and enduring impact was upon diverse circles of the intellectual,
artistic, and literary avant-garde.”238 Later, during World War II, “Nietzsche was
incorporated into the Nazi pantheon of German giants and became an integral part of
National Socialist self-definition.”239 Philosophers with a metaphysical bent found in him
a metaphysician, in Heidegger’s words, “the last metaphysician” of the Western tradition.
As preparations were being made for the Blitzkrieg, Heidegger emphasized the
importance of the will to power for Nietzsche and, in line with his own preoccupations,
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See Steven E. Aschheim’s valuable reception history, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany 18901990 (University of California Press, 1992), pp. 128-129. The whole book is well-worth reading
for those interested in the historical reception of Nietzsche’s thought in Germany. One wishes
there were comparable books about other philosophers, such as Plato. Personally I would relish a
book on Plato’s legacy in the Western World since, say, the Battle of Waterloo.
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Ibid., p. 51. See also p. 6, where Aschheim argues that, “by and large, traditional elites (in
Germany) continued to regard the philosopher as a dangerous and insane subversive. When the
right did seriously adopt Nietzsche it was after World War I during the Weimar Republic, and
then it was the work of mainly radical-revolutionary elements.” Further: “Far from representing
the reactionary (or even conservative) sectors of society (Nietzscheans) were characteristically
emancipationist, progressive, and moved by humanistic concerns. Socialism, anarchism,
feminism, the generational revolt of the young—these were all touched by the libertarian magic
of Nietzsche.”
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Ibid., p. 233.
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viewed Nietzsche as a thinker of being. After WWII, Walter Kaufmann’s translations of
Nietzsche and his monumental study, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, in
which he argued for a conception of Nietzsche as a philosopher of “experimentalism” and
self-overcoming, decisively influenced the American reception of Nietzsche’s thought.
Later, in the 1960s and 1970s, poststructuralist philosophers, like Foucault, Deleuze,
Derrida, and Lyotard, found in Nietzsche an anti-dialectical, anti-Hegelian thinker, whom
they could enlist in their (libertarian?) resistance to what they viewed as the predominant
homogenizing (and “phallogocentric”) forces and discourses that characterized a culture
they took to be obsessed with what Lyotard called “performativity.” This predominantly
French “new Nietzsche” hit the shores of the United States in the 1970s, around the time
of the bicentennial.240 Meanwhile, those Nietzscheans who wanted the recognition of the
predominant analytic movement in American and British philosophy, interpreted
Nietzsche in light of the epistemological mania, and they are still at it. Is Nietzsche’s
thought coherent? Is Nietzsche concerned with problems of knowledge? Of language?
“Respectable” thought in general wanted to know, is Nietzsche’s thought respectable?
Some answered no, others yes, depending on whether or not Nietzsche could meet their
standard of “respectability.”241 Political philosophers read him politically (what politics
do we derive from the doctrine of the will to power?), and systematizers read him to see
if he had a system.242 In the United States, Nietzsche’s influence on popular culture has

240

David Allison’s edited collection, The New Nietzsche (MIT 1999, originally published 1977)
was the text that introduced the (predominantly) French Nietzsche to many readers within the
United States.
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No one did more to make Nietzsche respectable in America than Walter Kaufmann.
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One example of an attempt to read Nietzsche as a systematic thinker is John Richardson’s
Nietzsche’s System (Oxford, 1996). Nietzsche’s relevance for political thought is more
questionable. Strauss and Cropsey devote a chapter to Nietzsche in the History of Political
Philosophy (Chicago 1987, Third Edition), but in Alan Ryan’s recent thousand page, two-volume
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been significant; the Beats read Nietzsche in New York, and Jim Morrison read him in
Los Angeles.243 Within the recent history of the American academy, Allan Bloom
interpreted Nietzsche as both the principle source of moral relativism that Bloom found
within the American university and as the antidote to the shallowness of this relativism.244
Nietzsche figures centrally in the thought of Harold Bloom and Richard Rorty, and to a
lesser extent in that of Stanley Cavell. These and other thinkers have attempted to
reconsider the meaning of philosophy and wisdom at the present historical moment and
within an American context.245 One could go on and on listing different interpretations
and uses to which Nietzsche’s writings have been put, and clearly there will have been
something for everyone in Nietzsche.
So perhaps Nietzsche’s books really are a special case in this regard, as he
suggests. Nietzsche himself says that his texts are all over the place, that his “art of style”
is “the most multiple” (vielfachste) there has ever been. Throughout his writings,
Nietzsche assumes a number of personae and employs multiple figures, in various
contexts; his texts appear altogether multifaceted and multivoiced.246 A vast array of

tome, On Politics: A History of Political Thought from Herodotus to the Present (New York:
Liveright, 2012), Nietzsche barely rates a mention.
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Nietzsche appears on the first page of Jack Kerouac’s epoch-making novel On the Road.
Jennifer Ratner-Rosenhagen (2012, pp. 252-253, and see note 14 below) notes another intriguing
pop culture use of Nietzsche, namely, Hugh Hefner’s mention of him in the editorial to the first
issue of Playboy. According to Hefner, gentleman like a nice cocktail, a bit of jazz, and a little
chat about Nietzsche.
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On Bloom’s interpretation of Nietzsche, see Jennifer Ratner-Rosenhagen’s fine “reception
history,” American Nietzsche: A History of an Icon and his Ideas (Chicago, 2012), pp. 271-272,
307-312. Bloom’s interpretation of Nietzsche can be found in his famous/infamous Closing of the
American Mind.
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Again, see Ratner-Rosenhagen, pp. 263-305. I also cannot fail to mention the superb study by
Geoff Waite, a serious contribution to political thought that takes up a position against Nietzsche
and Nietzsche’s influence, particularly on the political Left: Nietzsche’s Corps/e: Aesthetics,
Politics, Prophecy, or, the Spectacular Technoculture of Everyday Life (Duke University Press,
1996).
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I take the term from Professor Evans.
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personae jostles for position, sometimes agreeing with one another, at other times trying
to outdo each other in the effort to state a worldview, a philosophy.
All this is common ground among serious readers of Nietzsche, scholars and
others; the question that arises, however, is: why are Nietzsche’s texts like this? What
purpose or purposes does this multiplicity serve? It seems that the multiplicity that
characterizes Nietzsche’s work invites readers to see themselves in it as in a mirror, and
one wonders: what is the purpose of this mirror? Is Nietzsche trying to make a mirror of
the human world in all its diversity? One might retain certain doubts about this,
especially since one might hear a fairly consistent voice running throughout Nietzsche’s
writings, early to late, subtending the polyphony and play of masks. There can be no
doubt that Nietzsche has been read and used in many different ways in the relatively
small amount of time since the years after his collapse, when his writings first began to
become famous. Perhaps it is a mistake to read Nietzsche as though there were only one
facet or one voice there. His texts are almost endlessly complex, “wrapped in paradox
after paradox,” to quote Erich Heller.247 Probably if you don’t recognize all the others, all
the personae and voices, you miss the point. Probably this multiplicity is itself an
important part of the point. Perhaps it is related to Nietzsche’s “paganism,” understood as
a philosophical worldview that celebrates difference and individuality against the grand
communal metanarratives that suggest there is only one right way to think, to act, to
live.248
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Erich Heller, The Importance of Nietzsche (Chicago 1988), p. 15.
See especially The Gay Science §143, “The greatest advantage of polytheism.” Compare GS
§117. For further insight into Nietzsche’s critique of morality metanarratives, see D §108. In this
regard, TSZ, First Part, “On the Thousand and One Goals,” is also interesting, but there, too, one
finds Zarathustra suggesting the idea of a new metanarrative that would unite all humanity in the
pursuit of “one goal.”
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How does the multiplicity of Nietzsche’s texts connect with what he is trying to
do in Ecce Homo? Does Ecce Homo fit the pattern that is established by Nietzsche’s
other books? In some sense, Ecce Homo is less multiple than many of Nietzsche’s other
texts, and perhaps here, more than anywhere else in his work, Nietzsche’s own voice is to
be heard in its purity. The principal subject of the book is Nietzsche himself. At the same
time, Nietzsche wants to advance the idea that individual human beings should take up
the project of becoming who or what they are.
In Ecce Homo, the title and subtitle lay out the two main purposes of the work. On
the one hand, “Ecce Homo,” “behold the man,” indicates that in this work Nietzsche will
try to say who he really is. On the other hand, “Wie man wird, was man ist,” how one
becomes what one is, announces that this is not only a book about Nietzsche, but also
about how anyone might come to be the being that he or she is. The title, as many have
noted, comes from Jerome’s translation of John 19: 5 in the Christian Scriptures. “Ecce
homo” is what Pontius Pilate says when he presents Jesus to the crowd that is calling for
his blood. However parodic this may be, Nietzsche explicitly compares himself with the
Christian Christ in the title of his autobiography. The Christian Christ probably figures
more prominently in Nietzsche’s thought than it does in the thought of any other
generally recognized major philosopher, excepting perhaps Augustine. The subtitle,
meanwhile, is adapted from Pindar’s second Pythian Ode, where Pindar advises Hieron
of Syracuse to “become such as you are, having learned what that is.”249 The title thus
evokes the Christian tradition, whereas the subtitle harks back to ancient Greece. This
reference on the one hand to Christianity, on the other to ancient Greece, mirrors exactly
249

Pindar, Olympian Odes/Pythian Odes, ed. and trans. William H. Race (Loeb Classical Library,
1997), pp. 238-239.
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the opposition of the final words of Ecce Homo, namely, “Dionysus against the
Crucified.” I will not insist that Nietzsche intended the chiastic structure—in the case of
the title and subtitle, Christianity comes first, Greece second; in the last words of the
book this order is reversed—but I do think that understanding his view of the
oppositional relationship between Christianity and Greece, between Dionysus and the
Crucified, is essential for understanding what Nietzsche is up to in Ecce Homo. One key
goal of the present chapter is to present what I take to be a new interpretation of this
opposition and these last words.
A key way in which my interpretation of Ecce Homo departs from previous ones
can be brought to light in terms of a memorable analogy employed by Slavoj Žižek.
Žižek suggests that “the triad of paganism-Judaism-Christianity” repeats itself twice in
modern philosophy, “first as Spinoza-Kant-Hegel, then as Deleuze-Derrida-Lacan”
(Žižek 2004, p. 33). Žižek neglects to mention Nietzsche, though Nietzsche recognized
many of his own most characteristic thoughts in Spinoza250 and inspired Deleuze. Hence
Nietzsche is a key link in the modern movement of “paganism” within philosophy, which
means at least that he denies a moral world order. At the level of being or nature, we are
simply beyond good and evil. At the same time, there are also reasons why Žižek has to
exclude Nietzsche from these triads. For one thing, central to my interpretation, is that in
certain key contexts Nietzsche reduces Judaism and Christianity to a single phenomenon,
which he further links to Platonism, since “Christianity is Platonism for the ‘masses’ (das
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See, for example, Nietzsche’s 1881 postcard to Overbeck, where he announces his discovery
of Spinoza. Nietzsche suggests he and Spinoza are as one in denying free will, purposes, the
moral world order, the nonegotistical, and evil. Translated in Middleton (1996 p. 177).
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Volk),” and to the pessimistic philosophy of Schopenhauer.251 But what is even more
significant is that Nietzsche does not identify himself solely with paganism; rather, he
indicates that Judeo-Christianity, as well as what it represents (Plato, Schopenhauer, etc.),
is also part of what he is. The central argument of this chapter is therefore that Nietzsche
identifies himself with both of these forces, with paganism and Judeo-Christian
Platonism, at the same time. The true meaning of Ecce Homo’s last words, “Dionysus
versus the Crucified,” is not only, as almost everyone thinks, that Nietzsche identifies
himself with Dionysus and paganism against the “King of the Jews.” This is of course
undeniably true in some sense, but it is also not the whole story. On the contrary, what I
claim is that Nietzsche identifies himself with this opposition as such, that is, he himself
is, in his own person, Dionysus versus the Crucified. The reading of Ecce Homo
presented here will tend to confirm this view, but there are also numerous indications
throughout Nietzsche’s texts, especially his later texts, that it is an accurate and
defensible interpretation. As Erich Heller says, Nietzsche “once exclaimed in the secrecy
of his notebook,” that the “ruler’s virtues (Herrscher-Tugenden)” were to be understood
in terms of the formula “the Roman Caesar with the soul of Christ.”252 It cannot be stated
251

On the connection between Christianity and Platonism, see BGE Preface. Nietzsche’s thought
with respect to Judaism is complex, but on some level he definitely agrees with Lichtenberg, who
wrote, “In the end, we are nothing more than a sect of Jews.” The “we” refers, of course, to the
Germans but also to Christians in general. Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, Aphorismen (Manesse
Verlag, 1958), my translation, p. 375. For further insight into the complexity of Nietzsche’s
thought about Judaism see note 48 below. With respect to Lichtenberg, incidentally, it is worth
noting Nietzsche’s admiration for his writings, especially since this affinity is almost never
mentioned in the Nietzsche literature. In a discarded draft, apparently intended for EH “Clever”
§3, Nietzsche mentions his fondness for Lichtenberg (KSA 14: 477/rendered in English by WK,
on p. 339 of his translation). Much neglected in the English-speaking world, Lichtenberg was one
of Nietzsche’s forerunners as a writer of aphorisms in Germany.
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KSA 11: 289. Kaufmann has this as §983 in his translation of Nachlass fragments, entitled The
Will to Power (Vintage Books 1968). See Erich Heller (1988, p. 12). See also The Portable
Nietzsche, pp. 685-87. After Nietzsche went “insane” he signed letters both as Dionysus and as
the Crucified.
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too emphatically that Nietzsche’s ideal is a kind of combination of the two spirits, or
forces, that he identifies with Christ and Dionysus. I will call it an antithetical synthesis,
which can be understood, why not, as a kind of Hegelian speculative concept. (Nietzsche,
it goes without saying, would dislike the use of Hegelian concepts to characterize his
philosophy.) Nietzsche’s own preferred name for this concept is, of course, der
Übermensch.
What the rest of this chapter aims to show is that this antithetical synthesis is in
some sense the very essence of Nietzsche, as he himself presents himself. Obviously
Nietzsche sides with, or favors, that which is (whatever it is) symbolized by Dionysus,
but neither can he do without the element of the negative that the Crucified represents.
Further, the Dionysian logic, or the logic of amor fati, itself requires Nietzsche to affirm
the role of the Crucified in human history, since this logic dictates “that one wants
nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity” (EH “Clever” §10).
Judaism, Platonism, and Christianity are themselves part of the reality that Nietzsche
seeks to affirm. Nor have scholars paid enough attention to Nietzsche’s claim in Ecce
Homo that he only attacks that which he honors:
attack is in my case a proof of good will (angreifen ist bei mir ein Beweis
des Wohlwollens), sometimes even of gratitude. I honor, I distinguish by
associating my name with that of a cause or a person: pro or con—that
makes no difference to me at this point. When I wage war against
Christianity I am entitled to this because I have never experienced
misfortunes and frustrations from that quarter—the most serious
Christians have always been well disposed toward me. I myself, an
opponent of Christianity de rigueur, am far from blaming individuals from
the calamity of millennia (EH “Wise” §7/KSA 6: 274-275).
Autobiography and self-presentation are undeniably the most prominent task of
Ecce Homo, but we should also not forget the program indicated by the work’s subtitle.
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In addition to telling about himself and his life, Nietzsche also wants to encourage us as
individual readers to reflect on ourselves and to get involved in the project of becoming
what we are. In Living with Nietzsche, Robert Solomon emphasizes the importance of this
dimension within Nietzsche’s work, saying that he “reads Nietzsche as presuming…a
powerful prejudice, that we are free to develop our character and our talents and it is our
responsibility to do so.” And further that: “living with Nietzsche means taking our own
potential—and our responsibility for that potential—seriously.”253 If not in a literal sense,
Nietzsche wants to teach his readers how to become the authors of their own lives.254 One
might reasonably say, then, that Nietzsche’s philosophy aims to promote a sort of
autobiographical consciousness, especially in Ecce Homo. Nietzsche wants to advocate
what he calls Selbstbesinnung, self-examination, on the part of individuals as well as
humanity taken as a whole.
This becoming is to be affirmed by the individual who says, thus I willed it, I
have lived, I have been myself. If, as Socrates suggests, philosophy is learning how to
die, then for Nietzsche the proper words for the philosopher to say on her deathbed are: I
am happy with the one I was and have become, which can be reduced to the formula: I
will this unique life to recur eternally. Which can also be expressed by means of
Nietzsche’s formula: amor fati.255 Even better of course is to be able to say this to oneself
before one is about to die, and perhaps often.256
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Solomon (2003, pp. 206-207). Compare Robert Pippin’s Nietzsche, Psychology, and First
Philosophy (Chicago 2010), especially Chapter 6, pp. 105-120.
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Nehamas argues that this is precisely Nietzsche’s point. That Nietzsche aims to teach
individuals how to create themselves as a kind of unity from multiplicity. See especially Ch. 6 of
Nietzsche Life and Literature, which deals specifically with Ecce Homo.
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See EH “Clever” §10. Compare also GS sections 276 and 340.
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For some insight into Nietzsche’s thought about death, see Daybreak §349 and The Gay
Science §278.
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2. There is then at least a double program in Ecce Homo in accordance with the two titles
of the book. Both of these programs, moreover, tie into Nietzsche’s presentation of a
philosophical principle, which is his belief that a revaluation of values is both possible
and desirable at this point in human history. One of the primary reasons that Nietzsche
gives for his wanting to write and publish an autobiography is that he believes it to be his
destiny to confront humanity with “the heaviest demand (der schwersten Forderung) ever
made of it” (EH “Foreword” §1/KSA 6: 257, Large translation). This “heaviest demand”
is the demand to revalue all values, which Nietzsche describes in the last chapter of Ecce
Homo as his “formula for an act of supreme self-examination (Selbstbesinnung) on the
part of humanity, become flesh and genius in me (der in mir Fleisch und Genie geworden
ist)” (EH “Destiny” §1).257 Selbstbesinnung, which Kaufmann and Norman translate as
“self-examination,” and which Large translates as “self-reflection,” also means that
humanity is to become conscious of itself and to think about itself anew. Nietzsche
elaborates on the theme of Selbstbesinnung in his discussion of Daybreak in Ecce Homo:
My task (meine Aufgabe) of preparing a moment of the highest selfexamination for humanity (einen Augenblick höchster Selbstbesinnung der
Menschheit), a great noon (einen grossen Mittag), when it looks back and
far forward, when it emerges from the dominion of accidents and priests
and for the first time poses, as a whole (als Ganzes), the question Why?
(warum?) And For What? (wozu?)—this task follows of necessity from the
insight that humanity is not all by itself on the right way, that it is by no
means governed divinely, that, on the contrary, it has been precisely
among its holiest value concepts (ihren heiligsten Werthbegriffen) that the
instinct of denial, corruption, and the décadence-instinct (der décadenceInstinkt) has ruled seductively. The question concerning the origin of
moral values (die Frage nach der Herkunft der moralischen Werthe) is for
me a question of the very first rank because it is crucial for the future of
humanity (die Zukunft der Menschheit). The demand that we should
believe that everything is really in the best of hands, that a book, the Bible,
257

Duncan Large notes that the expression “become flesh” is an allusion to John 1: 14, “And the
word was made flesh.” See his translation of Ecce Homo, note to p. 88, which appears on p. 115.
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offers us definitive assurances about the divine governance and wisdom in
the destiny of man, is—translated back into reality—the will to suppress
the truth about the pitiable opposite of all this; namely, that humanity has
so far been in the worst of hands and that it has been governed by the
underprivileged, the craftily vengeful, the so-called “saints,” these
slanderers of the world and violators of man (EH “Daybreak” §2/KSA 6:
330-331; translation slightly altered by me).
Because he is the source of this heaviest demand, because it has become flesh and genius
in him, Nietzsche says he feels a “duty (Pflicht)” to tell others who he is. By explaining
how he arrived at the belief in the desirability of a revaluation of all values through his
life and personal experience, Nietzsche aims to inform readers about the meaning and
importance of this teaching. He also hopes that Ecce Homo will prevent people from
doing mischief with him; he fears that one day people will pronounce him “holy” and set
up a religion around him; he would rather be a buffoon than a holy man (EH “Destiny”
§1). He prefers “to be even a satyr to being a saint” (EH “Foreword” §2).
3. A new kind of exemplary life.— As in the case of other philosophical autobiographies,
Nietzsche means his autobiography to present an exemplary life and so to be instructive.
He expects, however, that it will be exemplary in a strikingly new way. Because, while
insisting on his own uniqueness, Nietzsche insists just as much on that of each one, at
least as a possibility. For this reason, Ecce Homo aims to present one model, and not the
model, of a philosophical becoming. Alexander Nehamas speaks to this dimension of
Nietzsche’s project when he writes that:
(Nietzsche) does not believe that there exists a single proper kind of life or
person. He thinks…that admirable people are one and all what he calls
“individuals.” But the very notion of an individual is one that essentially
refuses to be spelled out in informative terms. To give general directions
for becoming an individual is surely…self-defeating.258
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Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Harvard, 1985), p. 8. Compare Duncan
Large, Introduction to his translation of Ecce Homo (Oxford World’s Classics, 2007), pp. xv-xix.
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A little later in the same text, Nehamas says that, “to imitate Nietzsche properly would
produce a creation which…would…be perfectly one’s own—something which is no
longer an imitation” (ibid., my emphasis). On this interpretation, to be a Nietzschean
means not to treat Nietzsche himself and his writings as a model to be scrupulously
imitated, but rather to find a way to become yourself.
In this respect, the difference between Nietzsche’s autobiography and other
philosophical autobiographies becomes clearer. Perhaps the contrast is clearest in the case
of Rousseau, primarily because he and Nietzsche are close together in sharing an
appreciation for the uniqueness of the human individual. The difference is that whereas
Rousseau is fascinated by his own uniqueness, Nietzsche is more alive to the uniqueness
of others and to the immense possibilities presented by the innumerable human beings
now living and yet to be born. In this connection, we might see Rousseau as one of the
first to formulate a strong conception of human uniqueness, and Nietzsche as one of those
who extended this insight to give it a more universal application. In other words,
Nietzsche radicalizes Rousseau’s insight be expanding it. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche
expresses this awareness of human uniqueness very clearly:
I should think that today we are at least far from the ridiculous immodesty
that would be involved in decreeing from our corner that perspectives are
permitted only from this corner. Rather has the world (die Welt) become
“infinite” for us all over again, inasmuch as we cannot reject the
possibility that it may include infinite interpretations (unendliche
Interpretationen). (GS §374/KSA 3: 627).
This passage indicates how Nietzsche takes up and transforms another of Rousseau’s
major ideas, the idea that human beings are distinguishable from all other animals
because humans possess what Rousseau calls la faculté de se perfectionner, i.e., the
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faculty of perfecting themselves (Rousseau 2011, p. 53). Whether one considers human
beings collectively or individually, the point is that no one knows what human beings
may yet become, which also means, what interpretations of actuality and of how one
should live, are still possible. This idea is in stark contrast to the ancient view that
humans have a fixed nature and that there is therefore a limit to the human capacity for
change. Whereas Aristotle, for example, had maintained that, in practical life, there is
only way to go right, while there are infinitely many ways to go wrong (see EN 1106b2735), Nietzsche wants to entertain the idea that there are potentially many different ways
to live, each one possessing its own unique shortcomings and advantages. What
constitutes a good life differs from individual to individual and in different historical
circumstances.
In addition to the subtitle of Ecce Homo, Nietzsche gives ample other indications
that this is what he is up to in this book. At the end of the Foreword, for example,
Nietzsche quotes from his Zarathustra, when Zarathustra, at the end of the First Part of
the book, admonishes his disciples, saying:
You had not yet sought yourselves; and you found me.
Thus do all believers; therefore all faith amounts to so little.
Now I bid you lose me and find yourselves; and only
when you have denied me will I return to you.
The challenge to his disciples, as to Nietzsche’s readers, is to seek themselves and to find
themselves, an enterprise the importance of which Nietzsche reiterates at various points
throughout Ecce Homo. The many readings of Nietzsche as a kind of existentialist are
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aware that one of the fundamental questions Nietzsche repeatedly addresses to his readers
is: “Is that your will?” (GS §383).259
Nietzsche’s emphasis on difference coincides with the philosophy of selfbecoming that he wants to advocate, not only in Ecce Homo, but in his work as a whole.
But how does Nietzsche’s emphasis on individuals and self-becoming tie in with his
teaching about the revaluation of values? The revaluation will have to take place in light
of awareness of individual difference, and with the revaluation itself Nietzsche wants to
affirm the innocence of these multiple individual becomings. The formula “Dionysus
versus the Crucified” is the formula for Nietzsche himself.
4. Yet Ecce Homo is also undeniably Nietzsche’s autobiography, which is to say, it is his
story about his own life and philosophical becoming. In the passage intercalated between
the Foreword and the beginning of the first chapter, he says, “I tell my life to myself.”
While writing for himself, he also writes for others, to show them (and us) how one
becomes what one is by showing them how he became himself. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche
promises to tell us who he is. “For I am such and such a person,” he italicizes. “Above
all, do not mistake me for someone else” (EH Foreword §1/KSA 6:257).
It is important to emphasize that Nietzsche knew something about autobiography
and biography. In fact, this is a great understatement, because the biographical and the
autobiographical alike were major preoccupations with Nietzsche throughout his life.
Nietzsche was particularly interested in the connection between philosophy and the life of
the philosopher, and, as we saw in the Introduction to the present work, he even ventures
to suggest that all philosophies are nothing more than the disguised and perhaps
259
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249

unacknowledged autobiographies of their creators. In works both early and late, both
published and unpublished, Nietzsche returns again and again to consider the relation
between philosophy and humanlife and, in particular, the relation between single
philosophies and the lives and characters of the individual human beings who constructed
them.
Nietzsche’s interest in autobiography can be traced back to his adolescence. One
of Nietzsche’s biographers, Rüdinger Safranski (2002, p. 25), tells us that “during his
high school and college years, from 1858 to 1868, Nietzsche penned no fewer than nine
autobiographical sketches,” each one following “the general theme of ‘How I became
what I am.’” As a student of classical philology, Nietzsche studied Diogenes Laertius’
Lives of the Emminent Philosophers extensively, and Diogenes was a significant source
for Nietzsche’s early lectures on those he christened the “Pre-Platonic” philosophers.260
Nietzsche mentions his early studies of Diogenes in Ecce Homo (EH “Clever” §3).
Commentators have rarely, if ever, noted how the style of Ecce Homo resembles that of
the biographies in Diogenes’ Lives: a proliferation of anecdotes and characterizations
coming in rapid succession, by no means always chronologically ordered. In light of his
abiding interest in the connection between philosophy and both biography and
autobiography, it is both fitting that Nietzsche’s final major work should be an
autobiography, and reasonable to expect that when it came to working within this genre,
Nietzsche knew what he was about.
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According to Thomas Brobjer (2008, p. 35), “(Nietzsche’s) most extensive notes during the
second part of the 1860s were about the ancient historian of Greek philosophy, Diogenes
Laertius.” See Brobjer’s extremely valuable study, Nietzsche’s Philosophical Context: An
Intellectual Biography (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press), compare pp. 39, 49.
See also Greg Whitlock’s Introduction in Friedrich Nietzsche, The Pre-Platonic Philosophers,
trans., ed., and with an Introduction and Commentary by Greg Whitlock (Urbana and Chicago:
University of Illinois Press, 2001), p. xliv.

250

Scholars have been perplexed by Nietzsche’s apparent claim to tell the whole
truth about himself and his life in Ecce Homo. Unlike Augustine and Rousseau, both of
whom express their struggle to say who they really are, Nietzsche seems to believe that
he is fully capable of expressing himself and his life. Oscar Wilde’s “No artist is ever
morbid. The artist can express everything.” would seem perfectly to characterize
Nietzsche’s attitude to his own autobiography. This is not, of course, to say, that
Nietzsche did not have an appreciation for the limitations of language. Quite the contrary
is the case, as can be seen from numerous passages in Nietzsche’s work.261 Nietzsche
nevertheless avows a certain self-knowledge in this text, however much readers may be
inclined to doubt his claims. He also makes strong, perhaps extravagant, claims about his
mastery of language, about how he has achieved a certain perfection of expression that
allows him to communicate himself fully, without remainder.262
5. If this be madness, yet there is method in it.—Ecce Homo is a strange philosophical
autobiography for a number of reasons. In a memorable remark, Sarah Kofman says that,
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See, for example, The Gay Science, sections 179, 244, and 354. Compare, too, GS §189. The
unpublished fragment “On Truth and Lies in an Extramoral Sense” is highly relevant to this topic
as well (KSA 1: 873-890; there is an English translation by Breazeale).
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A footnote is the proper place to discuss philosophical and scholarly resistance to Nietzsche’s
claims for his mastery of language. Of course one might question whether what he says here
accurately reflects what human powers of expression are actually capable of doing, as well as
what human knowers are actually capable of knowing. The relation between word and object,
between word and feeling, remains, after all, a much-contested area, not only within philosophy
but within modern cognitive psychology as well. Isn’t Rosenzweig, for example, correct, when he
adduces the example of people’s proper names as being “sufficient witness to the fact that there is
something exterior to man, a ‘without’ surrounding him”? (Rosenzweig 1999 p. 80). Part of this
has to do with the fact that, as Eyers (2012, p. 20) puts it, the proper name is “chosen for the child
even before birth,” and stems from some “opaque parental desire.” But Rosenzweig’s point also
seems to be that a proper name doesn’t even really name. There is something that exceeds our
linguistic capacities. In a very lively, often questionable, but generally illuminating treatment of
Ecce Homo, Gary Shapiro employs the Lacanian matrix to suggest that Nietzsche is caught up in
the imaginary and the symbolic without awareness of the real. The suggestion is that Nietzsche
denies the real, and that, as a consequence, his text is haunted by the real, by the disavowed thing.
For another Lacanian reading of Nietzsche, see Alenka Zupančič’s The Shortest Shadow:
Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two (MIT 2003).
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“Ecce Homo has to be considered, by far, the most ‘crazy’ (‘fou’) text in all of
philosophy.”263 According to Kofman, the text’s “craziness” is related to the way that
Nietzsche radically subverts the autobiographical genre. Ecce Homo is a highly
“depersonalized” autobiography (22); “we can’t call Ecce Homo an autobiography
without putting (the word) in quotations” (29). There is, Kofman seems to lament,
neither “stable and substantial subject,” nor bios, in Ecce Homo. Indeed, in Ecce Homo,
Nietzsche confronts us with the spectacle of the “death (mort)” of the subject and of
“life.” The title of Kofman’s extensive commentary on Ecce Homo is Explosion, which
reflects Nietzsche’s repeated use of this trope, for example, in his famous remark: “Ich
bin kein Mensch, ich bin Dynamit” (EH “Destiny” §1/KSA 6: 365). Kofman, however,
takes the explosion to refer to Nietzsche himself, to his personality. To paraphrase, she
says there is more than one person in Nietzsche’s “I (‘ich’),” that there really is no
unified person at all, that there is rather, “nothing but a superabundant accumulation of
forces that explodes,” again and again (29-30). Kofman seems to interpret these
explosions as “symptoms” of Nietzsche’s “madness (folie),” which, however, she also
thinks Nietzsche is desperate to hide. The secret of the book, Kofman suggests, is that no
one is really there at the center of these repeated explosions. Or that, if there is something
there, it is “madness (folie).”
This is hardly Kofman’s last word, but I think I have given a fair presentation of
an important dimension of her argument. This is important because I want to contest the
longstanding idea that Ecce Homo is a “crazy (fou)” book and the product of “madness
(folie).” It seems to me that Ecce Homo is far from crazy, that the Nietzsche of this text is
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no less a “stable and substantial subject” than others, and that the argument and rhetoric
of the book are carefully wrought and wholly consistent, despite the obvious complexity.
I believe that Ecce Homo has an argument and that this book, considered as a whole, is
actually one of the most tightly and intricately designed in all of Nietzsche’s corpus. It is
a Laertian self-portrait that moves in the last chapter toward a self-imposed simplification
or concentration of what Nietzsche himself takes to be the essence of his philosophy.
Because of this self-imposed simplification, Nietzsche’s autobiography also offers itself
as a heuristic for reading his other texts, especially since Nietzsche provides comments
on each of his major published works as part of his autobiography.
Except for the order in which Nietzsche discusses his published books, Ecce
Homo does not for the most part proceed chronologically. To quote Duncan Large, “there
are major chronological gaps in the narrative, and a great deal of basic information which
one might legitimately expect to be provided in a biographical account is missing” (Large
2007, p. xi). If chronology is essential to narrative, then Ecce Homo is only a narrative
work in a loose way of speaking. If narrative is essential to autobiography, then Ecce
Homo is questionably an autobiography.264 It is not like Rousseau’s Confessions, or even
those of Augustine, which despite their numerous digressions, prayers, and so forth, hew
fairly closely to the chronology of life. To quote Walter Kaufmann, “the self-portrait (of
Ecce Homo) is not naturalistic” (EH p. 202).
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To make matters more difficult, what chronology there is in Ecce Homo suggests an
embarrassing inconsistency in Nietzsche’s text. Nietzsche claims that he only started to become
himself around 1876, and that many of his crucial thoughts have their origin beginning around
then. He credits his sickness with bringing him to himself, as I discuss in detail below. But this
chronology presents a problem because it relegates The Birth of Tragedy and the Untimely
Meditations to the period before Nietzsche became himself, and yet even in Ecce Homo,
Nietzsche argues that many of his central thoughts already appear in these works.
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Despite the understandable reservations that its strangeness inevitably provokes,
Ecce Homo clearly is an autobiography and a kind of “Geschichte meiner Seele.” The
reader gets as much of a sense of Nietzsche as a person, his life, his tastes, his
philosophy, as one gets of Augustine or Rousseau from their, arguably more standard,
autobiographies. Nietzsche communicates the central, as well as the characteristic,
experiences of his life, along with a strong impression of how he has lived and changed
over time. Throughout the text he multiplies little anecdotes and brief sketches of various
aspects of his character, a style familiar to readers of Diogenes Laertius. To say this
again, apparently no one has noted the strong stylistic resemblance between Ecce Homo
and Diogenes’ Lives. Nietzsche treats readers to tableaux of him wandering around like a
miserable shadow in 1879; of him dancing in the mountains around Nice, around the time
he was working on the third part of Zarathustra (EH “TSZ” §4); of him picking up and
reading from his Zarathustra, when he would “walk up and down in (his) room for half
an hour, unable to master an unbearable fit of sobbing” (EH “Clever” §4). We see him
drinking grog and writing Latin essays at Schulpforta. Later, he tells us, he gave up
alcohol entirely. We learn of his preference for Piedmontese cuisine; of his dislike of
coffee and for sitting. Nietzsche tells us that as a teacher at the Pädagogium in Basel, he
made the troublemakers behave and the lazy students work hard (EH “Wise” §4). He tells
us how once, looking for a place to stay, he went to the papal residence in Rome to ask if
they had a quiet room for a philosopher (EH “TSZ” §4).
Taking all this into account, Kofman’s claim that “Ecce Homo is the most
‘depersonalized’ autobiography there could be” appears less convincing. One clearly gets
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a picture of Nietzsche the man and his life from Ecce Homo. It is also significant that
Nietzsche shows himself as an individual and not merely as a type.
Nietzsche does frequently employ the detonative trope highlighted by Kofman.
But if not to the repeated outbursts of his madness, then what is Nietzsche getting at with
this metaphor? In one passage, he writes, “I understand the philosopher as a terrible
explosive, endangering everything (als einen furchtbaren Explosionsstoff, vor dem Alles
in Gefahr ist)” (EH “The Untimelies” §3). Socrates is in the background here, as well as
other philosophers who were perceived as endangering the established order. For
Nietzsche, the philosopher is destructive, though not merely so, for he is also creative,
and even needs to be destructive, in order to create.
6. In terms of its design, Ecce Homo does have a surface order that readers can easily
appreciate, corresponding to the way Nietzsche divided up the book: a Foreword, the
famous intercalated passage, three chapters (“Why I am so Wise,” “so Clever,” and
“Write Such Good Books,” respectively), subsequent sections in which Nietzsche
discusses each of his published writings in turn, ten different books in all, and finally, the
last chapter entitled “Why I Am a Destiny.” Counting the intercalated passage and the ten
parts devoted to Nietzsche’s books, Ecce Homo has sixteen major parts in all.
This order, of course, tells us little about what actually happens in Ecce Homo,
about how the argument of the text is to be construed by us, its readers. To quote
Kaufmann again, it is hard to disagree with the statement that Ecce Homo “is not easily
accessible.” (p. 214). Nietzsche’s text makes special demands on the reader, which are
consonant with his desire that readers should take up the project of becoming themselves.
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This is a peculiar conception of leading-the-soul (ψυχαγωγία, psuchagôgia), but it
certainly intensifies the experience of the reader’s freedom.
7. Sickness as central to Nietzsche’s self-conception.— One of the most surprising
features of Ecce Homo is the central role that sickness (Krankheit) plays in Nietzsche’s
life story. Probably no commentator on Ecce Homo has given this aspect its proper
weight, but it is the key to my interpretation of the text. Nietzsche’s view of sickness is
counterintuitive, because sickness is naturally regarded as an essentially bad condition or
negative experience. Nietzsche, by contrast, attributes a positive role to sickness in his
life. Sickness helped him, he says, to become himself, so much so that, if he’d never been
sick, he might have missed out on the opportunity for the self-realization he claims to
have achieved. In another text of 1888, Nietzsche contra Wagner, Nietzsche succinctly
expresses his belief about the role of sickness in his life:
And as for my long illness (Siechtum), do I not owe it indescribably more
than I own to my health (Gesundheit)? I owe it a higher health (eine
höhere Gesundheit)—one which is made stronger by whatever does not
kill it. I also owe my philosophy to it (NCW Epilogue §1/KSA 6: 436;
translation slightly altered by me).265
Obviously Nietzsche’s “infirmity,” his “sickness,” looms very large in his thought about
his own life and philosophy. The question that then arises is: how exactly did sickness
come to assume such a prominent role for Nietzsche? However perverse Nietzsche’s
estimation of sickness might appear, he clearly has certain reasons for going against the
common sense view and crediting sickness with a beneficial role in his life.
One thing that Nietzsche wants to show in Ecce Homo is that his life exemplifies
how wisdom can be won from illness, since on his account sickness helped him to
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become himself, to achieve a “higher health,” as well as his own, peculiar philosophy.266
More specifically, Nietzsche claims both that sickness gave him special powers and that
it provided an occasion for other, latent powers to come into play, powers which he
associates with what he calls “the great health (die grosse Gesundheit).” In Ecce Homo,
Nietzsche identifies five reasons why he is grateful for his experience of sickness: first,
sickness prompted him to stop living “idealistically” and “selflessly;” in other words it
freed him up, he claims, to become himself. Second, sickness transformed him into a
dialectical philosopher, like Socrates. Third, Nietzsche says sickness taught him about,
and ultimately allowed him to free himself from, ressentiment. Fourth, Nietzsche claims
that his experience of sickness was beneficial insofar as it was counterbalanced by his
more characteristic and fundamental experience of health. This opposition between health
and sickness in him opened up for Nietzsche the possibility of a revaluation of values.
The desirability of a revaluation of values is precisely the philosophical principle that
Nietzsche wants to advance in Ecce Homo, and he offers it as the starting point for future
philosophy. The discovery and possibility of the revaluation, however, hinges on
Nietzsche’s experience “in questions of décadence” (EH “Wise” §1), décadence being
more or less synonymous with sickness, both here in Ecce Homo and elsewhere in
Nietzsche’s writings. Fifth and finally, sickness forced Nietzsche to give up the
philosophy of pessimism to which he had previously subscribed, but here it was his
underlying health that took his sickness as an occasion to decide against philosophical
pessimism. His basic healthiness allowed him to take sickness as an occasion to branch
out and formulate a new philosophy.
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8. In Ecce Homo Nietzsche says that before he became sick, he lived selflessly, by which
he means that he went along with the crowd and lived as an “idealist.” Difficult as it may
be for us to think of Friedrich Nietzsche as an idealist and as going along with the crowd,
this is what he says about himself at that time. In a characteristic passage, describing his
years as a professor at Basel, he writes:
During my Basel period my whole spiritual diet, including the way I
divided up my day, was a completely senseless abuse of extraordinary
resources, without any new supply to cover this consumption in any way,
without even any thought about consumption and replenishment. Any
refined self-concern (Selbstigkeit), any protection by some commanding
instinct was lacking; I simply posited myself as equal to any nobody; it
was a “selflessness” (Selbstlosigkeit), an oblivion of all distance between
myself and others that I shall never forgive myself. When I was close to
the end, because I was close to the end, I began to reflect on this
fundamental unreason of my life—this “idealism.” Only my sickness
brought me to reason (Die Krankheit brachte mich erst zur Vernunft) (EH
“Clever” §2/KSA 6: 283 following Nietzsche’s italics as they appear in
the KSA).
“Only my sickness brought me to reason,” expresses a theme to which Nietzsche returns
again and again in Ecce Homo. Sickness was valuable to him because it prompted him to
take a step back and consider how he was living. In other words, it created a distance for
reflection, reflection being by its very nature impossible without distance.
There is a sense in which the key year in Nietzsche’s autobiography is not 1881,
when he first had the thought of the eternal recurrence, but rather 1876, when he
experienced the equivalent of a conversion (περιπέτεια). The year 1876 marks the
reversal, or περιπέτεια (peripeteia), in Nietzsche’s life. Of this time, he writes:
It was then that my instinct (mein Instinkt) made its inexorable decision
against any longer yielding (Nachgeben), going along (Mitgehn), and
confounding myself (Mich-selbst-verwechseln). Any kind of life, the most
unfavorable conditions, sickness, poverty—anything seemed preferable to
that unseemly “selflessness” (“Selbstlosigkeit”) into which I had got
myself originally in ignorance and youth and in which I had got stuck
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later on from inertia (aus Trägheit) and so-called “sense of duty” (aus
sogenanntem “Pflichtgefühl”) (EH “HAH” §4/KSA 6: 326).
At the moment of reversal, there is always a decision close by. In a definite sense, the
decision itself is the reversal, as it is in the other philosophical autobiographies we have
considered. What decides here is not “Nietzsche,” but what he calls “mein Instinkt.” He
suggests, rather paradoxically, that he himself didn’t know what he was doing:
“ignorance and youth” had led him to the point where “inertia” and “sense of duty” had
him trapped in an uncongenial routine. It is hardly necessary to state that the experience
Nietzsche describes is a common one, and also that it is difficult, once in, to slip the trap
prepared by one’s own history and professional training. But, as every schoolchild
knows, sickness can be a path to freedom and a break in the oftentimes dreary routine of
schooldays. In Nietzsche’s case, too, sickness came to the rescue:
Here it happened in a manner that I cannot admire sufficiently that,
precisely at the right time, my father’s wicked heritage (jene schlimme
Erbschaft) came to my aid—at bottom, predestination to an early death.
Sickness detached me slowly (Die Krankheit löste mich langsam heraus):
it spared me any break, any violent and offensive step. Thus I did not lose
any good will and actually gained not a little. My sickness also gave me
the right to change all my habits (Gewohnheiten) completely; it permitted,
it commanded me to forget; it bestowed on me the necessity (Nöthigung)
of lying still, of leisure (Müssiggang), of waiting and being patient.—But
that means, of thinking! (Aber das heisst ja denken!) (EH “HAH” §4/KSA
6: 326)
Sickness gave Nietzsche an excuse to retire that others understood and respected; it
allowed him to escape from his habitual routine and the “sense of duty” that had made
him stick to it. But if sickness gave Nietzsche freedom from his habits and the demands
of his profession, it also gave him freedom to think. But then Nietzsche doesn’t speak of
freedom in this context, but rather, of necessity. Sickness compelled him to give up his
habits, to forget his stupid routine, and it imposed lying still and idleness (Müssigang) on
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him as a necessity. Idleness here should be understood in light of the Greek, and
essentially Platonic, conception of σχολή (scholê), i.e., leisure, free time, idleness.
Leisure is essential for philosophy or science to emerge.267 Nietzsche says that sickness
made leisure necessary for him. In Twilight of the Idols, he had written: “Müssigang ist
aller Psychologie Anfang. Wie? wäre Psychologie ein – Laster?” (KSA 6: 59). “Idleness
is the beginning of all psychology. What? Would psychology then be – a vice?” The
passage alludes to a German proverb (as noted by WK in The Portable Nietzsche, p. 466),
which says, Müssiggang ist aller Laster Anfang, that is, idleness is the source of all vices.
Similar to the English proverb about the devil finding work for idle hands, this is the
voice of “the sacred cause of labor,” of the “work ethic,” in its purest form, and work is
opposed to philosophy, insofar as philosophy requires leisure. (Two of the most brilliant
pages ever written on this topic can be found in Leo Strauss’ Natural Right and History,
pp. 257-258, in the context of a discussion of Rousseau, no less.) As Karl Löwith has
noted, Nietzsche is at one with Plato, Aristotle, and other representatives of the ancient
tradition in championing the vita contemplativa, even while Nietzsche also thinks that the
modern world is far more inimical to such a life than the ancient polis ever was.268
Sickness freed Nietzsche from philology; it freed him from books. “For years I
did not read a thing—the greatest benefit I ever conferred on myself.” Nietzsche’s
ambivalence with respect to books is profound, because books take us out of ourselves
and away from ourselves, and in some sense compel us to submit to the will of another.
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In this way, Nietzsche is very similar to Rousseau, who also thinks that books have the
capacity to alienate us from our true selves.269 Relative to this forced prohibition against
reading, Nietzsche discusses how in the midst of his illness his “deepest self” gradually
emerged:
That deepest self (jenes unterste Selbst), which had become entombed and
silent as a result of continually having to listen to other selves (and indeed
that is what reading means!), awakened slowly, shyly, doubtfully—but
finally it spoke again. Never have I had so much happiness in myself as in
the sickest and most painful times of my life: one has only to look at
Daybreak, or perhaps The Wanderer and his Shadow, in order to grasp
what this “return to myself” was: a superlative kind of convalescence
(Genesung). The other (convalescence) merely followed from this one
(same section as above, KSA 6: 326, but this is my translation).
Here sickness itself appears paradoxically as the highest kind of convalescence, but of
course this isn’t really a paradox according to Nietzsche’s way of thinking. Sickness
prompted an improvement in Nietzsche’s condition; it taught him to stop living
mindlessly, as most people do, and to begin taking seriously questions that are usually
ignored by philosophers and other people alike, especially such questions as relate to
humanlife and about how one is actually to live. For this reason, questions concerning
nutrition, place, climate, recreation, and “the whole casuistry of selfishness (die ganze
Casuistik der Selbstsucht),” assume a central place within the argument of Ecce Homo
(EH “Clever” §10/KSA 6: 295). Most of the second chapter of Ecce Homo, “Why I Am
So Clever,” is devoted to a consideration of these questions. Nietzsche says he came to
see how these, arguably more mundane concerns, actually have a far greater importance
for humanlife than traditional philosophical, and Christian, concerns about God, soul, the
beyond, and so forth (see EH “Clever” §1, compare “Destiny” §8).
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Nietzsche thus opposes a kind of “realism” to what he calls “idealism,” and for
him “idealism” is a kind of “anti-nature” and not wanting to see the world as it actually
is. This idealism has both grander and more mundane forms. Platonism, the philosophy of
Schopenhauer, and, above all, Christianity are prime examples for Nietzsche of the antinatural approach to life (see EH “BT” §2). Nietzsche also describes these belief-systems
as “nihilistic,” by which he means that, by negating the only world that there is in favor
of an “imaginary” beyond, these belief-systems negate life. Nietzsche also gives more
commonplace examples of this “idealistic” tendency as well, for example, when he scoffs
at the ideal of classical education in Germany. He finds it amusing to imagine a
“classically educated” man with a Leipzig accent (“Clever” §1, the quotation marks are
Nietzsche’s). The point can be stated in the form of a question: what does classical
education have to do with living in nineteenth-century Leipzig? Nietzsche suggests that
such education is “idealistic,” not “realistic,” because it ignores humanlife. In general,
Nietzsche lambasts the Germans for being idealists in every way. The Germans have no
historical sense; they are nationalists and even racists; through Luther, Germany ruined
the Renaissance; German philosophy is rife with counterfeiters and veil-makers; and the
Germans not only lack, but don’t even want, clarity about the real world.
Just prior to the passage quoted above, Nietzsche confesses that he has “no
welcome memories whatever” from his entire childhood and youth. Hyperbolic though
this statement no doubt is, it serves further to illustrate Nietzsche’s point about how, prior
to his sickness, he lived “selflessly,” “idealistically,” ignoring physiology and real life.
He ate “selflessly,” he listened to music “selflessly,” he became a philologist “selflessly,”
and so on. Insofar as one acts or does things without considering what is truly important
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in, and for, humanlife, one acts “selflessly,” “idealistically,” in Nietzsche’s sense of the
term. In his own life, it was sickness that brought him to reason and reality.
9.

Nietzsche also claims that his long illness turned him into a kind of Socratic

philosopher. Nietzsche believes that Socrates’ philosophy is itself inseparable from
sickness. If for Plato and Aristotle philosophy begins with wonder, for Nietzsche it
begins with illness, at least where Socrates and his ilk are concerned (the Presocratics are
perhaps another matter for Nietzsche). One has to be sick in order not to go along with
the happy herd, and the happy herd has no use for sick philosophers. It is only when the
herd itself begins to become sick, moreover, that it becomes susceptible to the extreme
form of sickness that Nietzsche identifies with dialectical, Socratic philosophy. As
Nietzsche says, “the decadent typically chooses means that are disadvantageous for him,”
and this is particularly true of the ailing community insofar as it welcomes philosophy
(EH “Wise” §2).
Readers of Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy and Twilight of the Idols will be
familiar with Nietzsche’s arguments about Socrates, which he both refers to and revisits
in Ecce Homo. “My readers,” he says, “know perhaps in what way I consider dialectic as
a symptom of décadence; for example in the most famous case, the case of Socrates” (EH
“Wise” §1/KSA 6: 265). According to Nietzsche, something has to go radically amiss in
order for a philosopher like Socrates to emerge. Nietzsche’s idea seems to be that happy,
well-turned out human beings are indifferent to the search for reasons, to the Socratic
“magic…of cause and effect, of ground and consequence” (D §544). Why, after all,
should I bother to ask what things are, and about how I should live, when I am already
healthy and happy with my life?
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Nietzsche also talks about such communal illness in terms of the demise of the
ability to live according to instinct. With the onset of the illness, one begins to doubt
oneself; instead of acting, one withdraws to think about how one should act. Writing
about The Birth of Tragedy in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche boasts that he was the first to
recognize Socrates as:
an instrument of Greek disintegration, as a typical décadent (als Werkzeug
der griechischen Auflösung, als typischer décadent)…“Rationality”
against instinct (“Vernunftigkeit’ gegen Instinkt). “Rationality” at any
price as a dangerous force that undermines life (als gefährliche, als lebenuntergrabende Gewalt) (EH BT §1/KSA 6: 310)!
In the first section of “Why I Am So Wise,” Nietzsche draws attention to the
turning point of his life mentioned above that figures prominently at certain key junctures
in Ecce Homo (especially in the part on Human All-Too-Human). This was the period
around 1876-1880, or so, prior to Nietzsche’s writing The Gay Science, which marks a
new period of health.270 Nietzsche says that in 1879, he reached the lowest point of his
vitality; he says, “I still lived, but without being able to see three steps ahead.” He tells of
how he retired from his professorship in Basel and wandered around “like a shadow.” He
spent the winter in Naumberg, of all places, and states that this was his absolute
minimum. He began the Wanderer and His Shadow at that time, and says “doubtless, I
then knew about shadows.”
Work on Daybreak commenced the next winter, in Genoa, but Nietzsche tells us
that he was still ailing. “The perfect brightness and exuberance of the spirit, reflected in
this work, is compatible in my case not only with the most profound physiological
weakness, but even with an excess of pain” (“Wise” §1, my emphasis). He recalls how he
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had a three-day migraine, “accompanied by laborious vomiting of phlegm.” But in the
midst of all that, he claims, he “possessed a dialectician’s clarity par excellence,” and that
at this time he was able to think through “with very cold blood matters for which under
healthier circumstances I am not mountain-climber, not subtle, not cold enough” (ibid.,
my emphasis). At this point, Nietzsche makes the connection to Socrates explicit; to
repeat, he says that “my readers know perhaps in what way I consider dialectic as a
symptom of decadence; for example in the most famous case, the case of Socrates.”
Nietzsche suggests that Daybreak epitomizes his sick or décadent philosophy. If
dialectic is the symptom of sickness, and if sickness isolates one from the community,
then Daybreak might be read as the product of the breakdown of the communal authority
in Nietzsche. His sickness gives him the distance necessary to see moral values from the
outside, allowing him to examine dialectically the “moral prejudices” of his own political
community, as well as those of other political communities both in his own time and
throughout history. As opposed to ailing ones, healthy communities are held together by
authority, not by reason (see “The Problem of Socrates,” in Twilight). Nietzsche’s
argument pertains to the breakdown of the authority of the political and cultural regime, a
general decline that he sees as being most advanced in the person of the philosopher.
Similar in this respect to Vico, Nietzsche believes that the authority of the regime rests on
prejudices, especially moral prejudices; more or less “healthy” communities run more or
less smoothly on the basis of unexamined assumptions. Another name for these
unexamined assumptions is tradition. The philosopher, at least one of the Socratic sort,
emerges only when the authority of the old beliefs is already in decline. The community
is already sick, but because he embodies the communal sickness to a higher power, the
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philosopher is able to accelerate the advance of this disease. The authority of the old
beliefs is breaking down in each one of the individuals that comprise the political
community, but the philosopher still appears extraordinary because in him the general
breakdown is far more advanced. Nietzsche believes that in his own era Germany and
Europe in general are going through a similar period of decadence, which he famously
connects with the “death of God” and the breakdown of the Judeo-Christian worldview.
But this experience is not merely negative, and the decomposing organism of the
political community may provide the matter out of which a new humanity can come into
being. On Nietzsche’s account, the work of sickness—which can be likened to the labor
of the negative in Hegel—is necessary in order for change to occur.271 It is clear, I think,
that Nietzsche himself seeks a constructive alternative to the decaying belief-systems that
he sees all around him.
10. Ressentiment and its relation to sickness.— According to the argument of “The
Problem of Socrates,” in Twilight of the Idols, dialectic springs from ressentiment and the
associated desire for revenge. But what is ressentiment? And against whom, or what,
does it desire to take revenge? Nietzsche’s answer to the second question is in some sense
straightforward; he says, it is the desire for revenge against well-turned out human
beings, the “happy animals” and “good cows.” In On the Genealogy of Morals,
ressentiment is the key motivating factor behind the Sklavenaufstand in der Moral, the
slave-uprising in morals, through which the slaves seek to revenge themselves on the
masters. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche says one of the new truths he uncovered in the
Genealogy was that Christianity was born out of the spirit of ressentiment, that
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Christianity itself represents “the great rebellion against the dominion of noble values
(der grosse Aufstand gegen die Herrschaft vornehmer Werthe)” (EH “GM”/KSA 6: 352).
Yet it is important to note that Nietzsche also thinks that it was only with this great
rebellion that human beings became truly interesting. Further, this rebellion could never
have succeeded if the old order, the order of “noble values,” had not already been in
decline.
In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche confesses that he has had firsthand experience of
ressentiment. He also emphasizes how his “protracted sickness (meiner langen
Krankheit)” gave him both “freedom from ressentiment (die Freiheit vom Ressentiment)”
and “enlightenment about ressentiment (die Aufklärung über das Ressentiment)” (EH
Wise §6). Nietzsche says “the problem is far from simple.” A full understanding and a
thorough exposition of the concept would depend on a close reading of all those texts in
which Nietzsche elaborates the workings of ressentiment, but such an investigation lies
beyond the scope of the present work. In the main, I am interested here only in what
Nietzsche says about ressentiment in Ecce Homo, and especially in the connection
between sickness and ressentiment that Nietzsche establishes as part of the book’s
overarching argument. What he says about ressentiment in Ecce Homo nevertheless
throws a great deal of light on what Nietzsche thinks with this concept. Ressentiment, it
turns out, is the desire for the world to be other than it is, and as such, we might see it as
the source for Nietzsche of all so-called normativity, or any set of beliefs about how the
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world should be.272 Ressentiment is therefore also closely connected for Nietzsche with
the idealistic, anti-natural, and nihilistic philosophies and religions discussed above.
Alluding to his aforementioned ability to reverse perspectives, to see things by
turns from the perspective of decadence and from that of health, Nietzsche claims that to
understand ressentiment, one needs to have experienced it “from strength as well as from
weakness.” In an important passage he writes:
If something must be said in general against being sick (Kranksein) and
against being weak (Schwachsein), then it is that when one is sick and
weak, the proper saving-instinct (der eigentliche Heilinstinkt) of human
beings, which is the defense-and-attack-instinct (der Wehr- und WaffenInstinkt), becomes worn out (mürbe). One doesn’t know how to get away
from anything, to get over anything, to rebuff anything – everything hurts.
People and things come intrusively near, experiences strike too deeply,
and memory is an ulcerous wound. Being sick (Kranksein) is itself a kind
of ressentiment (EH “Wise” §6/KSA 6: 272, my translation).
The sick person (der Kranke) is more or less completely vulnerable to the world and can
no longer maintain his independence from everything else, for example, from other
people and things. Pushed around by everything, hurt by everything, the sick one
experiences the world as too much. In this condition, Nietzsche suggests, the desire to
take revenge on everything arises naturally. Since everything hurts the sick one, the sick
one desires to lash out and retaliate against so many sources of suffering. Nietzsche’s
response to this, the “remedy (Heilmittel)” he recommends to the sick one, is to do
nothing, is to cease from reacting at all. His name for this remedy is “Russian fatalism,”
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Heidegger gives this a metaphysical spin, interpreting ressentiment as clinging to the idea of an
unchanging being because of a hatred of time and becoming. Compare EH “BT” §3, where
Nietzsche describes his conception of Dionysian philosophy: “The affirmation (die Bejahung) of
passing away and destroying, which is the decisive feature (das Entscheidende) of a Dionysian
philosophy; saying Yes to opposition and war; becoming (Werden), along with a radical
repudiation of the very concept of ‘being’ (‘Sein’)—all this is clearly more closely related to me
than anything else thought to date” (KSA 6: 313, WK’s translation does not have the quotation
marks around “being,” but they appear in the KSA).
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“that fatalism without revolt which is exemplified by the Russian soldier who, finding a
campaign too strenuous, finally lies down in the snow.” In Nietzsche’s case, Russian
fatalism meant “tenaciously clinging for years to all but intolerable situations, places,
apartments, and society, merely because they happened to be given by accident: it was
better than changing them, than feeling that they could be changed.” He goes on to
explain the reason for this in some detail:
Because one would use oneself up too quickly if one reacted in any way,
one does not react at all any more: this is the logic. Nothing burns one up
faster than the affects of ressentiment. Anger, pathological vulnerability,
impotent lust for revenge (Rache), thirst for revenge (Rache), poisonmixing in any sense—no reaction could be more disadvantageous for the
exhausted: such affects involve a rapid consumption of nervous energy, a
pathological increase of harmful excretions—for example, of the gall
bladder into the stomach. Ressentiment is what is forbidden par excellence
for the sick (für den Kranken)—it is their specific evil—unfortunately also
their most natural inclination (EH “Wise” §6/KSA 6: 272-273)
Nietzsche’s enlightenment about ressentiment comes from his experience of being sick
and hence naturally inclined to resentfulness. He learned that ressentiment becomes
creative in its desire for revenge, and that the most intelligent and creative amongst the
sick take revenge on life by teaching other worlds, or “true worlds.” These “true worlds,”
or worlds behind the world, are the means by which the resentful ones revenge
themselves on life. This life, the only life we know, is judged by them and found wanting.
Nietzsche, however, learned to free himself from ressentiment by not reacting to his own
desire for revenge. Instead, he says, he learned simply to accept things as they were
whenever he found himself in this situation; he forbid himself the desire to react, ceasing
to struggle or to wish that things were otherwise. Later, when he had regained his health,
he says he was even more able to resist resentful feelings: “During periods of decadence I
forbade myself such feelings as harmful; as soon as my vitality was rich and proud
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enough again, I forbade myself such feelings as beneath me” (ibid.). Ressentiment just
makes the sick even worse, but Nietzsche’s fundamental health and vitality allowed him,
even in the worst cases, not to act on the promptings of ressentiment. His “philosophy”
has “seriously pursued the fight against vengefulness and rancor,” and this involved, he
claims, his own overcoming of the negative affects of ressentiment. For Nietzsche,
Socrates provides an illuminating contrast to his own practice, because Nietzsche wants
to interpret Socrates’ philosophical practice as through and through motivated by the
desire to take revenge on the world as it actually is. At the same time, as we have seen,
Nietzsche clearly identifies with Socrates in a significant way, saying that like Socrates
he too was occasionally a sick or décadent dialectician.
11. Nietzsche’s “dual ancestry.”— But if Nietzsche was sick just like Socrates, how
could he be any better than Socrates? Nietzsche answers that he had a countervailing
experience of health (Gesundheit). Although he clearly maintains the importance of
sickness in his life, Nietzsche argues that it is less fundamental than his experience of
health. “As summa summarum, I was healthy; as an angle, as a specialty, I was a
decadent” (EH “Wise” §2/KSA 6: 266). Nietzsche claims that he was, and is, basically
healthy, that health as he conceives it determined his basic outlook. It was this underlying
health that made even sickness an occasion for him to advance and improve himself and
his philosophy. The first two sections of “Why I Am So Wise” in particular establish
health and sickness as the basic points of reference in Nietzsche’s autobiography.
The first section of “Why I Am So Wise,” begins with Nietzsche meditating on
his relation to his parents and claiming that he himself is a mixture of the two opposing
qualities they represent. One parent represents ascent; the other, decline; and Nietzsche
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claims these two tendencies are counterbalanced in him. The passage is worth quoting in
full:
The good luck of my existence (meines Daseins), its singularity
(Einzigkeit) perhaps, lies in its undoing (Verhängnis): to express it in the
form of a riddle, I am already dead like my father, while, like my mother, I
still live and become old. This dual ancestry (diese doppelte Herkunft), at
the same time from the highest and the lowest rung on the ladder of life, at
once décadent and beginning – this, if anything at all, explains that
neutrality, that freedom from party in relation to the total problem of life
(im Verhältnis zum Gesammtprobleme des Lebens), which perhaps
distinguishes me. I have a finer nose for the signs of ascent and decline
than any person has ever had, I am the teacher par excellence with respect
to this,—I know both, I am both (ich kenne Beides, ich bin Beides)
(“Wise” §1/KSA 6: 264, my translation).
In light of Nietzsche’s other comments about his parents later in Ecce Homo, what he
says about them here is somewhat puzzling, and there seems to be some confusion
amongst scholars about how to interpret this riddle. This passage is usually, and I think
correctly, taken to imply that Nietzsche associates his father with death and decline and
his mother with ascent and life. In light of the positive tenor of his later comments about
his father, however, and the extremely scathing character of his later remarks about his
mother, what Nietzsche says about them here is actually rather riddling. Nietzsche
presents his father as a kind of otherworldly figure, “delicate, kind, and morbid,” “more a
gracious memory of life than life itself.” These qualities suggest the anti-natural
tendencies that Nietzsche associates with sickness, décadence, and “idealism.” His
mother, by contrast, however unsavory a figure, seems to symbolize for him rude health
and life. If his mother, along with his sister, is also “the greatest objection to ‘eternal
return,’” Nietzsche’s “truly abysmal thought,” then isn’t it clear that Nietzsche sides in a
definite sense with what his father represents, and therefore, with “death,” “decline,”
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“sickness,” and “decadence”? (EH “Wise” §3, Norman translation/KSA 6: 268).273
Nietzsche wants to show that, however much he may have overcome ressentiment and
“idealism” in his own life, he nevertheless cannot be properly understood without taking
into account these “sick” elements.
12. The revaluation of all values as a result of Nietzsche’s dual nature, and why there
may be a third in addition to the two.— The interplay of these two countervailing
experiences, sickness and health, in him is what Nietzsche says is decisive for the
particular kind of philosopher he has become. Most significantly he attributes his
invention of a revaluation of values to this interplay:
Looking from the sick-optic (Kranken-Optik) out toward healthier
concepts and values (gesünderen Begriffen und Werthen), and, vice versa,
looking again from out of the fullness and self-assurance of abundant life
(des reichen Lebens) back down into the furtive work of the décadenceinstinct – that was my longest practice (Übung), my authentic experience
(meine eigentliche Erfahrung), in which, if in anything, I became a master.
I now have ready at hand the ability to reverse perspectives (Perspektiven
umzustellen): first reason why perhaps a “revaluation of values”
(Umwerthung der Werthe) is possible for me alone (EH “Wise” §1/KSA
6: 266, my translation).
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A footnote is the proper place to discuss an issue that, from my point of view, is a side note,
though worth mentioning. Later, it is true, Nietzsche calls this idea of himself as a product of his
parents into question. This happens in the controversial third section of “Wise,” initially
suppressed by Nietzsche’s literary executors (in particular, Heinrich Köselitz and Elizabeth
Forster-Nietzsche, Nietzsche’s sister). This might appear to be one of the more “crazy” passages
of Ecce Homo, but, despite its undeniable metaphorical character, it seems intelligible and
sensible to me. The fact is, children are sometimes not very much like their parents at all, and it is
somewhat mysterious to us how natural talents and characters arise. Nietzsche writes (in Judith
Norman’s translation):
…people are least related to their parents: it would be the most extreme sign of
vulgarity to be related to your parents. Higher natures have their origins infinitely
further back; collecting, economizing, accumulating has gone on longest for their
sake. Great individuals are the oldest: I do not understand it, but Julius Caesar
could be my father – or Alexander, that Dionysus incarnate…
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Health and sickness, each one plays a dual role within this scheme, since healthy
concepts and values are the object of the Kranken-Optik, whereas the secretive workings
of the décadence-instinct are the object of the healthy perspective characterized by
abundant or overflowing life. Nietzsche claims that he has firsthand experience of seeing
things from these two perspectives and even that he is now able to adopt and reverse
these perspectives at will.
This passage and the surrounding text also suggests that Nietzsche has a third
perspective in addition to the perspectives of sickness and health, since he also knows
that he has these two perspectives and can adopt them at will. Gary Shapiro does a good
job of calling attention to this feature of Nietzsche’s argument, writing that Nietzsche’s
“rhetoric in the long discussion of his doubleness emphasizes that he knows his
doubleness; the knowing subject then stands outside the system of doubles…Nietzsche
claims not only to have an unusual system of multiple perspectives available to him but
to be in a position (to have a metaperspective) that allows him to play upon this system”
(Shapiro 1989, p. 150). Nietzsche therefore has at least two main perspectives and
possibly a third from which to view things, and his philosophy is consequently
determined by these two, or rather three, perspectives.
The key point to grasp in this connection, however, is that Nietzsche sees himself
as different from Socrates, because he is not only, or even primarily, a décadent.
Nietzsche claims that he is something else, and that what he is depends upon a certain
“physiological presupposition,” which he calls die grosse Gesundheit, “the great health”
(KSA 6: 337). This is also the presupposition of Nietzsche’s creation, Zarathustra, with
whom Nietzsche strongly identifies. Like Zarathustra, Nietzsche “says no and does no to
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an unheard-of degree, to everything to which one has so far said yes,” and yet, at the
same time, he is “the opposite of a no-saying spirit” (EH “TSZ” §6).
The alternative to Socratic philosophy is Nietzschean philosophy, and the
difference between them is that, whereas the Socratic philosophy is dialectical and based
on ressentiment, the Nietzschean philosophy is also creative, affirmative, and fully
expressive. This “also” is crucial, and it would be a great mistake to believe that
Nietzsche’s thought and writings are devoid of the Socratic element. On the contrary, the
whole argument of Ecce Homo tends to show how Nietzsche understands Socratic
philosophy as a part of Nietzschean philosophy. In other words, the Nietzschean
philosophy encompasses the Socratic philosophy, just as the great health includes
sickness. This coupling of “antipodes” also points to the final synthesis in Ecce Homo,
signified by the phrase: “Dionysus versus the Crucified.” The formula for Nietzsche
himself is “Dionysus versus the Crucified,” and though the Dionysian element
predominates, and Nietzsche of course in some sense prefers it, the Crucified
nevertheless symbolizes an essential element of Nietzsche’s character. Like his father,
like sickness or décadence, and like Socrates, “the Crucified” is an indispensible element
in the totality signified by “Nietzsche.”
13.

Overcoming pessimism.—Commenting on the role of sickness and health in

Nietzsche’s thought, Jaspers writes that “Nietzsche comprehends his own illness as a
symptom of the very great health which vanquishes everything.”274 Nietzsche’s concept
of health, it should be clear, is also central to my interpretation. Nietzsche himself,
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Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of his Philosophical Activity,
trans. Charles F. Wallraff and Frederick J. Schmitz (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965),
p. 115.
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attempting to characterize his kind of health, talks about how for a fundamentally healthy
person like him even sickness can be an incentive to life:
A typically morbid being cannot become healthy, much less make itself
healthy. For a typically healthy person, conversely, being sick can even
become an energetic stimulus for life, for living more. This, in fact, is how
that long period of sickness appears to me now: as it were, I discovered
life anew, including myself; I tasted all good and even little things, as
others cannot easily taste them—I turned my will to health, to life, into a
philosophy (EH “Wise” §2/KSA 6: 266-267).
Like the phoenix that rises from the ashes, Nietzsche emerges from his sickness a new
man bearing a new will to life and a new philosophy.275 Nietzsche’s long illness provided
the occasion for his underlying health to come into action, and this had a major effect on
his entire philosophical outlook.
The above passage continues: “it was during the years of my lowest vitality that I
ceased to be a pessimist; the instinct of self-restoration (der Instinkt der SelbstWiederherstellung) forbade me a philosophy of poverty and discouragement.” The
reference is of course primarily to Schopenhauer’s philosophy, which culminates in an
ideal figure of the ascetic who denies her will to live. As is well known, Nietzsche as a
young man became an adherent of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, and in Ecce Homo he
claims, among other things, that “atheism led (him) to Schopenhauer” (EH “UM” §2).
Ultimately, however, Nietzsche rejected Schopenhauer’s philosophy because it says “no”
to life, or at least strongly suggests this “no”:
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Nietzsche actually signed at least one letter, to Köselitz (Dec. 9, 1888), “Phönix.” See
Middleton 1996, pp. 331-333/CM Nietzsche Briefwechsel, 3rd part, volume 5 (Walter de Gruyter
1984), pp. 513-515.
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Perhaps at the end of his life, no man, if he be sincere and at the same time
in possession of his faculties, will ever wish to go through it again. Rather
than this, he will much prefer to choose complete non-existence.276
Prior to his illness, Nietzsche had accepted this “no.” His long illness, however, forbid
him this answer to the problem of life, and it activated his healthy instincts that helped
him to form a philosophy entirely antithetical to Schopenhauer’s. Nietzsche claims that
his fundamental healthiness voted against this pessimism. The new philosophy that
emerges is, by contrast, animated by a supreme “yes-saying pathos” (EH “TSZ” §1) It is
a philosophy that loves fate, that wills the eternal recurrence. Nietzsche expresses the
core of his new philosophy in the last section of “Why I Am So Clever”:
My formula for greatness in a human being is amor fati: that one wants
nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all in eternity.
Not merely bear what is necessary, still less conceal it—all idealism is
mendaciousness (Verlogenheit) in the face of what is necessary—but love
it (EH “Clever” §10/KSA 6: 297)
What, however, does Nietzsche understand by this health that allows him to make even
sickness as occasion for philosophical progress? Although Nietzsche discusses various
characteristics of his health in “Why I Am So Wise,” the most significant passage
pertaining to health comes when, in his discussion of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche
reproduces in slightly altered form section 382 of The Gay Science, which is entitled
“The great health (die grosse Gesundheit).”
Whoever has a soul that craves to have experienced the whole range of
values and desiderata to date (bisherigen Werthe und Wünschbarkeiten)…
whoever wants to know from the adventures of his own most authentic
experience (aus den Abenteuern der eigensten Erfahrung) how a
discoverer and conqueror of the ideal feels, and also an artist, a saint, a
legislator, a sage, a scholar, a pious man, and one who stands divinely
apart in the old style—needs one thing above all else: the great health
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Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, vol. 1, trans. E. F. J. Payne (New
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276

(die grosse Gesundheit)—that one does not merely have but also acquires
continually, and must acquire because one gives it up again and again, and
must give it up (EH “TSZ” §2/KSA 6: 337-338).
The great health allows one to experience multiple becomings, multiple values, and
multiple perspectives. It gives one insight into what Nietzsche regards as the highest
human types and hence contributes to the comprehensiveness of Nietzsche’s
understanding of humanlife in all its diverse manifestations and turns.
14. How oddly one becomes what one is.— In order to grasp the novelty of Nietzsche’s
understanding of how one becomes oneself, it is necessary to see how, for him, the task
of becoming what one is differs significantly from the project of pursuing self-knowledge
as traditionally conceived by the Socratic-Platonic tradition. Self-knowledge for
Nietzsche doesn’t mean to know oneself as mind or soul, but rather to know oneself as an
individual. In this sense, there is a certain tension between knowing oneself and
becoming oneself. Ultimately Nietzsche thinks that self-becoming may converge with
self-knowledge, but there are significant differences between the two conditions (i.e.,
insofar as one can speak of becoming as a condition). Here we come face to face with one
of the most paradoxical arguments in Ecce Homo. Not only is becoming-oneself different
from self-knowledge, but Nietzsche claims that self-knowledge is, at least for a time,
inimical to the project of becoming oneself. In other words, Nietzsche argues that
becoming what one is requires, not knowledge, but rather a veil of ignorance about what
one is, at least for a time. This “at least for a time” is an important qualification, because
Nietzsche maintains that at some point the veil does (and perhaps must) drop, and a kind
of self-knowledge emerges. At least this is how he says things happened for him in his
own life.
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Since Nietzsche’s argument here is paradoxical but extremely important for his
program of becoming-oneself, it is necessary to consider it closely and by stages.
Nietzsche initially characterizes his teaching about self-becoming by drawing the contrast
with self-knowledge in strong terms:
For let us assume that the task, the destiny, the fate of the task transcends
the average very significantly: in that case, nothing could be more
dangerous than catching sight of oneself with this task. To become what
one is, one must not have the faintest notion what one is (Dass man wird,
was man ist, setzt voraus, dass man nicht im Entferntesten ahnt, was man
ist). (EH “Clever” §9/KSA 6: 293).
This passage lays out the basic thesis that Nietzsche wants to defend, and I want to note a
few things in particular. Nietzsche claims that this teaching is especially relevant for
extraordinary types like him, which raises the question whether Nietzsche’s conception of
becoming-oneself is really applicable to the majority of people. This question must
remain open, though there are many suggestions in Nietzsche’s corpus that he shares the
widely held and time-honored belief that only a select group of people have the stuff to
become philosophers and artists (to say nothing of the saints).277 He furthermore sets selfknowledge and self-becoming in opposition to each other, which raises a question about
how this opposition is to be understood. What does it mean to say that ignorance is
essential in order for someone with an extraordinary task to become who she is? It seems
strange to think of ignorance being helpful in any context, much less where one’s entire
humanlife is at stake. Nietzsche, however, seems to see this ignorance about oneself as
serving a protective function, and he claims that it is dangerous to get sight of one’s task
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One of the great questions of philosophy, rarely asked, is the question to what extent all human
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common people for answers to the great questions?) The tradition seems to assume that natural
talent for philosophy is as rare as natural talent for basketball or golf, if not rarer.
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too early. In his own case, if he had known his task too early he might never have become
a scholar, a Schopenhauerian, a friend of Wagner, and so forth. He would have avoided,
in other words, all those things that from the point of view of his task were blunders. Yet
these blunders, he wants to say, were ultimately instructive and hence beneficial for his
task. He continues:
From this point of view even the blunders of life have their own meaning
and value—the occasional side roads and wrong roads, the delays,
“modesties,” seriousness wasted on tasks that are remote from the task
(der Aufgabe). All this can express a great Klugheit, even the supreme
Klugheit: where nosce te ipsum would be the recipe for ruin, forgetting
oneself, misunderstanding oneself, making oneself smaller, narrower,
mediocre, become reason itself. Morally speaking: neighbor love, living
for others, and other things can be a protective measure for preserving the
hardest self-concern (Selbstigkeit). This is the exception where, against my
wont and conviction, I side with the “selfless” drives (der “selbstlosen”
Triebe): here they work in the service of self-love (Selbstsucht), of selfdiscipline (Selbstzucht).
Here Nietzsche appears to reverse one of his key positions in a surprising way, arguing
that selflessness has a positive value. This positive value, however, is directly
proportionate to the extent that selflessness (Selbstlosigkeit) serves selfishness
(Selbstsucht). This last qualification is crucial; Nietzsche is not actually reversing his
position but is rather nuancing it in an interesting way. Forgetting oneself can be selfserving in some situations, as in the case where one commits blunders from the point of
view of one’s task, which nevertheless end up serving that task. Nietzsche’s argument
about the way this is supposed to work, however, raises a number of questions. For
example, how is one supposed to distinguish between simple selflessness and selflessness
that is in the service of self-seeking?278 And assuming one is pursuing this selfless route
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to self, how does it come about that at some time the veils fall, revealing the real task?
Lastly, readers might also wonder about the invitation to think of a life as having only
one, primary task. Why not two, or three, or multiple tasks? What is clear is that
Nietzsche has come to think of his life as being to dedicated to one task above all, and
this is the task that in Ecce Homo he names “revaluation of all values.”
15. Have I been understood?— Ecce Homo ends in a curious way. On its surface, the
last chapter, “Why I Am a Destiny (Warum ich ein Schicksal bin),” might appear
excessively bombastic, full of self-adulation and invective against Christianity. Beneath
the appearance, however, it is possible to see that Nietzsche is progressively moving
toward a concentration of himself and his philosophy into a single formula. In this last
chapter, Nietzsche announces the birth of great politics (grosse Politik); claims he is “the
first immoralist;” and submits that he, like Socrates or Jesus, breaks the history of
humanity in two. We need an entirely new calendar after Nietzsche to reflect this decisive
break.279 The negation of Christian morality and “the good human being” mark the
beginning of a new epoch. Prior to Nietzsche, no one recognized that what was valued
most highly were counter-concepts to life. His psychological insight into the dark places
of Christianity distinguishes him from the whole of humanity hitherto. Nietzsche has
uncovered the secret motivations of what he calls “the crime against life” (EH “Destiny”
§7). “There was no psychology at all before me,” he says.
It is always necessary to remember that in Nietzsche’s discourse, Christianity
appears both as itself and as a symbol of a more fundamental trend, which Nietzsche
links with numerous other things, including Platonism, the pessimistic philosophy of
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appended to The Antichrist/KSA 6: 254. An English translation can be found in Norman 2005,
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Schopenhauer, and to some extent Judaism.280 What these belief systems have in common
is that they are all expressions of “antinature (Widernatur)” and “the unselfing-morality
(die Entselbstungs-Moral).” They are moralisms that teach a moral world order, an
ontological and/or theological order that subtends the world as we actually experience it.
The emergence of the “great politics” hinges on the rejection of these nihilistic belief
systems, which harm life by occluding the real task of our earthly existence. Nietzsche
blames the idea of a world behind the world for poisoning the human relation to life. He
enumerates a list of concepts associated with the anti-nature belief system and contrasts
them with considerations to which he assigns real importance for humanlife:
The concept of “God” invented as a counterconcept of life (als GegensatzBegriff zum Leben)—everything harmful, poisonous, slanderous, the
whole hostility unto death against life (gegen das Leben) synthesized in
this concept in a gruesome unity! The concept of the “beyond,” the “true
world” invented in order to devaluate the only world there is—in order
to retain no goal, no reason, no task for our earthly reality (keine
Aufgabe für unsre Erden-Realität)! The concept of the “soul,” the “spirit,”
finally even “immortal soul,” invented in order to despise the body, to
make it sick, “holy;” to oppose with a ghastly levity everything that
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Can one lump Judaism in with Christianity, Plato, et al.? Nietzsche’s attitude to Judaism is
rather complex: certainly he believes that there is an ancient war between Judea and Rome, and
that Christianity was the Jewish Trojan horse that destroyed the pagan empire, but he also
respects Judaism as Judaism, much in the way that Gibbon says the Romans respected it, i.e., as
an ancient and hence noble tradition (as compared with the Christians, whom the Romans viewed
as truly “crazy”). On the opposition between Judea and Rome, see GM, First Essay §16. For the
idea of Christianity as an extension of Judaism, see, for example, GS §137, A §44. Nietzsche also
interprets Christianity as Paul’s revenge against Jewish law; see D §68. For Nietzsche’s view on
Jewish conceptions of death, as opposed both to pagan and to Christian ones, see D §72.
Nietzsche expresses respect for the Hebrew Scriptures. And, indeed, who is a more “Nietzschean”
figure than that poet, warrior, dancer, and occasional murderer, David? Nietzsche’s thought about
contemporary European Jewry, meanwhile, is complex, but by no means wholly or even mostly
negative. See especially D §205 and BGE sections 250 and 251. Nietzsche found German antiSemitism disgusting, a fact Walter Kaufmann was careful to emphasize in his interpretation of
Nietzsche. The Nazi appropriation of Nietzsche naturally raised the question is Nietzsche a racist.
In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche describes the German anti-Semite as an “abortion (Missgeburt)” (EH
HAH §2). See also EH “The Case of Wagner,” sections 1 and 2. It is nonetheless undeniable that
in GM the “slave rebellion in morality (Sklavenaufstand in der Moral)” is prominently linked
with the Jews.
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deserves to be taken seriously in life, the questions of nourishment, abode,
spiritual diet (geistiger Diät), treatment of the sick, cleanliness, and
weather (EH “Destiny” §8/KSA 6: 373-374, bold text = my emphasis).
In his own life, Nietzsche’s sickness woke him from his “idealistic” slumber, causing him
to realize what he now claims is truly important in life: the questions of nourishment,
living arrangements, place, climate, and recreation. To this list, he now adds “the
treatment of the sick” and “cleanliness” (actually very Cartesian concerns). Nietzsche
wants to redirect human concern to “the only world there is,” and he wants us to focus
our energies on forming a goal, reason, and task “for our earthly existence.” The old
politics gained support from anti-natural, otherworldly belief-systems, teaching humans
that they had a preestablished place in a preestablished cosmic order. The laws of the
community drew power from this cosmic phantasmagoria as well, which lent force to the
project of subordinating individual interests to communal ones. This is why “great
politics” begins with Nietzsche, because now humanity will have to work out its destiny
in the absence of such cosmic supports and in the light of Nietzsche’s philosophy that
seriously calls into question the authority of any community. On what basis could
individuals now be persuaded to subordinate their interests to those of a community?
The question—Hat man mich verstanden?—recurs like a refrain at the head of
each of the last three sections of Ecce Homo. Has one understood me? Nietzsche asks.
We as readers will have understood him when we have grasped the meaning of his final
formula for himself, “Dionysus versus the Crucified.”
Having first studied the roles of sickness and health in Nietzsche’s life story, and
second, having considered the problem of how one becomes what one is in relation to
ignorance about what one is, we are now in a position to gather together a discourse
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about how, exactly, Ecce Homo can be understood as a philosophical autobiography and
in terms of what it contributes to our understanding of Nietzsche’s philosophy. In Ecce
Homo, Nietzsche presents ultimate philosophical principles and an exemplary
philosophical life, and the principle that he wants to prove above all is that a revaluation
of all values is both possible and desirable at this point in human history. Nietzsche says,
“Revaluation of all values: that is my formula for an act of supreme self-examination on
the part of humanity, become flesh and genius in me” (EH “Destiny” §1). A revaluation
of values is possible because Nietzsche has already accomplished it, and it is desirable
because of what Nietzsche claims his experiences and investigations have taught him,
namely, that humanity has been misguided up until now and that, consequently, we
haven’t yet given serious thought to what kinds of goals we might formulate for our
earthly reality.
The experience of sickness played a crucial role in Nietzsche’s life because it
compelled him to look at his life anew and to think about how he was living. Sickness or
décadence was his “angle,” his specialty; it introduced an element of distance into his
thought, giving Nietzsche a new perspective from which to view things. It alienated him
from the beliefs and practices that had hitherto determined his life, and Nietzsche
suggests that such distance and alienation is, at least at some point, necessary for
philosophy to emerge. The hammer has to be broken for us to begin reflecting on it.
Nietzsche is perhaps the first in a line of near-contemporary philosophers who
view philosophizing itself as either an illness or a symptom of illness (e.g., Rosenzweig,
Wittgenstein, etc.). One should contrast this perhaps uniquely modern (or even
postmodern) view with the traditional view that, though humanity may be sick,
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philosophy is not a symptom of the illness but rather a means to its cure. From Plato to
Boethius to Hegel, so many philosophers thought that humans were fallen, but that
philosophy, far from being a symptom of this fallen condition, was its cure. But be that as
it may, there is something to be said for the idea that philosophy emerges (historically)
only when something has gone wrong. Now, whether it is sickness or some other
experience (or experiences), something has to enter in to the life of the philosopher in
order to disrupt her life as a happy, healthy animal, a “good cow.”
On Nietzsche’s account, and based on his personal experience, something has to
go wrong in order for questioning to begin. As Nietzsche writes in The Gay Science,
“pain always raises the question about its origin while pleasure is inclined to stop with
itself without looking back” (GS §13). If this is so, then perhaps philosophy truly does
begin with a wound and pain. This can’t be the whole story, however. For pain is
universal to the human condition, and if there really are happy, healthy humans, then they
are happy and healthy despite the presence of pain and not as a result of its complete
absence. Are those who become philosophers simply more sensitive to pain?
But sickness or whatever it is that introduces the negative, and hence distance, is
not the end of the story for Nietzsche. Becoming a philosopher in Nietzsche’s sense of
the term also requires overcoming sickness, requires health and, indeed, “the great
health,” as its true foundation. His philosophy is not so much the symptom of an illness,
as it is the expression of a very great health.
16. Bejahung (affirmation).— The interpretation of Ecce Homo presented here gives
readers of Nietzsche a heuristic tool or method for approaching Nietzsche’s texts. We are
now in a position to see that we may always address Nietzsche’s texts with the question,
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which of the two (or three) Nietzsches is speaking in a given context? Is it the Nietzsche
who speaks from the point of view of sickness? Or the one who speaks from the point of
view of health? Or is it perhaps the third Nietzsche, the one who can take an overarching
view of the two tendencies in their difference and productive tension? Perhaps it is this
last one that is the most Nietzsche of all, assuming that there is some third position in life
outside of those Nietzsche identifies with sickness and health. What Nietzsche seems to
suggest is that the great health is different from what we might call normal health, since
the great health includes sickness, and indeed cannot dispense with it in order to become
what it is.
For various reasons, Nietzsche’s autobiography has not commanded the attention
it deserves, especially among Nietzsche scholars (with some exceptions). This neglect is
unfortunate because, studying Ecce Homo, one can become aware of the inadequacy and
incoherence of the predominant interpretations of Nietzsche of the past hundred and some
odd years. The will to power concept, so central to the interpretations of Heidegger,
Kaufmann, and others, hardly figures at all in Ecce Homo, and in one case the reference
is purely negative. Nietzsche does not present himself as a metaphysician, but rather as a
psychologist and a new kind of philosopher. Meanwhile, the idea that Nietzsche’s
repudiation of Christianity and Platonism is somehow unequivocal appears extremely
dubious in light of Ecce Homo. By his own insistence, sickness, anti-nature, and
décadence, as well as all the perspectives associated with these states, played an
indispensible formative role in his own becoming. The Dionysian logic, or the logic of
amor fati, has to affirm these negative states, has to affirm the necessity of JudeoChristianity, Platonism, Schopenhauer in the history of humankind, just as Nietzsche
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himself affirms the role of sickness, décadence, decline, corruption, ressentiment,
pessimism, and so forth in his own life and becoming. Nietzsche, it is worth
remembering, only attacks things as a sign of good will (ein Beweis des Wohlwollens)
(EH “Wise” §7/KSA 6: 274-275). It would seem to follow that he possesses a
tremendous fund of good will where sickness and its various expressions are concerned.
Ecce Homo also concerns the question of how one becomes what one is in
general. This raises the question whether, and if so, to what extent, Nietzsche considers
his own life and becoming to be exemplary for others. As noted above, there seems to be
a paradox here, because to the extent that one becomes oneself, one becomes like
Nietzsche as well. This paradox, however, is only apparent. For, assuming there are
individuals very different from Nietzsche (psychologically, in their tastes, and so forth),
their becoming will only resemble his insofar as it is unique and therefore on some level
incomparable.
But what if the basic opposition that Nietzsche identifies in himself is actually
definitive of human nature and human history, so that no one, however fully realized and
unique, escapes a choice in this regard? In the last chapter of Ecce Homo, “Why I Am a
Destiny” (Warum ich ein Schicksal bin), Nietzsche contends that the conflict he
represents will be decisive for the future of humanity, that with him “great politics”
begins. Does he mean, perhaps, that each of us might, and perhaps must, recognize this
conflict in herself or himself, and that the battles of the future he claims to foresee are to
take place within each of us, in the struggle between the health that affirms life and the
sickness that wills the nothing? Perhaps the “great politics” is great precisely because it
concerns this struggle that inheres in each particular individual. And yet, were this so, it
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would remain unclear whether, for Nietzsche, anyone has a choice in the matter. We
become who we are, he says, precisely in ignorance of who we are, and it appears that for
him there is no other way for us to become. Yet despite all this, and perhaps even because
of it, one must choose. For just as Socrates chose to devote his life to the investigation of
being in speeches; and Augustine to dedicate his life to a being called god; and just as
Descartes chose to turn within himself to look for truth; and Vico to seek the causes of
things in history; and, finally, just as Nietzsche himself made a decision against
everything in him that longed for a world beyond the world; so, too, each of us may come
to choose about the most important things (including, of course, about what the most
important things are). In the course of a long search for truth, one opens, hopefully, to a
certain event of mind, to a moment in which, to paraphrase a consummate Platonist, the
object of our search is illuminated (Seventh Letter, 344b) and we see an unprecedented
truth that we may call starting point, principle, beginning, ἀρχή. Then, in that moment,
there would truly be something there for us to grasp and found our lives on, and we
would have a choice between acceptance and refusal. And even were we to decline the
choice, we would nonetheless choose. For, as Yancy (2002, p. xxvi) puts it, “to remain
neutral is itself already a choice.”
According to Nietzsche, the moments that call for philosophical judgment may
eternally recur.
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